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The goal of this dissertation is to understand how the rhetoric used by 
Rousseau in his works about the origin of human language (the Discourse on the 
Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men and the Essay on the Origin of 
Languages) is compatible with the philosophical meaning of these works. This will 
only sound tautological to readers unfamiliar with the inherent difficulties in 
Rousseau’s writing. The difficulties are rhetorical because the ambiguous character 
of his writing raises the question of whom Rousseau wants to persuade about what. 
Some interpreters have dismissed Rousseau’s mode of writing as simply 
problematic or contradictory, refusing to acknowledge the existence of a double 
teaching hidden in his rhetoric, probably under the impression that such a thing 
would be incompatible with his democratic politics. Others have perceived the 
ambivalent character of his texts, but have taken that ambivalence to be a goal in 
itself, therefore interpreting Rousseau’s rhetoric as a merely diffusive linguistic 
artifice. The interpretations put forward in this dissertation will show that both these 
positions are wrong. Our readings will show instead that not only is Rousseau’s 
mode of writing neither accidental nor idiosyncratic, but also that his rhetoric is 
never diffusive, but always purposeful. We will claim that the ambivalences found 
in his work are subservient to the different “philosophical” views that he offers to 
the different types of readers he addresses. The complexity of his rhetoric lies, 
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therefore, in the mélange between what is persuasion and what is argument in his 
texts. To unravel this mélange is to articulate Rousseau’s philosophical discourse or, 
what we prefer to call, his philosophical rhetoric. 
The originality of this thesis lies in the attempt to explain, or better said, 
illustrate, the logic behind Rousseau’s writing strategy, an effort not found in other 
studies dedicated to Rousseau’s mode of writing.1 The questions that will guide our 
research are the following: is Rousseau’s account of the origin of speech related to 
his own use of discursive language? And is his discursive language, i.e. his rhetoric, 
related to the political paradox regarding inequality at stake in the Second 
Discourse? By exposing these relations we should be able to articulate the more 
fundamental relation between the nature of speech and politics in Rousseau. That, I 
believe, is the source for the fundamental ambivalences in his thought, namely, the 
ones between democracy and aristocracy, materialism and dualism, poetry and 
philosophy. The key to reconciling these apparent oppositions is in the 
interpretation of the images, the vocabulary, and the enigmatic constructions that 
constitute Rousseau’s rhetorical strategy. This interpretation should allow us, as 
such, to access what Rousseau “says without saying” about the nature of speech and 
politics. Through it we shall see that Rousseau’s mode of writing is one with his 
system: his rhetorical strategy echoes his conclusions, on the one hand, about the 
powers that distinguish human beings from beasts, and on the other, about the 
inequalities, both natural and contingent, that issue from these powers and that 
distinguish one human being from another.  
                                                
1 Other than the works by Derrida and de Man, the works by R. Masters, R. Wokler, C. Kelly,  
V. Gourevitch, and R. Velkley to be cited below are among the main sources for this question.   
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In the first half of this dissertation, we will focus on the question of the 
origin of languages in Rousseau. In order to contextualize our interpretation and 
better introduce our subject, we will depart from Derrida’s critique of the 
metaphysics of presence that, as he sees, determines Rousseau’s thought. I will 
show that deconstruction misses the deeper sense of the question of pure presence in 
Rousseau and the related issue of the origin of languages. Derrida stops at the only 
apparent essentialism in Rousseau for, among other things, not considering correctly 
the relation between Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages and the account 
of that origin in the Second Discourse. We will first show how deconstruction is 
grounded on an interpretation of Rousseau that fails to grasp the complex sense of 
his rhetoric; we will then see how in the texts on the origin of languages, 
Rousseau’s rhetoric hides the inextricable relation that Derrida – but also Paul de 
Man, in the critique of his mentor – fails to see, namely, the relation between the 
powers that distinguish human beings from beasts.  
As Rousseau tells us in the Second Discourse, these powers are the capacity 
to form general ideas (the implicit condition for speech) and the capacity to be a 
free agent. But if speech and freedom are, for Rousseau, inextricably related, for 
Derrida, freedom only seems to be possible as the result of the destruction of speech 
as presence, i.e. as the result of the endless play between “writing” 
(“supplementarity”) and speech (presence), and the endless transformations of 
meanings produced by this play. For Rousseau, however, the tendency of speech to 
become dogmatic (i.e. to create the illusion of pure presence) does not destroy the 
common ground for language shared by all human beings. Rousseau’s speculations 
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on this subject imply a subtle notion missed by his critics. It is through the 
universality of the passions that, through the long transition from an animal to a 
human state, the communication among the first human individuals became 
possible. Hence, before becoming victims of the innumerable and inevitable errors 
that appeared with conventional languages – among which are indeed the illusions 
of self-presence denounced by Derrida – human beings shared at their origins the 
capacity to form and communicate ideas of their passions and of anything that at 
any given point became part of the external and internal formation of the species. It 
is through this elementary power to form and communicate these first self-reflective 
general ideas that the first human beings acquired the capacity to be free agents: “to 
recognize themselves as free to acquiesce or resist,” as Rousseau says in the Second 
Discourse, to what was previously a purely instinctive and unreflective command. 
For Rousseau it is thus this individual capacity to reflect on the general sense of 
their passions and faculties that distinguishes human freedom from animal freedom, 
and that allows the first human beings to start transforming their world with new 
meanings, conventions, and generalizations. 
Both Derrida’s and de Man’s shortcomings can help put in evidence the 
relation between Rousseau’s rhetoric and what he has to say about language. While 
wanting, as the deconstructionists, to expose the artificial nature of reason, 
Rousseau entices us to go beyond what for many (certainly for Derrida and de Man) 
stands as the threshold of intelligibility. In order to understand the specificity of 
human communication, intelligence, and language, he takes an unprecedented 
approach to “the study of man” by considering the “state of nature” in its most 
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radical sense; his inquiry on the origin of speech is also a speculation on the mental 
transformations that might have determined the biological beginning of humankind. 
The notion that Rousseau’s speculation presupposes the evolution, or as he says, 
“progress,” of the species in terms of both the external and the internal formation of 
its individuals, will be crucial for our argument. We will see how his own use of 
language, i.e. his philosophical rhetoric, is to a great extent dependent on his 
account of how the basic human faculties, which cannot be merely considered as the 
natural response to a concrete need of adaptation, developed and were perfected.  
In the second half of the dissertation, we will show that Rousseau’s account 
of the origins in the Second Discourse presents a political problem, which will be 
the main reason for Rousseau’s rhetorical strategy. There we will explore the 
conclusions of Part One, or better said, the main consequence of Rousseau’s 
discussion of the origin of languages. If the origins of human freedom, speech, and 
inequality are inter-related, and if Rousseau’s evolutionary treatment of the “state of 
nature” leads us to assume the development of freedom, speech, and inequality as 
the development of the distinctive human traits, then Rousseau’s treatment of the 
current meaning of these things must be studied accordingly. Rousseau’s discourses 
on what it means to be free and on whether intellectual inequalities are conventional 
or natural must be articulated by taking into account the imperfection that, as we 
will argue in Part One, has always characterized human communication. Rousseau’s 
own use of language seems to be predicated on his insights about human language in 
general. According to him, the more human language developed, the more human 
beings could agree about their particular experiences; however, the more abstract 
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language became (i.e. the more general terms became necessary), the more 
dogmatic human beings became. Rousseau assumes in his account of the origin of 
languages that, at this stage of the human species, abstract notions had to be adopted 
dogmatically as part of the natural dynamics of human communication, as if the 
pressure for the dissemination of certain terms were always prevalent over the 
reflection needed to the understanding of those terms. As Rousseau describes in Part 
Two of the Second Discourse, it was with the appearance of politics that the 
distance between individuals concerning the intelligibility of certain concepts (such 
as, for instance, freedom and justice) reached a climax.  
Rousseau devises his rhetorical strategy with this political disparity in mind: 
if humanity starts with and develops itself through an inequality of powers (an 
inequality which is manifested both physically and intellectually, namely, also 
through the use of language) how can we conciliate the meritocratic or aristocratic 
politics which would in principle result from these natural inequalities, with the 
democratic imperative of the general will? We will show how this political riddle 
permeates the Second Discourse, with an interpretation of Rousseau’s prelude to the 
book, his Epistle Dedicatory. It is here where we will find the opposition that 
conditions Rousseau’s philosophical rhetoric and that can dissolve, or place under a 
different light, what is often perceived as the doctrinarian sense of his political 
thought. The opposition – to which Rousseau alludes already in the epigraph to the 
Second Discourse taken from Aristotle’s Politics – is the one between the types of 
individual wills or dispositions that, in general, mark the difference between human 
beings who are willing to be ruled and those who desire to rule. A close reading of 
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the Epistle Dedicatory allows us to explore the question of sovereignty – the 
undivided sovereignty of the general will – from a different angle than that found in 
Rousseau’s Social Contract (we will also return to this question in the Appendix to 
this work), for allowing us to draw a clear distinction between a political 
(egalitarian) and a philosophical (non-egalitarian) sense of freedom. These 
oppositions are, however, far from being explicit in the text and can only appear 
through an approach to Rousseau’s rhetoric that should become clear in the first part 
of this work. In a substantial portion of the second part, we will illustrate the 
political sense of Rousseau’s rhetoric with an analysis of the first note to the book 
dedicated to Herodotus and of the Machiavellian element in the Epistle Dedicatory. 
In our last chapter, we will return to the philosophical principles that 
coordinate Rousseau’s rhetoric. We will expand on the relation between human 
freedom and the origin of languages, by focusing on the faculty responsible for 
human perfectibility and thus responsible for what Rousseau calls the main 
difference between human beings and other animals. This faculty, imagination, 
assumes both a productive and cognitive character in Rousseau. This character 
marks perhaps the greatest theoretical difference between Rousseau and his 
opponents. We will see that the neglected difference between Rousseau and 
Condillac on this point becomes emblematic of Rousseau’s revolutionary approach.  
We will lastly consider the epigraph to the Second Discourse. The political 
opposition between rulers and ruled – the topic of the discussion from which 
Aristotle’s passage is taken – is ultimately what determines Rousseau’s odd 
rhetorical strategy. Thus, even before we start with the Epistle Dedicatory, we find 
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already in the epigraph the context for Rousseau’s discussion of natural inequality 
and, thus, the context for his discussion, in the main text of the Second Discourse, 
of the principles that ultimately determine his political philosophy. Aristotle’s 
treatment of the natural inequality between rulers and ruled addresses precisely the 
question of the political necessity of democracy at stake for Rousseau; it also sets 










Rousseau’s Self-Presence. Derrida on the Origin of Languages. 
 
1. In Of Grammatology, Rousseau is used as the paradigm for what Jacques 
Derrida calls “Western logocentrism.” In Rousseau we would find the culmination 
of the metaphysics of presence that started with Plato.1 Derrida wants to reveal what 
he sees as the main dogma of that tradition, namely, the notion that meaning in 
general can be derived from a universal account of human nature or nature tout 
court. As Paul de Man puts it, for Derrida, 
 Rousseau (...) is governed by a tradition that defines Western thought 
in its entirety: the conception of all negativity (non-being) as absence 
and hence the possibility of an appropriation or a reappropriation of 
being (in the form of truth, of authenticity, of nature, etc.) as 
presence.2  
 
Derrida sees this “appropriation of being” as an egoic utterance of one’s own voice 
(in the literal sense of the word), a voice isolated, as it were, from what is outside 
                                                
1 Derrida, Of Grammatology, translation by G. C. Spivak, Johns Hopkins (1976), pp. 97, 162, 167, 
246, 301 and 315. Henceforth, Gramm. 
2 De Man, Blindness and Insight, Methuen (1983), p.114. 
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that ego, namely, the externality of what is taken as reality. Still in the words of de 
Man, 
this ontological assumption both conditions and depends on a certain 
conception of language that favors oral language or voice over written 
language (écriture) in terms of presence and distance: the unmediated 
presence of the self to its own voice as opposed to the reflective 
distance that separates this self from the written world.3 
 
The problem, for Derrida, is that it is externality that, ultimately, powers the voice; 
for him, an individual will is always determined by the context within which the 
individual exists. For Derrida, the power of reification self-ascribed by one’s own 
voice or speech is the source of all dogmatic conceptualizations that characterize 
Western thought. This permanent attempt to enact self-presence is nothing but the 
failure of human beings to start with and be guided by otherness or difference: by 
what is already there on the canvas of externatily. 
In his book, Derrida prefaces his account of Rousseau’s Essay on the origin 
of languages with a whole chapter dedicated to one of Rousseau’s most influential 
readers of the last century, Claude Lévi-Strauss. He seems to justify his choice of 
Rousseau by first confronting one possible interpretation of Rousseau and only then 
Rousseau’s text, almost as if Lévi-Strauss’ interpretation should serve as the 
introduction to Rousseau’s thoughts on language, and not the other way around. It is 
not clear whether Derrida really believed that Lévi-Strauss’ reading was 
representative of Rousseau to the point that it could be used as an introduction to 
Rousseau, or whether he forced a pre-conditioned interpretation of Rousseau that 
would not resist a more serious comparison between the philosopher and the 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
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anthropologist. The latter possibility is suggested by the way Derrida ends his 
book:4 what Rousseau gives as “dream,” Lévi-Strauss takes as the truth. Yet in light 
of what came before in Derrida’s account, his closing remarks cannot be taken very 
seriously.5 Although whether Rousseau would ultimately side with Lévi-Strauss or 
with him does not change Derrida’s points about language and his deconstructive 
rhetoric as a whole, the distinction would open a third possibility that apparently 
was not considered by deconstruction: the possibility that Rousseau would have 
disagreed with both Lévi-Strauss and Derrida on the issues at stake, namely, on the 
question of human origins. 
                                                
4 Gramm., p.316. Derrida closes his book with a passage of the Émile where Rousseau says the 
following: “You will say I too am a dreamer; I admit it, but I do what others fail to do, I give my 
dreams as dreams, and leave the reader to discover whether there is anything in them which may 
prove useful to those who are awake.”  
5 Given Derrida’s questioning of the paradigm that, as he sees it, founds the Western tradition, 
Rousseau’s philosophical precision is not a priority. Rousseau commits the same mistakes of the 
main examples of that tradition, e.g. Plato, Descartes, or Hegel (see p. 160). The possibility of 
philosophical or conceptual precision is actually implicitly denied by Derrida’s claim that “there is 
nothing outside of the text” (p. 158) and that there is no such a thing as the author’s intention 
(there’s no author) (p. 246). Yet a reader unfamiliar with Derrida’s rhetoric could suspect the 
existence of a second teaching (i.e. an esoteric doctrine) in his work, and therefore that he is 
ultimately after some form of conceptual precision. This suspicion disappears when one realizes 
that Derrida simply does not acknowledge this mode of writing, failing to recognize it in the key 
authors he considers. The only conceptual precision left to deconstruction – and apparently the one 
that guides the whole effort – concerns a certain “notion” of the work of the negative, as Derrida 
says, “the play of difference” or “supplementarity”: “It is precisely the play of presence and 
absence, the opening of this play that no metaphysical or ontological concept can comprehend.” (p. 
244) “The supplement is neither a presence nor an absence. No ontology can think its operation” (p. 
314). See also pp. 246-7. On the concept of “supplement,” see pp. 163 and 241. 
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Let us start by stating the “particular motif” that, according to Derrida, links 
Lévi-Strauss to Rousseau. Derrida’s particular contention is with Rousseau’s alleged 
belief in the proper meaning of things.  
Rousseau no doubt believed in the figurative initiation of language, 
but he believed no less (...) in a progress toward literal (proper) 
meaning (...). It is to this eschatology of the proper (prope, propius, 
self-presence, property, own-ness) that we ask the question of 
graphein.6  
 
Rousseau’s account of the emergence of proper names is then the condition of his 
account of nature. We cannot speak of natural characteristics of human beings 
because  
we have not the means of interpreting beyond [the] general conditions 
of possibility [of a fact that we deem natural] (...). This fact bears on 
(...) the essence or the energy of the graphein as the originary 
effacement of the proper name. From the moment that the proper 
name is erased in a system, there is writing, there is a ‘subject’ from 
the moment that this obliteration of the proper is produced, that is to 
say [there is writing] from the first appearing of the proper and from 
the first dawn of language. This proposition is universal in essence 
and can be produced a priori. How one passes from this a priori to the 
determination of empirical facts is a question that one cannot answer 
in general here. First because, by definition, there is no general 
answer to a question of this form.7 
 
“Writing,” in the broad sense of the action implied by Derrida, precedes and 
determines speech, necessarily. “Writing” is of the movement of “supplementarity”, 
namely, the substitution of one set of signifiers by another in the process of 
articulation and formation of words and other signs.8 There are two main direct 
                                                
6 Gramm., p. 107. 
7 Ibid., p. 108. 
8 Ibid., p. 245. “It is the power of substituting one organ for another, of articulating space and time, 
sight and voice, hand and spirit, it is this faculty of supplementarity which is the true ‘origin’ – or 
nonorigin – of languages” (p. 241). 
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consequences of this doctrine. First, our attempt to understand concepts is always 
hindered by the arbitrary (metaphorical or mimetic) formation of words: the 
supposed correspondence between the original voicing and the real object is a 
chimera. We cannot really speak of an original (proper) word because the first 
words were the product of an on-going articulation – precisely of what Derrida calls 
“writing” – that pre-determines the articulation of the word itself and, thus, is 
beyond the will or intention of the subject. Also, there cannot be a logical 
correspondence between a word and the idea (intended as a sensation or perception) 
because the real meaning of all speech cannot be retrieved. The original meaning of 
something is lost forever in what Derrida describes as the true origin of language, 
namely, this endless process of substitution that started with the language of 
gestures.9 Therefore, no matter how general and consensual a notion becomes, we 
have no means to take for granted its correspondence to reality – in Derrida’s terms, 
we have no way to tell whether the name is indeed proper. Accordingly, there 
cannot be knowledge, philosophical or scientific, of the specific nature of man, i.e. 
of “man,” of “nature,” or of human nature. Not only it is man who makes his own 
“nature,” but also that “know-how” vanishes in the process. If, as Derrida says, we 
have no means to pass from the “a priori to the determination of empirical facts,” if 
there is an insurmountable gap between what he describes as “the general conditions 
of possibility” – i.e. the simple “essence or energy of graphein” as the original force 
behind all language – and the factual or empirical data behind words and concepts, 
                                                
9 Ibid., pp. 234-5, 238-9. “There is never a painting of the thing itself and first of all because there 
is no thing itself” (p. 292). 
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then all general notions are mere conventions, that is to say, never general enough.10 
From a philosophical perspective, we should heed the fact that language and reason 
must be understood and ultimately articulated within the realm of pure rhetoric, a 
realm whose references are entirely circumstantial and, by definition, never 
universal.   
The second consequence is that “no reality or concept would correspond to 
the expression ‘society without writing.’”11 Hence it is not speech, as Rousseau says 
in the first paragraph of the Essay, the first social institution, but “writing.” If this is 
true, speech cannot be the main difference between human beings and other 
animals: we can conceive of human societies without speech (the first ones), but not 
without “writing.” Indeed, it is true that for Rousseau the language of gestures 
(which Derrida assimilates to “writing”), being easier and less dependent on 
conventions than vocal language, precedes the latter.12 But Rousseau is not explicit 
about whether we can already speak of human beings in societies where language is 
gestural. Left on Derrida’s terms, the opening theme of the Essay, namely, the 
difference between human beings and other animals, is irrelevant to Rousseau.13 
With these two consequences in mind, let us go back to Lévi-Strauss. In the 
example used by Derrida, the chapter ‘A Writing Lesson’ in Tristes Tropiques, 
Lévi-Strauss narrates his experiences with a South-American tribe. Some of his 
                                                
10 Cf. Derrida’s doctrine with Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, mainly Book III, 
ch. 2 and 3. 
11 Gramm., p. 109 
12 Rousseau, Essai sur l’origine des langues, Gallimard, Pléiade ed. (1995), ch.1, p. 376. 
Henceforth, EOL. 
13 We will show that the only way to confront this theme on Rousseau’s own terms is to read the 
Essay in light of the Second Discourse.  
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observations would, as he claims, corroborate Rousseau’s theory of the original 
goodness of man. In a passage quoted by Derrida, Lévi-Strauss tells us of the innate 
innocence and goodness of the Nambikwara, in a language that could be easily 
mistaken for Rousseau’s:  
[Their] misery is enlivened by laughing whispers. Their embraces are 
those of couples possessed by a longing for a lost oneness; their 
caresses are in no wise disturbed by the footfall of a stranger. In one 
and all there may be glimpsed a great sweetness of nature, a profound 
nonchalance, an animal satisfaction as ingenuous as it is charming, 
and, beneath all this, something that can be recognized as one of the 
most moving and authentic manifestations of human tenderness.14  
 
Yet no matter how Rousseauian the passage might sound, Lévi-Strauss is not 
Rousseau; indeed one can claim that he “adapts” Rousseau’s account of human 
goodness to justify his own ideology, as Derrida would say, his own anthropological 
dream. He does it by pinpointing the precise moment – the anthropological fact – 
that marks the fall of man into the long path of his corruption. This fact is the 
appearance of writing.  
The primary function of writing, Lévi-Strauss says, as a means of 
communication, was to facilitate the enslavement of other human 
beings.15  
 
This is what interests Derrida in ‘The Writing Lesson.’ Lévi-Strauss claims that the 
Nambikwara are innocent and good because they are a society without writing.16 
And the lesson which the chapter talks about refers to the experience of the first 
effects of writing in a society without writing. The amour-propre produced by Lévi-
                                                
14 Gramm., p. 117 (Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, translation by J. Russell, New York (1961), p. 
285). 
15 Ibid., p. 292. 
16 Ibid., p. 288. 
 16 
Strauss’ experiments with the Indians confirms his theory that corruption or 
oppression starts with the written language, and that written languages, as all 
languages, must have started suddenly in society.17  
However, how can one deny that the “writing lesson,” which refers only to 
Lévi-Strauss’ own introduction of the written language to the Nambikwara, was an 
artificial interference? And in this case, why should it be used as a parameter? In 
spite of Derrida’s apparently disproportional critique of the author of Tristes 
Tropiques, he is right to say that it is “the anthropologist who comes to disturb order 
and natural peace.”18 Conversely, Derrida wants to disturb Lévi-Strauss’ romantic 
dream by denouncing Lévi-Strauss’ presence. Writing is not the source of political 
domination, enslavement, or amour-propre, because it denotes a broader action than 
the one conventionally associated with the term.19 This broader action, “the play of 
difference,” coordinates the development of language. As such, writing is not an 
isolated fact that appears suddenly, as an accident in the course of history, but, on 
the contrary, it is the very mechanism that punctuates the history of languages. 
Therefore, the oppression and violence that Lévi-Strauss sees as the consequence of 
the appearance of writing are, for Derrida (albeit in a different and broader context) 
the mark itself of the continuous obliteration of the proper produced by graphein: 
every “writing” gesture is violent.20 If writing is thought of in this elementary sense, 
                                                
17 “[L]anguage could only have been born suddenly. Things could not have begun to signify 
progressively.” Quoted by Derrida, p. 121, from Lévi-Strauss, Introduction à l’oeuvre de Marcel 
Mauss. 
18 Ibid., p. 113. 
19 “The narrow sense of linear and phonetic notation” (p. 109). 
20 Cf. Gramm., pp. 111-112, and 135. 
 17 
namely, as the production and obliteration of self-presence, of property, or of an ego 
that would be “incapable of appearing to itself except in its own disappearance”21 – 
like the little Indian girl in Lévi-Strauss’ incident of the battle of names22 – then it is 
simply a mistake to describe the Nambikwara as a society without writing, violence, 
and a certain consciousness of the proper that their “writing” obliterates. 
Lévi-Strauss is guilty of going against the two consequences implied by 
Derrida’s doctrine of writing, and in this sense, Derrida is correct in his diatribe. 
Lévi-Strauss must have language and writing start discretely, in different moments, 
as accidents, in order “to restore the status of authentic language, human and fully 
signifying language, to all languages practiced by peoples whom one nevertheless 
continues to describe as ‘without writing.’”23 He must identify the precise moment 
of change in order to justify the precise meaning of concepts attributed to the 
original state of human beings such as, mainly, the natural sweetness, tenderness, or 
goodness of savage man. Finally, he must also reduce the complex task of 
explaining the origin of evil in human society by identifying writing as its singular 
cause. All this is denounced by Derrida as evidence of Lévi-Strauss’ essentialism. 
By praising “the range of the voice” while discrediting “writing,” Lévi-Strauss 
endorses a metaphysics of presence that, in the terms of deconstruction, is 
ultimately the image of his own voice (of the self-presence of his speech) and his 
own romantic dogmas about human nature.24 
                                                
21 Ibid., p. 112. 
22 Tristes Tropiques, p. 270. 
23 Gramm., p. 120 (italics in the original). 
24 Ibid., p. 140. 
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Lévi-Strauss is just Derrida’s long introduction to Rousseau, whom he 
believed engaged in the same sort of essentialism.25 Rousseau’s literary language 
and mistrust of the speech of the Philosophes (hence his alleged mistrust of living 
presence) might lead one to think, erroneously according to Derrida, that he had 
broken with the philosophical tradition to which he belongs.  
Rousseau condemns writing as destruction of presence and disease of 
speech (...) [but,] he rehabilitates it to the extent that it promises the 
reappropriation of that of which speech allowed itself to be 
dispossessed.26  
 
Derrida uses Rousseau as a foil for his theory of writing, a use that, in our view, 
pre-determines his reading and compromises his appreciation of Rousseau’s 
philosophy as a whole. That said, both Derrida’s and de Man’s critiques raise 
crucial questions and can therefore be used as introduction to the origin of human 
languages  in Rousseau. 
There is a tension within deconstruction (more precisely, between Derrida 
and de Man) about the status of the written language used by Rousseau. It concerns 
whether Rousseau’s writings were meant, as Derrida wants, as a sort of revelation of 
unmediated presence, “the reappropriation of that of which speech allowed itself to 
be dispossessed;” or whether Rousseau would actually concur with Derrida about 
the merely poetic (i.e. conventional) character of any writing, his own included, the 
position defended by de Man. We must note that the question refers only to whether 
or not Rousseau was aware of the conventionality of the concepts that he employs 
and of the ambiguities related to these concepts. Deconstruction does not consider 
                                                
25 Ibid., p. 301. 
26 Ibid., p. 142. 
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the possibility of whether Rousseau was not only aware of the ambiguities, but 
could also justify them without subscribing to a metaphysics of presence.27  
In the next paragraphs we will introduce the main difficulties with Derrida’s 
interpretation. First, we will consider the fact that Rousseau’s philosophical rhetoric 
is not taken into account by Derrida, and thus that Rousseau’s texts are not 
examined accordingly. Then, we will consider Derrida’s problematic interpretation 
of the metaphorical origin of speech in Rousseau. We will also introduce the 
relation between consciousness, language and knowledge, central in our next 
chapters, and illustrate a more general but fundamental claim: the doctrinarian 
monism of Derrida’s theory of the infinite chain of supplementarity is simply 
incompatible with a thought that presupposes human beings having the principle of 
their action in themselves, and their freedom as what makes them different from 
other animals. 
 
2. The way in which deconstruction thinks of both language and the human 
faculties related to language prohibits from the outset a serious consideration of how 
we can know and give meaning to things: if, as the instruments of philosophy, 
human language and reason fall apart when confronted with the ultimate questions 
(e.g. the original meaning of human things), then “meanings” must be explained as 
having an arbitrary instead of a natural foundation. All philosophy is poetry.28 
                                                
27 We will illustrate how this happens in chapter 2. 
28 This is different from the affirmation that philosophy should or must be poetical. If all philosophy 
is poetry, there are no truths, only dreams. 
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Derrida’s main claims are built upon this assumption, which apparently no 
experience, evidence or intuition was enough to shake.29  
With such a starting point, Derrida seems to forget that the opinion that 
philosophy is a mistake, and that only poetry (or “difference”) can keep us honest, is 
the very tissue of the first philosophical debates. Let us just advance one point about 
this basic opposition. Western philosophy (understood here in its Socratic tradition) 
also seems to start with certain assumptions or hypotheses. We must first believe in 
the possibility of philosophy, despite what appearances might tell us; if philosophy 
is possible, in order to become possible we have to turn the whole of our faculties 
towards it; and in order for it to be possible for one individual, it must be tested with 
and ultimately be possible for other individuals as well. Without expanding on this 
generality, it seems safe to affirm the following. Contrary to the point of departure 
adopted by deconstruction30 (indeed, contrary to all radical empiricist inspiration), 
these hypotheses are not limited by a purely epistemological definition of 
knowledge, i.e. the possibility to articulate knowledge in a universal rational 
language. Instead, the hypotheses presuppose the suspension of judgment about the 
extent of the power of the very instrument that is usually taken for granted in both 
our thinking and our communication of ideas, i.e. discursive rationality.  In their 
quest for the best, philosophers are always in the precarious situation of having to 
deal, on the one hand, with the insufficiency of language and reason (our dianoetic 
powers), and on the other, with their necessity to test their insights and doubts. It is 
at this juncture that the question of how to write philosophy appears, i.e. of how to 
                                                
29 Cf. Gramm., p. 108. 
30 Ibid., p.162. 
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have an efficient method and a safe rhetoric on discourses of this kind. It is in light 
of this initial situation that Rousseau’s critique of writing in his Essay on the Origin 
of Languages – a critique denounced by Derrida as absurd – should be interpreted.31  
Derrida conditions all his discourse to his conviction – deduced probably 
from his assumptions about human intelligence and understanding – that no 
philosophical knowledge is possible. For him, the question of “how to write 
philosophy” has been, since Plato, a mask to the question of “how to write the 
‘philosopher’s self-presence.”32 Writing only becomes evil as philosophical writing, 
the sort that Rousseau allegedly attacks and perpetrates at the same time, the 
contradiction pointed out by Derrida.33 Philosophy is vanity and Rousseau should 
have known better.  
Derrida reduces or equates Western philosophy to dogmatism without 
considering whether what he perceived as blind essentialism should be assessed 
after a contemplation of the philosophical hypotheses and the ensuing questions of 
method and rhetoric dismissed by him. In order to better explain this claim, we need 
to go over the main assumption behind Derrida’s thesis that “writing” undercuts all 
forms of identity, including the alleged identities (intentions) of philosophical 
                                                
31 Rousseau stresses the potential of writing of “glorifying” the errors implicit in human 
communication. What Rousseau sees as error, Derrida sees the unstoppable work of 
supplementarity, or simply, difference. 
32 “Philosophy is, within writing, nothing but this movement of writing as effacement of the 
signifier and the desire of presence restored, of being, signified in its brilliance and glory. The 
evolution and properly philosophic economy of writing go therefore in the direction of the effacing 
of the signifier, whether it take the form of forgetting or repression. (...) The concept of repression 
is thus, at least as much as that of forgetting, the product of a philosophy (of meaning)” (p. 286). 
See also p. 160. 
33 Cf. Gramm., pp. 144 ff. 
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writers.34 Echoing the erosion of consciousness and the valorization of the 
unconscious as the “real” seat of knowledge started by Nietzsche, Derrida’s critique 
of the philosopher’s self-presence can be seen, first and foremost, as nothing but 
that, namely, a critique of “the myth of consciousness”:  
Speech and the consciousness of speech – that is to say, consciousness 
simply as self-presence – are the phenomenon of an auto-affection 
lived as suppression of difference. That phenomenon, that presumed 
suppression of difference, that lived reduction of the opacity of the 
signifier, are the origin of what is called present. That which is not 
subjected to the process of difference is present.35  
 
Rousseau is Derrida’s main target because he was the representative of the Western 
tradition who had apparently tried harder to overcome the metaphysics of presence. 
Yet, Derrida seems to believe that it was impossible for Rousseau to achieve such a 
feat without having access to the linguistic revolution started by Nietzsche. Hence, 
Rousseau’s position is necessarily ambivalent; although without great conviction, he 
participates in the metaphysics of presence to the extent that he worships its central 
dogma: the “myth of consciousness.” 
By not confronting Rousseau’s rhetoric, particularly in the analyses of The 
Essay on the Origin of Languages and the Second Discourse, Derrida misses the 
peculiar sense in which consciousness is the distinctive human trait for Rousseau. 
According to him, to inquire about the origin of (human) language is to inquire 
about the origin of humanity, an inquiry that is already as a project a manifestation 
of self-presence. Derrida takes to the limit the notion that to question continuity is 
to fall in the trap of essentialism, and in the manner of the materialists in 
                                                
34 Ibid., pp. 160, 246, and 286. 
35 Ibid., p. 166. 
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Rousseau’s time, Condillac in particular, in Derrida human beings differ from beasts 
only by degree.  
For Derrida, the development of human language occurs with the needs 
imposed by various circumstances; nothing inherently human – namely, a unique 
human capacity – would have worked as the motor of that development. He suggests 
that, on this matter, Rousseau stands in permanent contradiction for saying what he 
did not wish to say.36 Rousseau says that language starts with the passions (thus that 
it had an inherently human origin) for being blinded by the desire to affirm his own 
self-presence and to efface the unbearable fact of the “always-already.”37 Indeed 
Rousseau says in the Essay that “it seems that need dictated the first gestures, while 
the passions wrung forth the first words.”38 The apparent contradiction of this quote 
is at the crux of Derrida’s thesis that writing precedes speech. He cannot reconcile 
this sentence with the opening line of the book: “Speech distinguishes man among 
animals.”39 Thus, for Derrida, it makes no sense that the difference between gestural 
                                                
36 Gramm., pp. 200-1, 215. 
37 Ibid., pp. 201, 215, 245. 
38 EOL, ch. 2, p.380. 
39 As in Rousseau’s Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inegalité parmi les hommes, or the 
Second Discourse (Henceforth, SD. We will refer to the translation by V. Gourevitch, in The 
Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, Cambridge, 1997, followed by the page number in 
parenthesis of the Pléiade edition, Gallimard, 1964), the first impression in Rousseau’s Essay is that 
he follows Locke, who says that human beings differ from animals by having the power of 
abstraction and of general ideas (cf. Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, 11, §11). 
However, because Locke commits Hobbes’ mistake, namely, the supposition of “some sort of 
society already established among the inventors of language” (SD, p. 145 (146)), his argument 
about how human beings pass from particular to general ideas is contradictory, “since this 
unanimous agreement must have been motivated, and since speech seems to have been very 
necessary in order to establish the use of speech” (SD p. 147 (148-9)). For Locke, human beings are 
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and vocal language amounts to the difference between animal and human life. 
Rousseau’s correlation between, on the one hand, needs and gesture, and on the 
other, passion and speech must be wrong, for the supplementarity of speech does not 
denote a different movement than the one that made the first gestures appear within 
the species. Language appears as supplement, difference, articulation, or “writing;” 
speech is simply a phase in a more extensive and continuous flux.  
Rousseau apparently accepts and denies, at the same time, that speech has a 
metaphorical origin:  
As man’s first motives for speaking were of the passions, his first 
expressions were tropes. Figurative language was the first to be born. 
Proper meaning was discovered last. One calls things by their true 
name only when one sees them in their true form. At first only poetry 
was spoken; there was no hint of reasoning until much later. 
 
But then, he immediately gives us a counterexample:  
However, I sense the reader stopping me at this point to ask how an 
expression can be figurative before it has a proper meaning, since the 
figure consists only of a transference of meaning. I agree with that. 
But in order to understand what I mean, it is necessary to substitute 
                                                                                                                                            
superior to beasts because their capacity to generalize ideas conduces to the advancement of 
knowledge and the progress of the species. However, if one questions this progress achieved 
through the development of human languages, i.e. if one eliminates the optimism about both reason 
and the consequences of the advancement of knowledge, the relation of superiority is inverted (see 
SD, Note 13, originally marked “*b.”). This is the situation faced by both Rousseau and Derrida. 
But different than Derrida, Rousseau questions, as we will see below, Locke’s doctrine that all 
languages, animal and human, start with particular ideas received from the senses. Speech is what 
distinguishes human beings from other animals – and as such it is the mark of human language – 
because, as Locke points out (Essay, II, 11, §§9, 10, 11), the human voice is the organ through 
which we start to express general ideas or abstractions. But if human and animal languages had the 
same source, i.e. sensation, what would have made human beings leave their animal condition? 
Rousseau must explain how the first words of the first individuals of the species expressed already 
general ideas, namely, how human language starts with assumptions (or knowledge) about the 
general. 
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the idea which the passion presents to us for the word which we 
transpose. For one only transposes words because one also transposes 
ideas. Otherwise figurative language would signify nothing.40  
 
Rousseau says that speech is engendered by passions and that reason only appeared 
much later. But then he says that our passions express ideas, and thus that the 
capacity to have ideas must be prior (or immediately prior) to speech. What 
Rousseau says here is that speech is engendered by ideas. The question then is about 
the formation and the status of such ideas.41 
Rousseau illustrates what he means by saying that in that initial situation a 
savage man’s first naming acts depended on a triangular relation between a passion 
(e.g. fear), the idea of the passion, and the idea of the object arousing the passion 
                                                
40 EOL, ch. 3, p. 381 (my italics). 
41 Again, Rousseau is not simply following Locke’s doctrine that the original of all ideas comes 
from either “SENSATION” or from the “Perception of the Operations of our own Minds,” which 
Locke calls “internal Sense” or “REFLECTION” (Essay, II, 1, mainly §4, and III, 1 and 2). Whereas 
what Locke says about the original of ideas presupposes human beings as always having the 
capacity for these operations, Rousseau dares to inquire, albeit rather indirectly, about the origin of 
the very idea of reflection and of the operations of the mind related to that power, of which the 
passion of fear is one example. Discovering what this “internal sense” is and how it became a power 
in human beings, is tantamount to the quest indicated in the Preface of the Second Discourse, 
namely, self-knowledge (see Rousseau’s second note to his book at the beginning of his Preface, 
where he quotes the Lockean Buffon on the importance of our “internal sense”). Rousseau’s 
conceptual difference with Locke and the Lockeans is the following. For Locke the operations of 
the mind can only be employed upon “Impressions made on our Senses by outward Objects” (II, 1, 
§23); there is no thinking before these stimuli from outside, and on this regard, “Understanding is 
merely passive” (II, 1, §25). For Rousseau, who, as we will see below, adopts a different starting 
point than Locke, the first object of reflection of the first individuals of the species did not come 
from outside. The first human beings left the state of animality on their own: their own selves were 
their first object of contemplation. This capacity of the first human beings to have ideas of their 
own implies that their understanding was not merely passive, i.e. at the mercy of externality, and 
that their choices were not necessarily pre-determined by circumstances. Cf. also what Rousseau 
says about the “operations of the Mind” in the SD, p. 144 (146). 
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(e.g. another individual perceived as bigger and stronger). The first name (nom) or 
sound chosen to denote the object expressed actually the passion aroused by the 
object. In the Second Discourse Rousseau says: 
 the first words (mots) used by men (les hommes) had in their Mind 
(Esprit) (...) the meaning (sens) of an entire proposition.  
 
The word (mot) “giants” was therefore more than a mere name (nom). It meant fear 
to its inventor (fear of other individuals perceived as bigger and stronger). In a 
second moment,42 the object previously named “giant” is recognized as another man 
simply, and another name is invented to denote their resemblance, for instance, the 
name “man;” similarly, the first meaning of “giant” is dropped and the word is 
finally used as an adjective to denote an actual bigger and stronger individual.43  
The enigmatic character of this passage of the Essay, as well as of the related 
one in the Second Discourse, is clearly deliberate. Let us try to assess what is at 
stake. If we have ideas before we have words, and if the first words are expressions 
of those ideas, then there is at least one sense in which proper names would have 
existed before or in contiguity with the first figurative words. In Rousseau’s 
example, “giant” is a figurative name for the false impression caused by the 
stranger, but, at the same time, it refers to the idea of fear felt by its author and, in 
this sense, it is the proper name of that idea. Therefore, we can affirm, as Rousseau 
does, that the first language was figurative only if we accept his caveat about ideas 
preceding and putting in motion the whole thing. However, and this is the point 
distorted by Derrida, it is not the coordination between ideas and words that is at 
                                                
42 “after many experiences” refers here to the experiences along the course of the long history of the 
species. 
43 Cf. SD, p. 147 (149). 
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stake here, a blunder that any reader of Locke would have avoided.44 What is at 
stake for Rousseau is instead something apparently inconceivable for Derrida: if 
consciousness became an innate power to human beings, so did their capacity to 
compare, acknowledge, and refer to their passions and faculties – in other words, 
their capacity to have ideas about these things. 
On this matter, let us broach an interpretation that will find support in the 
next chapters. Rousseau must have thought of the formation of the first ideas (the 
ideas preceding speech) in two ways: one, as the result of the distancing from the 
oneness with nature (animal state) and the transformations of self-love in the first 
individuals; the other, as the immediate unfolding of elementary self-awareness (or 
reflection) into the individual’s awareness of his instincts. One is the result of how 
the first individuals perceived themselves in relation to others and, as such, it is 
related to the sense of the imagination described by Derrida;45 the other relates to 
the growing awareness or acknowledgement of not only their limited existence, but 
also of their bodily and mental powers previously enacted as pure animal instincts; 
                                                
44 This initial correspondence (or relation of property) between the idea and its expression 
disappears with the first developments of language, which were characterized by errors in the 
communication of the ideas. In this sense, to affirm that Rousseau defends the notion of a 
correspondence between ideas and words is to misunderstand his point.  
45 Derrida acknowledges that Rousseau speaks of imagination as the active faculty and the passage 
on imagination (Gramm., pp. 182 ff.) is perhaps the most interesting in his book. However, he 
describes imagination in terms of a mechanicist logic of desire: “If we desire beyond our power of 
satisfaction, the origin of that surplus and of that difference is named imagination” (p. 185). “(...) 
all language in general springs forth when passionate desire exceeds physical need, when 
imagination is awakened, which awakens pity and gives movement to the supplementary chain” (p. 
217). See also in p. 187 how for Derrida “the entire problematic of power and the act” is subsumed 
under his “logic of the supplement.” Cf. with SD, 140-1 (141-2). 
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here, imagination becomes the active faculty of foresight, intuition or, simply, 
intelligence. Thus, through imagination human beings changed their instincts, by 
corrupting them in one sense and perfecting them in another. 
Due to the profound influence of Lockean empiricism on Eighteenth century 
thought, the notion that some faculties and ideas are innate to human beings was not 
seriously considered by most representatives of the French Enlightenment. Locke 
uses children, namely, human beings in their current constitution, as the paradigm 
for his arguments.46 For Rousseau, however, children are a bad starting point 
because they represent human beings already having been profoundly altered with 
respect to the situation of the first individuals of the species. For Locke, that no 
ideas are innate to human beings is shown by the incapacity of infants to enact their 
potentialities, needing for that the external stimulus of society. Rousseau sees this 
incapacity rather as an effect of the corruption of the senses produced by the 
“progress” of the species, although he states that, for obvious reasons, there cannot 
be an empirical proof for this argument. 
A good deal of uncertainty surrounds the main fact which serves as 
the basis for Mr. Locke’s entire reasoning; For in order to know 
whether, as he claims, in the pure state of Nature the woman is 
commonly with child again and brings forth too a new birth long 
before the former is able to shift for himself, would require 
experiments which Locke has surely not performed and which no one 
is in a position to perform. (...) Regarding Children, there are good 
many reasons to believe that their strength and their organs develop 
later among us than they did in the primitive state of which I speak. 
The original weakness they owe to their Parents’ constitution, the care 
taken to swaddle and cramp all their limbs, the softness in which they 
are reared, perhaps the use of another milk than their Mother’s, 
everything thwarts and delays in them the first progress of Nature. 
(...) Locke’s reasoning therefore collapses, and all of that 
                                                
46 Cf. Locke’s Essay, II, 1 and III, 3. 
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Philosopher’s Dialectic has not protected him against the error 
Hobbes and others committed [i.e. the presupposition of ‘some sort of 
society already established among the inventors of language’, p. 145 
(146)]. They had to explain a fact of the state of Nature, that is to say 
of a state where men lived isolated, and where a given man had no 
motive whatsoever to stay by some other given man, nor perhaps did 
men have any motive to stay by one another, which is far worse.47  
 
Understanding Rousseau’s questioning of “the main fact which serves as the 
basis for Locke’s entire reasoning” is the key to the Second Discourse. Without ever 
making it entirely explicit, Rousseau superimposes the two ways in which we can 
understand human beings at their origins: the individual as an infant and the pre-
rational situation of our pre-human ancestors. Although (or because) this distinction 
holds the key to Rousseau’s most basic metaphysical assumptions, he left entirely to 
the reader the task of sorting out its consequences, the most important of which 
being the opposition between a state in which the human faculties are from the 
outset present structurally or instinctively in the individual (infant); and a state in 
which consciousness and the faculties that ensue from it are only nascent in the 
species. The main difficulty in the Second Discourse is to understand how these new 
“instincts” (if we can speak of consciousness and the new faculties in this manner), 
which cannot, as Derrida suggests, be considered as merely the natural response to a 
concrete need of adaptation, develop and are perfected.  
We can only speculate about whether Rousseau’s cryptic treatment of this 
matter reflects the caution of not being immediately dismissed for dualism, 
idealism, or mysticism by those of whom he thought as his main readers. How to 
confront the principles established in Locke’s Essay without either being ridiculed 
                                                
47 SD, note 12, originally marked “10”, third remark (my italics). On the original marking of the 
notes, see the English edition, p. 370. 
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by or engaging in an endless and fruitless debate against these readers? Whatever 
Rousseau’s reasons were, when we take into account the aforementioned distinction, 
there is nothing in his thought that situates him in “an entire naive philosophy of the 
idea-sign.”48 Thus, lest we completely misunderstand what Rousseau “says without 
saying” about our origins, the distinction in question – which is not taken into 
account by Derrida or, for that matter, by most commentators of Rousseau – needs 
to be considered in every step of both the Second Discourse and the Essay. To 
confront the apparent ambivalences concerning the origin of languages, we must 
have in mind the full extent of what Rousseau means by the different constitutions 
(interior and exterior) that the first individuals of the human species had in 
comparison to human beings in their current internal and external constitution.49  
With this in mind, let us turn to a text that lies at the heart of Derrida’s 
argument, the third chapter of Essay, entitled ‘That the First Language Must Have 
Been Figurative.’ Rousseau ends this chapter with the following statement:  
Since the illusory image presented by passion showed itself first, the 
language answering to it was invented first; subsequently it became 
metaphorical when the enlightened mind recognized its original error 
                                                
48 By following Rousseau’s hints we easily realize that his ideas must not be confounded with those 
of Lévi-Strauss. On this matter of the value of signs we should wonder whether it is not actually 
Derrida who is situated by the inverted version of the dogma with which he charges Rousseau: a 
naive philosophy of the sign-idea. See Gramm., p. 277. 
49 We must have in mind evolution. See Rousseau’s subtle introduction to this question in SD, pp. 
124-5 (122-3) and 134-5 (134-5). On the concept of evolution in Rousseau, consult mainly R. 
Wokler, Rousseau on Society, Politics, Music and Language, chapter 3 (‘The Discours sur 
l’inégalité and its sources’), New York (1987); and R.D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of 
Rousseau, ch. 3-4, Princeton (1976). 
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and came to use expressions of that first language only when moved 
by the same passions as had produced it.50  
 
Technically, or from a grammatological point of view, there is absolutely no 
difference between the illusory image and a metaphor. The difference implied by 
Rousseau consists instead in a different state of consciousness regarding the two 
naming acts implied in the chapter. The naming act of the primitive human being 
(an individual at the inception of the human species) consisted of the error or the 
illusion of transposing his idea of fear to the idea of the object that triggered his 
fear. Rousseau does not call the first language metaphorical because a transposition 
(metaphor) of ideas is, when seen from outside, literally an error. Again, the naming 
act itself is the direct vocal expression of the idea of the passion and as such it has a 
proper sense; at the same time, the transposition of the idea of fear was not 
intentional and can be known as an error only retrospectively. Thus although the 
first words were not metaphors in the way we, enlightened minds, generally 
understand the concept, they still had a figurative or metaphorical quality.  
Language becomes assumedly metaphorical only when the newly enlightened 
mind has learned about the error of mistaking one idea for another, and has found a 
way to refer to the idea of his passion without making that mistake, namely, by 
consciously using a metaphor of words. From the point of view of consciousness, it 
is the reversal of the original situation. This is what we believe to be condensed in 
the last sentence of Rousseau’s chapter. After many experiences – which should be 
considered errors only from the point of view of the imperfect communication 
                                                
50 EOL, ch. 3, p. 254 (382). Whenever reference also in parenthesis (Pléiade), translation by V. 
Gourevitch, in The Discourses and Other Political Writings,  
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attempted by the first inventors – and a very long time into the development of the 
human species, the idea of fear stops being simply transposed to the ideas of the 
objects that can trigger the passion (such as a stranger, a beast or a thunder). The 
awareness that the passion in question is different from the object associated with it 
makes a direct reference to the passion problematic. The idea of the passion stops 
obeying the order of particular references: it becomes abstract and nameless. It 
becomes a general idea, namely, an idea believed to exist to all the participants of 
the linguistic community. Expressions regarded as having been originally associated 
with fear (such as e.g. “stranger,”  “beast” or “thunder”) are now used to refer 
indirectly, or metaphorically, to the passion. Thus, language becomes metaphorical 
only when human beings become conscious of the general nature of their passions, a 
situation that according to Rousseau must have been separated from that of the first 
inventors by “thousands of Centuries.”51 
Derrida’s demotion of consciousness, his notion that “writing” (as the 
constant movement of the chain of supplementarity) precedes both speech and 
consciousness,52 and that for this reason we can never know the true intention of an 
author, blind him to the irony in Rousseau’s text, especially in what concerns the 
perspective of the “enlightened mind.” We will see that what opposes Rousseau and 
Derrida is not fundamentally different from what opposes Rousseau and Condillac – 
even if Derrida takes his distance from Condillac as well. According to Derrida’s 
                                                
51 “milliers de Siécles” (“incorrect” accentuation and caps in the original). SD, p. 144 (146). 
Rousseau’s distinction in this chapter between “figurative” and “metaphorical” language should 
help us understand later the puzzling passage in the Second Discourse about proper names and 
general ideas. 
52 Gramm., p. 166. 
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view, namely, that figurative language signifies nothing, we can only say that the 
passions might have “wrung forth the first words” if we have no illusions regarding 
the intentions and self-awareness of the subject of these passions. Needs, modified 
by the nascent imagination and ensuing passions, become desires. But the 
motivation behind desire (i.e. its meaning) obeys a chaotic, unconscious, and as 
such, metaphorical process. Hence, whatever originates with the passions is still, for 
Derrida, within the order of external necessities. This is precisely what Rousseau 
denies when in a crucial passage of the Second Discourse he says that the specific 
trait of man is his capacity to act freely and to recognize this freedom.53 While 
Rousseau depicts the cognitive power associated to consciousness as the mark of 
humanity, Derrida moves in the opposite direction and demotes consciousness to a 
fundamentally negative position, whereby any cognitive process associated with it is 
seen under the sign of myth and self-deception.  
[T]here has never been anything but writing; there have never been 
anything but supplements, substitute significations which could only 
come forth in a chain of differential references, the ‘real’ supervening, 
and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from 
an invocation of the supplement, etc. And thus to infinity, for we have 
read, in the text, that the absolute present, Nature, that which words 
like ‘real mother’ name, have always already escaped, have never 
                                                
53 “It is, then, not so much the understanding that constitutes the specific difference between man 
and other animals, as it is his property of being a free agent. Nature commands every animal and the 
Beast obeys. Man experiences the same impression, but recognizes himself free to acquiesce or to 
resist; and it is mainly in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of his soul exhibits 
itself.” SD, pp. 140-1 (141-2).  
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existed; that what opens meaning and language is writing as the 
disappearance of natural presence.54  
 
Derrida’s doctrines that consciousness is a myth and that therefore “there is 
nothing outside the text”55 stop him from realizing that in spite of what an isolated 
passage might indicate, for Rousseau, neither need nor passion can explain what 
brought mankind out of the natural state of dispersion. In and of themselves, need 
and passion can only explain individual actions qua re-actions to externality or to 
(“actions” by) other individuals; and human beings are not, like other animals, 
purely passive or re-active creatures. The experiences and circumstances that helped 
trigger the rudiments of reflection in the first individuals of the species helped them 
also to break with their previously pre-conditioned instinctive commands: it was 
consciousness that powered the first individual human actions. 
 
3.  
Rousseau could not think this writing, that takes place before and 
within speech. To the extent that he belonged to the metaphysics of 
presence, he dreamed of the simple exteriority of death to life, evil to 
good, representation to presence, signifier to signified, representer to 
represented, mask to face, writing to speech. But all such oppositions 
are irreducibly rooted in that metaphysics. Using them, one can only 
operate by reversals, that is to say by confirmations. The supplement 
is none of these terms. It is especially not more a signifier than a 
                                                
54 Gramm., p. 159. “Even if there is never a pure signified, there are different relationships as to that 
which, from the signifier, is presented as the irreducible stratum of the signified. For example, the 
philosophical text, although it is in fact always written, includes, precisely as its philosophical 
specificity, the project of effacing itself in the face of the signified content which it transports and 
in general teaches. Reading should be aware of this project, even if, in last analysis, it intends to 
expose the project’s failure. The entire history of texts, and within it the history of literary forms in 
the West, should be studied from this point of view” (p. 160). 
55 Ibid., p. 158.  
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signified, a representer than a presence, a writing than a speech. None 
of the terms in this series can, being comprehended within it, 
dominate the economy of difference or supplementarity. Rousseau’s 
dream consisted of making the supplement enter metaphysics by 
force.56 
 
At the end of his book, Derrida does not include consciousness in the terms 
of his series; he leaves out the crucial opposition. Is it not the demotion of 
consciousness that makes possible the argument that “writing” precedes speech?  
When Rousseau says that “speech distinguishes man among other animals” he 
means that a specifically human language did not exist before the appearance of 
consciousness and the capacities that for him define human nature:  
It would seem (...) that the invention of the art of communicating our 
ideas is a function no so much of the organs we use in such 
communication as of a faculty peculiar to man (...).57  
 
For Rousseau, the development of human languages started with the development of 
consciousness, the conventionality of the first properly human signs (speech) 
appeared with the intentional act of the first reflective beings, and it is this intention 
or the reflected idea behind the intention that is at stake, regardless of the flawed 
communication that, as we saw, issues from those first attempts to communicate 
ideas vocally. Rousseau acknowledges that the language of gestures precedes vocal 
language by being “easier and less dependent on conventions;” however, although 
gestures might be sufficient for a communication based on the immediacy of needs 
– whereby they can serve as means for an un-reflected and instinctive response to a 
situation – they were not sufficient as a means to express the ideas that appeared 
                                                
56 Gramm., p. 315. 
57 EOL, p. 251 (379). My italics. 
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with reflection: “our gestures signify nothing but our natural restlessness.”58 
Whereas pre-human or animal language depends on the organs employed in the 
communication, the art of communicating ideas depends solely on the faculty 
responsible for the existence of those ideas in the first place. Speech is the mark of 
human beings because the voice is the first organ used by that faculty. It is the organ 
through which the first individuals of the species expressed their first ideas by 
transposing, albeit inadvertently, the idea they had of a passion to the idea of an 
external object.  
For Rousseau, it is not “consonants and articulation” that mainly 
distinguishes words from random sounds.59 Consonants and articulation (“writing”) 
are just the face or the form of the flawed communication that takes place with the 
first ideas. Phenomenologically, they might seem like the main elements of speech, 
but like speech they cannot precede what causes them. It is here that, at least from a 
Rousseauian perspective, Derrida’s law of supplementarity falls apart. 
Supplementarity is not “the true ‘origin’ – or nonorigin – of languages,”60 because 
for Rousseau “the faculty peculiar to man”61 does not consist of “the power of 
substituting one organ for another,”62 but of substituting one idea for another by 
means of the different organs at the individual’s disposal. The consideration of the 
cognitive nature of these ideas and of the individual’s relation to himself escapes 
Derrida’s logic of supplementarity (or “play of difference”), which is focused only 
                                                
58 Ibid., p. 249 (376). See also SD, 146-7 (148-9). 
59 Gramm., p. 315. 
60 Ibid., p. 241. 
61 EOL, p. 251 (379). 
62 Gramm., p. 241. 
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on linguistics and which responds to the stern belief that there cannot be anything 
outside language (or outside the “play of difference”) such as the knowledge of 
what one wants, feels, or thinks.  
Derrida’s true thesis is not about the precedence of “writing” or 
supplementarity over speech, but about “the myth of consciousness” and the view 
that we cannot speak of human origins or nature because we have no means to 
discourse about the ontological difference between human beings and brutes.63 
Derrida misses the extent of the questions behind the philosophical rhetoric used in 
the Second Discourse; in particular, he misses the meaning of the ambiguity in 
Rousseau’s account of the origin of languages: on the one hand, the fact that human 
beings start, through elementary reflection, with the intuitive or instinctive 
knowledge of the ideas they form of themselves, their passions and their powers; on 
the other, that the same awareness that kindles these ideas leads to a communication 
with others (sociability) that is from the outset marred by error.64  
To sum up and conclude, against what Derrida thinks, the ambivalences in 
Rousseau’s text always have a purpose. It is true that Rousseau’s discourses are 
about “origins,” “nature,” “being” and other metaphysical subjects; and it is also 
true that he often gives us the impression of treating these subjects in line with at 
                                                
63 At the same time, even if Derrida were correct in his metaphysical assumptions, the precedence of 
“writing” over speech would not be a matter of contention and, as a thesis, would have a 
questionable originality. From that angle, his argument would be a sort of Thrasymachian 
description of the inevitably self-deceptive and dreamy character of human existence. 
64 On the fact that human logos can err as the difference between human beings and other animals, 
see Plutarch’s text, Que les bêtes usent de la raison, quoted without being named in the SD (p. 138-
9 (138)) and named without being quoted in the Social Contract (I, 2). For an interpretation of this 
text, see chapter 6 below. 
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least part of the metaphysical tradition questioned by Derrida; but Rousseau is too 
elusive in his language to be judged on the basis of isolated passages and literal 
readings, as Derrida systematically does.65 Instead, particularly when it comes to 
metaphysical concepts, Rousseau should never be taken at face value. Although he 
is not, like Derrida, in a crusade against the property of presence, he saw as part of 
his challenge the task of calling the attention of his readers (or at least some of 
them) to the trap of dogmatism, Derrida’s main concern. That said, Rousseau’s 
understanding of human intelligence and language takes him in a completely 
different direction from the one chosen by Derrida: from a philosophical 
perspective, for Rousseau, skepticism and materialism can also become dogmas and, 
as such, the mere manifestation of self-presence; from a psychological perspective, 
he takes the desire or necessity for self-presence as an inevitable trait in human 
beings, which he illustrates with his well-known passages on amour propre. This 
latter consideration also conditions his writing. The philosophical search for the 
truth and the best must be done in a language that takes this political-psychological 
trait of human character into account and that, at the same time, leaves the road 
open for free thinking.  
For Rousseau, the relation of truth in what concerns the origin of human 
language is in the single capacity of the first individuals of the species to have ideas 
(general ideas), and to have about these ideas a sure truth of the sort of the Cartesian 
sensible cogito.66 It is not about the property of names, as Derrida insists, but about 
the consciousness of a feeling – if we want, the property of a perception – and the 
                                                
65 Cf. Gramm., pp. 174, 196-7, 203-4, 301-2. 
66 Cf. Gramm., p. 276 
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intuitive supposition of the same consciousness in others. Again, the fact that 
intelligibility cannot depend on or be put to proof in a mathematical-logical manner 
does not prevent its possibility. It is this simple notion, namely, that human 
intelligence is not a value but a fact, that, due to the reasons indicated, cannot be 
accepted by Derrida without damage to his basic assumptions. Derrida must, then, 
denounce the “myth of consciousness” in order for his own writing to exist. By 
doing so, he simplifies the human complexity implied in Rousseau’s texts: 
consciousness becomes limited to a sort of blunt self-awareness ready to be 
distorted by infinite “writing.” Derrida’s deconstruction has, as we have been 
arguing, a hard core, which when exposed places his indictment of philosophy and 
his treatment of presence under a completely different light.67 In Rousseau, the 
question is not about mastering complexity or describing the work of the negative; it 
is about the possibility of knowledge in spite of the imperfection of human 
languages. Why can we not think the chaotic building up of our unconscious desires 
without canceling the validity of a parallel development of the thought processes 
and cognitive faculties related to consciousness? Albeit in his own peculiar manner, 
Rousseau gives us evidence that not only can we perceive this duality in ourselves, 
but also that we can imagine it in the first individuals of the species.  
 
                                                
67 Unless we refuse to challenge Derrida’s strictly nominalist understanding of language, a proper 
consideration of Rousseau reverts the order suggested by deconstruction and makes us wonder 
whether absolute supplementarity is not a greater dogma (certainly a more abstract one) than the 
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Any speech about nature is, for Derrida, a delusion of self-presence. Nature 
also is a lie: “[It] (...) has always already escaped, (...) never existed;”1 “[it] is 
nothing but the myth of addition.”2 Self-consciousness fools us, making us believe 
in an origin or nature of the human race and therefore in a break with the (natural?) 
“chain of differential references.” Because there was no identifiable break, there is 
no way we can determine the origins of what clearly distinguishes our species from 
the previous one.3  
In his analysis of mimesis, Derrida interprets Rousseau’s use of the 
expression “the voice of nature” as another evidence of Rousseau’s dogmatism:  
What does Rousseau say without saying, see without seeing? That 
substitution has always already begun; that imitation, principle of art, 
has always already interrupted natural plenitude; that, having to be a 
discourse, it has always already broached presence in difference; that 
in Nature it is always that which supplies Nature’s lack, a voice that is 
substituted for the voice of Nature.4 
                                                
1 Gramm., p. 161. 
2 Ibid., p.167. 
3 Like consciousness, nature is also not included in Derrida’s series at the end of his book. We 
wonder, how would Derrida define the exteriority of “nature”? 
4 Gramm., p. 215. 
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“Rousseau is sure that the essence of art is mimesis,”5 says Derrida, who calls this 
imitative character at the origin of languages “the archeo-teleologic definition of 
nature”6 in Rousseau.  
Derrida suggests that Rousseau is embarrassed by his claim that speech and 
song had a common origin and that he uses the notion of imitation to efface his own 
blunder.7 As in the question of the figurative origin of languages opposed to a later 
awareness and active use of metaphors, here too we must have in mind the vast 
period of time dividing the two moments at stake. Let us consider first Rousseau’s 
alleged blunder.  
In chapter 12 of the Essay on the Origin of Languages, ‘The Origin of 
Music,’ Rousseau says the following:  
Together with the first voices were formed either the first articulations 
or the first sounds, depending on the kind of passion that dictated 
them. Anger wrests from us threatening cries, which the tongue and 
the palate articulate; but the voice of tenderness is gentler, it is 
modulated by the glottis, and this voice becomes a sound. However, 
its accents are more or less frequent, its inflections more or less acute 
depending on the sentiment that accompanies it. Thus cadence and 
sounds are born together with syllables: passion rouses all the organs 
to speech, and adorns the voice with their full brilliance; thus verse, 
song, speech have a common origin.8 
 
But this is what he says in the article ‘Song’ of his Dictionary of Music quoted by 
Derrida:  
The Song does not seem natural to man. (...) The first expressions of 
nature have nothing in them melodious or sonorous. (...) The 
                                                
5 Ibid., p. 203. 
6 Ibid., p. 197. 
7 Cf. Gramm., pp. 196 ff. with EOL, ch. 12. 
8 EOL, pp. 281-2 (410) my italics. 
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melodious and appreciable Song is nothing but a peaceful and 
artificial imitation of the accents in the speaking or passionate Voice; 
we cry and lament without singing: but singing, we imitate cries and 
laments; and as, of all imitations, the most interesting is that of the 
human passions, of all manners of imitating the most agreeable is the 
Song.9 
 
For Derrida, the notion of imitation cancels the need to explain the logical 
necessity of, as he puts, a genetic order between the origin of the first words and 
that of the first songs. Imitation unites speech and song and, as such, it is what 
keeps together Rousseau’s ideal of the melodious origin of language.  
The archeoteleological concept of nature annuls the structural point of 
view. In the beginning or in the ideal of the all-harmonious voice, the 
modification [(song)] becomes one with the substance [(speech)] that 
it modifies. (...) Since the first speech must be good, since ‘the voice 
of nature’  [dictates to us] that the original and ideal essence of speech 
is song itself, one cannot treat the two origins separately.10  
 
It is true that if one merely cross-examines the passages in question, the 
contradiction remains. If one wants to distinguish the different levels of the 
argument in Rousseau’s treatment of the origins, one must do it in light of the work 
that holds the key to these contradictions.11 The interpretation of the Second 
Discourse will show that the origins of speech and music must have been kept 
separated by a very long period, and thus that these terms must be parsed 
accordingly: 
First words........................................................................Grammar 
                                                
9 Rousseau, Dictionnaire de Musique, Gallimard, Pléiade ed. (1995), p. 695. Gramm., p. 197. 
10 Gramm., p. 198. 
11 The logical problem noticed by Derrida is too obvious. His suspicion that Rousseau was either 
unaware of or dishonest about it is hasty and absurd. “Rousseau hesitates (...) between two 
necessities. (...) The notion of imitation reconciles these two exigencies within ambiguity” 
(Gramm., p. 196, my italics). 
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First inflections.................................................................Music 
There is no magical trick or mystical inspiration in Rousseau’s account of the 
origins. The expression “the voice of nature” should be taken first for what it 
literally is: the first human cries were not, in this sense, utterances of “the voice of 
nature” but, precisely, of human voice, that is to say, of a voice that was already a 
modification of what came before it. “The voice of nature” is, in this most basic 
sense, the pure animal (or pre-human) expression of a want before being modified 
by consciousness; as such, it is not what defines human beings in their origin, but, 
on the contrary, what separates them from other animals:  
  Voice of nature..............................................................First human voice 
Thinking always at the initial situation of the human species, when we read 
in the Essay that “at first there was no music other than melody, nor any other 
melody than the varied sound of speech,”12 we must remember that in the same way 
that the first words were expressions of the idea of a passion, the first inflections 
(“melodies”) were expressions of the intensity of a passion or the modification of 
one passion by another. This is what Rousseau meant about the origin of “music.” 
(“The accents [of the voice] are more or less frequent, its inflections more or less 
acute depending on the sentiment that accompanies it. (...) [P]assion rouses all the 
organs to speech, and adorns the voice with their full brilliance.”) And this is also 
what he must have meant by “cadence and sounds [being] born together with 
syllables, (...) verse, song, speech [having] a common origin.” As Rousseau affirms 
in his Dictionary, music, as we understand it, is not natural to human beings. What 
                                                
12 EOL, p. 282 (411). 
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is natural is, precisely, this use of inflections (“cadence and sounds”) to 
communicate the modification of a passion. (Like metaphors, music is a much later 
development in the history of languages.) Here again the communication attempted 
with these proto “melodies” was probably, as with the first words, marred by errors 
and idiosyncrasies. For this reason, Rousseau could never have seriously affirmed, 
and indeed he never did, that our passions are universally attached to certain sounds, 
even if the form in which he presents his ideas might suggest the opposite 
conclusion. At any rate, two things, tacitly denied by Derrida, seem to have been 
essential for Rousseau on this regard. First, that these primitive variations of sounds 
were only possible because of an awareness, by the individual, of the passions at 
stake; and therefore that these sounds were, regardless of their communicative 
effectiveness, meaningful to that individual. Secondly, that even if we think of these 
primitive sounds as having been both established and altered as conventions, later 
when musical intervals became fixed and music was invented, the inflections of 
speech must have been used as natural references. Different than with grammar, 
there was no semantic crisis in the way the elements of music developed: whereas 
with metaphorical language human beings had realized their blunders (i.e. the 
merely conventional value of their words), the first intervals, rhythms and modes of 
music were still seen, after all the transformations suffered by those first inflections, 
as representations of the human passions. 
Hence, one can speculate that, for Rousseau, the first inflections of the 
human voice were, at least in one sense, natural: as the first human makings, they 
shaped the development of the human passions, becoming at a later stage a “natural” 
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reference for the musical expression of a people. To this we can add the more trivial 
observation that many sounds associated with the human passions can be traced 
back to a more identifiable primitive (animal) origin. That said, regardless of these 
speculations and contrary to what Derrida defends, it should become clear that there 
is no “ideal of the all-harmonious voice” in Rousseau, at least not as a philosophical 
concept.13  
To consider what mainly interests Rousseau about the relation between music 
and nature, we must distinguish between two senses of nature that are deliberately 
blurred in his work. One is nature in its continuous, pre-human, ineffable sense, 
which, according to Derrida, Rousseau “say[s] without saying, see[s] without 
seeing.” The other is human nature. The distinction is obviously vital. Rousseau 
would agree with Derrida that human beings start already “outside” of the first 
sense of nature and that, from the beginning, human language is made of arbitrary 
conventions; in this sense the concept of “human nature” would be contradictory: 
man is and has always been a product of his own “writings.” However, as we have 
seen, for Rousseau there is more than one side to these arbitrary conventions. For 
him, the deceptions that from the start characterize the human condition do not 
preclude what we can call elementary self-knowledge; neither do they preclude the 
understanding of the intellectual development of the human species that starts with 
this elementary self-knowledge.  
The consideration of the origin of languages in terms of the first human 
faculties such as consciousness and the imagination is central to the main challenge 
                                                
13 Gramm., p.198. 
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in Rousseau’s work, namely, to understand the “logic” that develops with the 
characteristically human sensing (sentiment) of one’s own existence. We can say 
that this “logic of self-presence” (and the role it had in the history of mankind) is 
another way of referring to Rousseau’s political-psychology. It escapes Derrida’s 
logic of supplementarity because it articulates presence – which deconstruction 
depicts as the source of all our evils – as something inextricable from human life. 
This notion of the inextricability of presence can be associated with the 
“doctrinarian” sense of Rousseau’s work, that is to say, with what Derrida and 
others take to be his theory of the natural goodness of man.  
Let us state this succinctly: it is not goodness that is natural for Rousseau, 
but the necessity of goodness as a value – not presence, but the necessity of it. 
Again, we must have in mind the fundamental distinction: the “nature” or 
“(con)formation” of the first individuals of the species must not be confounded with 
that of human beings as we see them today. Rousseau’s doctrine of the natural 
goodness of man is a moral-political doctrine that refers to human beings as he sees 
them in their current state; it is not a metaphysical position and it is not, in spite of 
his intention of allowing such an impression to his readers, a theory about our 
distant origins. Thus returning to our point about music, the difficulty, here too, is 
with what is left behind by Derrida’s consideration of “the voice of nature.” The 
relation between music and nature is not derived from what Rousseau teaches us 
about the original differences between human beings and other animals, for music 
implies a sense of order that only appears at a much later stage of human life; what 
Rousseau “says without saying” is that the elements of music (melody in particular) 
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were natural developments from the cadences and sounds that at that later stage 
were directly associated with the various human passions. It is only when taken in 
isolation, namely, without the consideration of the vast distance separating the 
moments in question, that “the voice of nature” can be confounded with an “ideal of 
the all-harmonious voice.”14  
The allegation that regardless of how we put it, the relation between music 
and nature would still denote an allegiance to the metaphysics of presence can be in 
principle dismissed by what Paul de Man says on the matter:  
[Rousseau’s] text (...) accounts for its own mode of writing, it states 
at the same time the necessity of making this statement itself in an 
indirect, figural way that knows it will be misunderstood by being 
taken literally.15  
 
For de Man,  
what happens in Rousseau is exactly what happens in Derrida: a 
vocabulary of substance and of presence is no longer used 
declaratively, but rhetorically, for the very reasons that are being 
(metaphorically) stated.16  
 
Hence, far from becoming prey to presence, de Man presents Rousseau as a master 
on the subject. Unfortunately, de Man goes too far with his claim that Rousseau’s 
understanding of language coincides with Derrida’s. It is true that Rousseau’s 
                                                
14  
 
15 De Man, Blindness and Insight, p. 136. Henceforth, Blindness. 
16 Ibid. pp. 138-9. 
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arguments on music and morality are, to a great extent, contingent on his times,17 
but they are also inspired by his understanding of what separates human beings from 
other animals; in this sense, they respect a logical principle. Certainly, Rousseau’s 
rhetoric is not aimed at a theological understanding of nature, as affirms Derrida.18 
Yet, de Man moves to the other extreme and defends that Rousseau’s rhetoric is 
about the “hollowness” of human language, or the mere “prefigur[ation of the 
text’s] own misunderstanding as the correlative of its rhetorical nature.”19 De Man 
maintains that Rousseau’s language was purely literary and that all the 
ambivalences present in his work were nothing but the very tissue of what one can 
call his philosophy:  
Despite the apparent alacrity with which one is willing to assent in 
principle to the notion that all literary and some philosophical 
language is essentially ambivalent, the implied function of most 
critical commentaries and some literary influences is still to do away 
at all costs with these ambivalences; by reducing them to 
contradictions, blotting out the disturbing parts of the work or, more 
subtly, by manipulating the systems of valorization that are operating 
within the texts. When, especially as in the case of Rousseau, the 
ambivalence is itself a part of the philosophical statement, this is very 
likely to happen.20  
 
                                                
17 See Rousseau’s First Discourse, where he identifies modern life as the motivation for his action, 
giving us reasons to believe that his critique is contingent on the historical situation.  
18 Derrida entirely misconstrues Rousseau’s references to religion and to providence as a serious 
attempt on Rousseau’s part to infer his philosophy from a theological doctrine. See Gramm., pp. 
256, 257, 259, 260, 298-9. 
19 Blindness, p.136. 
20 Ibid., pp. 111-2 (my italics). 
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Against Derrida – who misses the ultimately literary character (intention?) of 
Rousseau’s rhetoric and thus the distinction indicated by de Man between 
ambiguities and contradictions21 – de Man argues that Rousseau’s  
description of oral speech or of music can be shown to possess, from 
the start, all the elements of distance and negation that prevent written 
language from ever achieving a condition of unmediated presence.22  
 
However, like Derrida, his departing point is Rousseau’s Essay, not the Second 
Discourse. He uses the same problematic interpretative strategies to arrive at his 
anticlimactic conclusion, according to which, for Rousseau, both vocal language and 
music respect a diachronic rather than a synchronic structure. Chapter 16 of the 
Essay, ‘False Analogy between Colors and Sounds,’ holds, according to de Man, 
sufficient and unambiguous evidence for his main claim, namely, that “contrary to 
Derrida’s assertion, Rousseau’s theory of representation is not directed toward 
meaning as presence and plenitude but toward meaning as void.”23  
De Man grounds his interpretation on a passage from that chapter where 
Rousseau affirms that sounds are not natural but always determined by relations that 
have no referent in nature. He disregards the fact that Rousseau’s discussion of 
music and valorization of melody over harmony address primarily a cultural and 
                                                
21 De Man avoids a direct attack on his mentor; on the question of Rousseau’s ambivalence, he says 
“the text of De La Grammatologie necessarily fluctuates.” According to him, Derrida’s critique of 
Rousseau can be summarized as follows: “[Rousseau] ‘knew’, in a sense, that his doctrine disguised 
his insight into something closely resembling its opposite, but he chose to remain blind to this 
knowledge.” That said, “having deliberately bracketed the question of the author’s knowledge of his 
own ambivalence, Derrida proceeds as if Rousseau’s blindness did not require any further 
qualification. This leads to simplifications in the description of Rousseau’s stated positions on 
matters of ethics and history” (Blindness, pp. 116 and 119). 
22 Blindness, p. 115. 
23 Ibid., p. 127. 
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musicological concern. As does Derrida, he also misses the fact that in order to 
consider the relation between music and nature, one must take into account the 
different moments in the development of the species implied by Rousseau. 
Consequently, de Man also fails to appreciate the logical relation between the layers 
contained in Rousseau’s rhetoric. By interpreting the ambiguities in the text as 
“correlative to its rhetorical nature,” he does not see that Rousseau’s writing 
strategy is a necessity imposed by the nature of politics (in the large sense of the 
term), not of language.24 Rousseau rhetoric is a necessary evil that appears with the 
natural contrast between philosophy and politics. This is the sense in which he can 
be associated to the Western philosophical tradition and this is the reason why his 
“doctrines” must be separated from his metaphysical views. A merely literary 
approach to Rousseau’s texts is incompatible with his greater philosophical 
arguments, which, unfortunately, we can only access obliquely.  
De Man’s mistake is not so much in the fact that he reads passages such as 
“in a harmonic system, a given sound is nothing by natural right” or “the field of 
music is time, that of painting space” as evidence of the diachronicity of music, but 
the fact that he takes this diachronicity to be the heart of the matter for Rousseau. 
That music and language are formed diachronically, namely, that sounds have no 
absolute (synchronic) reference in nature, would not indeed (as should have become 
clear from our previous discussion) have been a matter of contention for Rousseau. 
                                                
24 Cf. de Man, Allegories of Reading, Yale (1979), p. 156. Henceforth, Allegories. We note, 
however, that Rousseau’s decision to be elliptic about crucial points and to organize his text in the 
way he did was unrelated to his acknowledgement of the limitations of discursive reason. The 
political reasons for his rhetorical strategy will be treated in the second part of this dissertation. 
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However, to affirm that the “rhetoricity” or the deliberate ambiguity of his language 
is a goal in itself, or that music and language are, for him, “hollow at the core,”25 is 
simply to ignore all his fundamental hypotheses about human origins and the 
different “states of nature” that punctuate the Second Discourse.  
De Man’s trick to free Rousseau from Derrida’s indictment is to transform 
him into a deconstructionist avant la lettre.26 If Rousseau’s language is, like 
Derrida’s, allegorical,27 then a certain coherence of such “allegoricity” should be 
found throughout his texts. Rousseau’s rhetoric or literary language would have 
followed strictly, like Derrida’s, the motto “the only literal statement that says what 
it means to say is the assertion that there can be no literal statements;”28 if one 
accepts this, his work could be studied unsystematically or aphoristically, namely, 
any isolated passage would illustrate the natural ambivalence of language expressed 
by that motto, either by confirming or questioning it.  
We do not have to leave the chapter of the Essay used by de Man to see how 
his claim does not do justice to what Rousseau is telling us. Consider for instance 
the following passage:  
the voice proclaims a being endowed with sense (un être sensible); 
only animate bodies sing. It is not the mechanical flutist that plays the 
flute, but the engineer who measured the flow of air and made the 
fingers move.29  
 
                                                
25 “Music becomes a mere structure because it is hollow at the core, because it ‘means’ the negation 
of all presence.” Blindness, p. 128. 
26 Allegories, p. 141. 
27 “The allegorical mode is accounted for in the description of all language as figural and in the 
necessarily diachronic structure of the reflection that reveals this insight.” Blindness, p. 135. 
28  Ibid., p. 133. 
29 EOL, p. 291 (420). My italics. 
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Following de Man’s argument, if language – “[whose] structural characteristics (...) 
are exactly the same as those attributed to music”30 – is hollow at the core or devoid 
of meaning, is because it is the result of a process of interaction that starts and ends 
before the single individuals can account for it; it is not the individual who invents 
language, but language who invents the individual.31 And if we are all prisoners of a 
fiction, then the notion of a free action, at least in the sense intended by Rousseau, 
is a chimera. Yet here, as well as in other more crucial passages, Rousseau clearly 
implies that human beings are not passive or merely mechanical beings, and that 
they have the principle of their action (anima) in themselves. Would de Man suggest 
that Rousseau’s notion of free action is just another side of the intended 
ambivalence in his text? Can one really be persuaded, even if we leave it to terms of 
this chapter of the Essay, that Rousseau is more serious about the “rhetoricity” of 
language than about the human capacity of free agency?  
De Man does not openly contradict Rousseau’s notion of freedom or free 
will; instead, he sets aside what he perceives as being ambiguous and affirms that 
Rousseau’s notion of freedom is “Nietzschean:”  
From the start, freedom appears as an act of the will (...) pitted against 
the ever-present obstacle of a limitation which it tries to transgress. It 
is a consequence, or another version, of the statement at the beginning 
of the Second Discourse, that the specificity of man forever escapes 
our grasp since ‘the more we study man . . . the less we are in a 
position to know him’ (3:123). Any confinement within the 
boundaries of an anthropological self-definition is therefore felt to be 
a restriction beyond which man, as a being devoid of natural 
specificity, will have to transgress. This will to transgress, in a pre-
Nietzschean passage, is held by Rousseau to be the very definition of 
the Spirit: ‘the power to will or, rather, the power to choose, as well 
                                                
30 Blindness, p. 131. 
31 Allegories, p. 160. 
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as the feeling of this power is a purely spiritual act’ (3:142). Very 
little distinguishes power to will, or willpower (puissance de vouloir) 
from ‘will to power,’ since the power to choose is precisely the power 
to transgress whatever in nature would entail the end of human 
power.32  
 
De Man seems to maintain the very practice he denounces. Is the passage 
from the Preface of the Second Discours – in his free translation, “the more we 
study man . . . the less we are in a position to know him” – enough evidence that, 
for Rousseau, no knowledge about our origins is possible? Let us first underline that 
what de Man means by knowledge here is “confine[d] within the boundaries of an 
anthropological self-definition.” He is clear throughout his text that the target of 
deconstruction is epistemology, the alternative being the infinite openness of 
literature, not wisdom. The attack on “Western logocentrism” seems to ignore the 
difference between epistemology and philosophy, namely, between scientific 
discourse and philosophical rhetoric, and therefore between the latter and 
literature.33 The ambivalence dismissed by de Man about the passage from 
Rousseau’s Preface is in the possibility of more than one approach to the study of 
man. This is better appreciated if we consider the full passage:  
What is more cruel still is that every progress (progrés) of the human 
Species (Espéce) removes it increasingly farther from its primitive 
                                                
32 Allegories, pp. 139-40. 
33 “The impossibility of reaching a rationally enlightened anthropology also accounts for the 
necessary leap into fiction, since no past or present human action can coincide with or be under way 
towards the nature of man” (ibid., p. 141). De Man does not see that Rousseau’s philosophical 
rhetoric is less a response to a theoretical than to a political necessity. Rousseau “leaps into fiction” 
because of the limitation of discursive reason and the natural difficulty of human communication, 
not because he sees communication and knowledge as impossible. See Allegories, pp. 137, 142, 155 
and 158. Also, it is not the nature of literature that makes it political, but politics that commands the 
necessity of a certain kind of writing (cf. with pp. 156-9). 
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state – the more new knowledge we accumulate, the more we deprive 
ourselves of the means of acquiring the most important knowledge of 
all – and that, in a sense, it is for studying man so much that we were 
put out of a position to know him.34  
 
Rousseau indicates a difficulty, not necessarily an impossibility. The 
difficulty regards both the object and the method of approaching it. But again, he 
speaks of two objects as if they were one. In the first part of the sentence, the object 
is our primitive condition which was lost in the night of times due to all the 
transformations of the human constitution produced by the “progress of the 
species;” in the second part, the object must be “man as [we] see him today,”35 of 
whom knowledge is blocked because of a certain sense in which he has been 
continuously studied. There are two ways in which we can understand the study of 
man here: the study of man as body and the study of man as soul. If this distinction 
is indeed presupposed by Rousseau, then one perspective must be examined in light 
of the other. But whereas the study of man as body can be associated with the 
epistemological effort of the tradition attacked by de Man, and can indeed be the 
sense of the study of man that according to Rousseau crippled our chances to know 
ourselves, it was responsible, at the same time, for the emancipation of passions and 
the explosion of desires that fuel the notion of freedom mistakenly attributed to 
Rousseau by de Man. De Man’s radically modern definition of freedom – “the 
power to transgress whatever in nature would entail the end of human power” –  is 
radically dependent on the sense of the study of man that he condemns.36 
                                                
34 SD, p. 124 (122-3). My italics. 
35 SD, p. 134 (134). 
36 That de Man’s freedom does not correspond to Rousseau’s philosophical understanding of 
freedom or free action and that it is fully incompatible with Rousseauean freedom in its political-
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Having said that, if Rousseau merely considered the possibility of the study 
of man as soul (namely, the alternative to the study of man stressed by de Man), 
then he must have at least conjectured the possibility to acquire “the most important 
knowledge of all.” Two reasons indicate that he considers this possibility. First, the 
study of man implied by “the inscription on the Temple at Delphi,” “Know 
Thyself,” is the theme of the book;37 the denial of the possibility of self-knowledge 
not only would make the whole project absurd, but also would amount to the 
adoption of a dogmatic starting point, precisely what Rousseau wants to reject. 
Secondly, right before the passage in question, Rousseau compares the subject of his 
discourse to an image taken from Plato.38 As Socrates in the Republic, he compares 
the current state of the human soul to a statue of the sea-god Glaucus.  
 Before we return and conclude with de Man, let us examine this second 
point in detail. According to Ovid’s account in the Metamorphoses (13,900 – 
14,74), a book also deeply familiar to Rousseau, before becoming a god, Glaucus 
was a fisherman. Glaucus relates that he once sat on a meadow on the border of the 
                                                                                                                                            
psychological sense does not mean that one should uncritically endorse the traditional view 
cynically rejected by him: “Should we infer with the traditional interpreters of Rousseau, that the 
intersubjective, reflective situation of self-encounter, as in the specular self-fascination of 
Narcissus, is indeed for Rousseau the paradigmatic experience from which all other experiences are 
derived?” Allegories, p. 152. 
37 Note how Rousseau starts the Preface: “The most useful and the least advanced of all human 
knowledge seems to me to be that of man (...), and I dare say that the inscription on the Temple of 
Delphi alone contained a more important and more difficult Precept than all the big Books of the 
Moralists. I therefore consider the subject of this Discourse to be one of the most interesting 
questions Philosophy might raise (...)” SD, p. 124 (122). See also how he starts the Exordium and 
Part One, and the contrast right at the outset between two understandings of man: l’homme and 
l’Homme.  
38 Rep. 611b-d. 
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sea to fish. He was the first to have set foot on that meadow, which had never been 
spoiled or cropped by cows and goats, and whose flowers had never been visited by 
bees. After laying his catch on that perfect grass he saw something miraculous 
happen. In contact with the grass, the catch was brought back to life and fled back to 
the sea while Glaucus watched awestruck. He wondered, “Had some god done it or 
was it the juice of the herb?” Glaucus decides to eat the herb but agonizes with the 
reaction and throws himself in the sea. There, he was received by the sea-gods, 
purged of what was mortal in him, and altered in his physical and mental 
constitution.  
The ancients represented the sea-god Glaucus by a human figure with all 
sorts of sea-bred accretions grafted onto his body and face. Rousseau compares the 
current state of the human soul to a statue of Glaucus (namely, a statue of a 
monstrous image) that was disfigured by the action of time, i.e. by storms and by 
the sea, having acquired, therefore, actual sea-bred accretions.  
The image has puzzling features. The purely natural is represented by 
an artifact, a sculpted image of a god, and the god himself is a 
peculiar one. (...) We are enjoined to remove the natural sea-bred 
accretions to have a better view of a mere artifact representing a god 
who originally was human, and whose divine shape was grotesquely 
distorted by an apparel of mythical sea monsters.39  
 
How can the original of the disfigured copy of Glaucus represent the natural 
state of the human soul? How can it represent the soul of the first individuals of the 
species? On a first sight, the image is indeed puzzling: “Is Rousseau’s natural man 
                                                
39 R.Velkley, Being after Rousseau, Chicago (2002), p. 37. 
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also only something of common human origin that has been deified, and perfected, 
by a poetic fiction?”40 
With relation to the premise on the surface level of the Preface – i.e. that the 
study of man as soul is possible – the image can be seen as a metaphor for the 
immense distance that we need to account for in order to contemplate our origins. 
At the same time, it suggests the impossibility of knowing our origins, for how can 
we know the original of the being that the statue represents? If this is the crucial 
opposition posed by the image, then the key to the Delphic injunction is already 
present in the Preface of the Second Discourse. As Velkley puts it,  
Rousseau seems to follow some aspects of the Platonic account of 
knowing: knowing must proceed through images. (...) The Glaucus 
analogy is a prime example of Rousseau’s mastery of the Platonic art 
of educating through images, which he employs in every writing as 
part of his philosophical rhetoric.41  
 
There is, however, another ambivalence that is not related to the sheer incongruence 
or oddness of the Glaucus analogy.42 The incongruence fades away and the 
ambiguity becomes a positive one when we turn to the hypothesis that Ovid’s image 
of Glaucus is also playing a role for Rousseau. Glaucus, the original of the copy that 
represents our soul, was initially a man. But the symbolism used by Ovid to present 
the man Glaucus is rather particular. It might have struck Rousseau for its parallel 
with the Biblical account of the fall43 or, more interestingly, as the inversion of the 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., pp. 37-8. 
42 The relevance of this other ambivalence depends on whether Rousseau actually meant the 
expanded signification of his image and its context. This same question will be crucial in our 
consideration, later in this work, of Rousseau’s first note to the Second Discourse. 
43 Whether that symbolism was Ovid’s or actually belonged to an older tradition is irrelevant here. 
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Biblical fall: Glaucus is a mortal who by eating the virgin herb becomes immortal. 
Rousseau might have thought of Glaucus’ fall as a metaphor for the birth of the 
human soul and for the passage from a pre-reflective to a reflective state. But 
whereas according to the Biblical account the human soul falls from the heavens, 
here it is created on Earth. Glaucus’ choice between attributing, unreflectively, the 
incident of the re-birth of the fish to the will of the gods or reflecting about its 
possible physical causes44 denotes, on the one hand, the original awareness of death, 
and on the other, the ensuing initiative (action) on the individual’s part to avoid 
death, namely, the idea that the virgin herb would make him immortal.  
Thus, by taking Ovid’s tale into account, the image of the disfigured statue of 
Glaucus points to three “originals.” One is the statue itself in its original unaltered 
shape, which can be associated with the idealized account of the nature of human 
beings as seen today, namely, as already altered in their physical and mental 
constitution;45 in the Second Discourse, Rousseau refers to this sense when he writes 
“l’Homme.” The second is the god that the original statue represents, which can be 
associated with the elusive sense of a being in metamorphosis, “l’homme.” The third 
is the man Glaucus, whose fundamental spiritual elements (awareness of death, 
elementary self-consciousness, and freedom of choice) can be associated with the 
first beings of the species. Rousseau refers to this third sense when he writes 
“l’homme Sauvage.”46 
                                                
44 “Had some god done it or was it the juice of the herb?” Metam. 13.940. 
45  Metam. 13.955 
46 In chapter 3, we will return to the question of the different spellings of crucial terms in the 
Second Discourse, but one can anticipate Rousseau’s procedure by reading his note to Émile, 
 59 
De Man’s claim that “the ambivalence [in Rousseau’s text] is itself a part of 
the philosophical statement”47 – in other words, that Rousseau’s understanding of 
language and knowledge is naturally ambiguous and always contextual – shows that 
his interpretation was limited to the surface narrative of the text. The image of 
Glaucus is just one of the many examples of how, contrary to de Man’s perception, 
Rousseau uses a subterranean narrative when discussing his most complex subjects. 
Rousseau’s rhetoric is never merely diffusive, although in order to make sense of 
his texts we often need to explore the full content of his images and push them to 
the limit of their signification. This is why the claim that “there is nothing outside 
the text” is, at least insofar as Rousseau is concerned, a stultifying thesis: the main 
things are kept precisely “outside” and can only be articulated through a 
consideration of what is anathema to the deconstructionists, namely, the intention of 
the author. De Man does not even mention the image of Glaucus. One can suspect 
that because for him this sort of interpretation would compromise his thesis that 
Rousseau’s “rhetoricity” is an end in itself, his views about language, as in Derrida, 
pre-conditioned his whole interpretation – or the extent of it.  
The Glaucus image points us in another direction. It sorts out the 
contradiction on the surface level of the text, namely, the contradiction between the 
injunction to self-knowledge and the notion “that the specificity of man forever 
escapes our grasp.”48 The positive ambivalence contained in the image shows that, 
                                                                                                                                            
Pléiade ed., vol. 4, p. 345: “I have a hundred times in writing made the reflection that it is 
impossible in a long work always to give the same meanings to the same words.” 
47 Blindness, p. 111. 
48 I.e. that “the more we study man . . . the less we are in a position to know him.” Allegories, pp. 
139-40. My emphasis.  
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for Rousseau, there is a way in which both self-knowledge and knowledge about our 
origins are possible, even though de Man would be right to claim that the knowledge 
here would not be epistemological or immediate.49 Let us be clear about this point. 
The mere fact that on the surface narrative of his text Rousseau incurs the 
ambivalences or contradictions pointed out by his commentators shows that, for 
him, self-knowledge and knowledge about our origins (the study of man as soul) 
cannot, in principle, be immediate objects of discursive reason. De Man is correct in 
pointing out that Rousseau’s rhetoric should be sufficient evidence that he does not 
intend to convey any sort of immediate presence with his writings; but it should be 
clear by now that a denial of “presence” does not imply an endorsement of 
“difference.” For Rousseau, the communication of philosophical ideas 
(philosophical knowledge) such as the ones of the Second Discourse must be done 
indirectly: “knowing must proceed through images.”50 Perhaps we can infer by 
                                                
49 If philosophical self-knowledge is possible for Rousseau, it is possible, clearly, only at the end of 
a very long journey. Not only does Rousseau make no promises, but also the use of a thick 
rhetorical layer to protect whatever in his work can help in that journey denotes his pessimism 
regarding that possibility. Richard Velkley notes that Rousseau’s pessimism is double. On the one 
hand, Rousseau’s rhetorical strategy and “doctrines” attest his lack of faith in human self-
determination; on the other, the possibility of self-knowledge, philosophy and philosophical 
freedom is not equivalent to the possibility of happiness or self-fulfillment, for the liberation of 
philosophy leads also to the awareness of “the inescapable bondage of human nature” (op. cit., p. 
35). 
50 Velkley, op. cit., p. 37. The passage from the note in Émile with which Derrida ends his Of 
Grammatology should be understood exactly in these terms. “Most learned men are learned in the 
way of children. Vast erudition results less from a multitude of ideas than from a multitude of 
images. Dates, proper names, places, all objects isolated or devoid  of ideas are retained solely by 
memory of signs; and rarely does one recall some one of these things without at the same time 
seeing the page on the right- or the left-hand side where it was read or the form in which it was seen 
the first time. Pretty nearly such was the science fashionable in the last ages. That of our age is 
 61 
analogy that the communication of philosophical ideas suffers, from Rousseau’s 
perspective, from the same deficiency of the elementary communication of ideas of 
the first human beings. Language provides only a limited (metaphorical) reference 
to the abstract objects of philosophy (e.g. the states of the soul, being, etc), which 
can only be generalized indirectly or intuitively. Hence the necessity to consider, in 
spite of all the risks of failure, the intention of the (philosophical) author. The main 
thing missed by the deconstructionists in their analysis of Rousseau is this implicit, 
but nonetheless fundamental, distinction between “language” and “the art of 
communicating ideas.” 
De Man attempts to correct Derrida’s interpretation by calling our attention 
to the rhetorical importance of Rousseau’s language and by rightly assessing that 
Rousseau’s text “postulates the necessity of its own misreading.”51 He stresses the 
centrality of the Second Discourse in Rousseau’s works and the importance of the 
neglected passage on the origin of languages in that book.52 However, as Derrida, he 
seems to approach Rousseau looking for confirmations, not for answers. Even if de 
Man presents Rousseau in an apparently more positive way than does Derrida, 
Rousseau remains for him a deceitful paradigm – a statue of Glaucus disfigured by 
the action of time. This is flagrant in de Man’s treatment (or non-treatment) of 
                                                                                                                                            
something else. One no longer studies, one no longer observes, one dreams; and we are gravely 
presented with the dreams of some bad nights as philosophy. I will be told that I, too, dream. I 
agree; but I give my dreams as dreams, which others are not careful to do, leaving it to the reader to 
find out whether they contain something useful for people who are awake” (book 2, p. 112 (in the 
Pléiade ed., vol. 4, pp. 350-1)). Translation by A. Bloom, Basic Books (1979). See also p. 108 
(345). 
51 Blindness, p.136. 
52 Allegories, pp. 143 and 159. 
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freedom in Rousseau. He distorts one of the most crucial passages in the Second 
Discourse in order to equate Rousseau’s notion of freedom to his own: freedom as 
the power to choose or to will, and as such, the power to transgress.53 Rousseau is 
clear that the will is not the essence but the means of freedom. Choice presupposes a 
reference within oneself, a certain knowledge or, in his words, a recognition of that 
power. If we abstract from this knowledge, the fundamental difference between 
human beings and beasts disappears – it becomes, as wanted Condillac, a difference 
of degree, not of quality. With the chaotic emancipation of their passions, human 
beings would be in the ever-inferior situation of having to depend on the artificiality 
of their languages and reason: perfectibility would be always a curse, never a 
blessing. Accordingly, the order brought about by artificial reason would have the 
merely utilitarian function of allowing human beings a peaceful or bearable 
existence, at best.  
Rousseau is explicit that it is not understanding – therefore, not language – 
that separates human beings from other animals, but de Man’s interpretation tacitly 
denies this fundamental point. Supposing freedom as the power to transgress, we 
transgress in the name of what? If freedom is either the power to manifest our 
individual amour-propre or, at best, the amour-propre of the human race,54 then 
human beings are, in the first case, not different than other animals, and in the 
second, entirely dependent on the faculty that Rousseau affirms after all not to be 
the specific difference between human beings and other animals, namely, 
                                                
53 Allegories, p. 140. 
54 “The power to choose is precisely the power to transgress whatever in nature would entail the end 
of human power” (ibid.). 
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understanding. Rousseau’s thinking about our origins is, therefore, the exact 
opposite of that of de Man and Derrida.55 His re-ordering of the human passions 
must be studied in light of his philosophical, not anthropological, understanding of 
human beings, because the germ of philosophy is, for him, prior to the germ of 
poetry, because philosophy is more natural than poetry.  
Every animal has ideas, since it has senses; up to a point it even 
combines its ideas, and in this respect man differs from the Beast only 
as more does from less: Some Philosophers have even suggested that 
there is a greater difference between one given man and another than 
there is between a given man and a given beast; It is, then, not so 
much the understanding that constitutes the specific difference 
between man and the other animals, as it is his property of being a 
free agent. Nature commands every animal, and the Beast obeys. Man 
experiences the same impression, but he recognizes himself free to 
acquiesce or to resist; and it is mainly in the consciousness of this 
freedom that the spirituality of his soul exhibits itself: for Physics in a 
way explains the mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas; 
but in the power of willing, or rather of choosing, and in the sentiment 
of this power, are found purely spiritual acts about which nothing is 
explained by the Laws of Mechanics.56 
 
                                                
55 Derrida’s interpretation is, in this regard, less problematic than de Man’s. 
56 “Tout animal a des idées puis qu'il a des sens, il combine même ses idées jusqu'à un certain point, 
et l'homme ne différe à cet égard de la Bête que du plus au moin: Quelques Philosophes ont même 
avancé qu'il y a plus de différence de tel homme à tel homme que de tel homme à telle bête; Ce n'est 
donc pas tant l'entendement qui fait parmi les animaux la distinction spécifique de l'homme que sa 
qualité d'agent libre. La Nature commande à tout animal, et la Bête obéït. L'homme éprouve la 
même impression, mais il se reconnoît libre d'acquiescer, ou de resister; et c'est surtout dans la 
conscience de cette liberté que se montre la spiritualité de son ame: car la Physique explique en 
quelque maniére le mécanisme des sens et la formation des idées; mais dans la puissance de vouloir 
ou plûtôt de choisir, et dans le sentiment de cette puissance on ne trouve que des actes purement 






The Difference between Human Beings and Beasts 
 
 
Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages, deconstruction’s paradigmatic 
text, must be read in light of the Second Discourse. The relation between the two 
texts is at the same time evident and elusive; it is evident because of the common 
archeological theme of both works; it is elusive because much of what is said in one 
text seems to muddle what is said in the other. Clearly, it was not Rousseau’s 
intention to make the true relation between his texts readily accessible. In order to 
understand the logic of this relation we must take into account and correctly assess 
Rousseau’s rhetorical strategy. The Second Discourse only reveals its propaedeutic 
function when we fully confront that strategy. We must resist approaching the text 
in the manner of the deconstructionists, for that would inevitably lead, right at the 
outset, to a misunderstanding of the plan of the book and of the fundamental 
distinctions presupposed by Rousseau. 
Derrida’s and de Man’s respective literal and literary readings are 
incompatible with a positive approach to Rousseau’s rhetoric, an approach that 
needs to start with the presupposition that Rousseau’s rhetoric is philosophical and 
not merely diffusive. Derrida starts with an a priori view of Rousseau’s general 
 65 
understanding of language, which he denounces as dogmatic. De Man starts in the 
right direction by claiming that Rousseau’s rhetoric is the evidence of how he 
understood language, but his Derridean conception of language limits his 
interpretation and makes him twist Rousseau’s central point about human freedom. 
According to deconstruction, we cannot meet Rousseau’s challenge of thinking the 
origin of languages because we cannot go, as it were, beyond language. With de 
Man, the claim is that Rousseau is fully aware of the impossibility of discoursing 
about our nature and therefore that he is not serious when he does it. De Man goes 
to the extreme of calling Rousseau’s “rhetoricity” the ultimate goal of his whole 
effort. Yet, as we have suggested in the last chapter, the “rhetoricity” that de Man 
brings to the center of things reflects nothing but his own incapacity to make sense 
of Rousseau’s rhetoric and to find the meaning of Rousseau’s texts.  
In their allegorical-aphorismatic approach, the deconstructionists do not 
address the real question in Rousseau’s study of the human origins: what makes 
human beings fundamentally different than other animals? Their failure, however, is 
not only due to their specific approach. It has deeper roots. In the next pages we will 
examine the passage in the Second Discourse that is at the heart of the debate that 
deconstruction did not articulate.  
Like the third chapter of the Essay and, unfortunately, not in a less enigmatic 
manner, the passage of the Second Discourse in question addresses the dilemma 
about the origin of general ideas.1 It is here where Rousseau marks his main 
difference (on the related questions of the origin of languages and the difference 
                                                
1 We will focus on four paragraphs, from the one starting with “Man’s first language...” to the one 
ending in “... anything but proper names” (SD, pp. 146-8 (148-50)). 
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between human beings and other animals) with the Lockean tradition represented by 
Condillac, who is mistakenly seen by some as Rousseau’s main source for the 
passage.2 Let us move in steps.  
When men’s ideas began to expand and to multiply, and closer 
communication was established among them, they sought more 
numerous signs and a more extended language: They multiplied the 
inflections of the voice and added gestures which are by their Nature 
more expressive, an less dependent for their meaning on prior 
agreement. Thus they expressed visible and moving objects by means 
of gestures, and objects that strike the ear by imitative sounds: but 
because gesture indicates almost only present or easily described 
objects and visible actions; because it is not universally serviceable 
since darkness or an interfering body render it useless, and because it 
requires attention rather than exciting it; it finally occurred to men to 
substitute for it the articulations of the voice which, although they do 
not stand in the same relation to some ideas, are better suited (plus 
propres) to represent them all, inasmuch as they are instituted signs; a 
substitution which can only have been made by common consent, and 
which must have been rather difficult to be implemented by men 
whose crude vocal apparatus (dont les organes grossiers) had as yet 
had no practice, and which is even more difficult to conceive of in 
itself, since this unanimous agreement must have been motivated, and 
since speech seems to have been very necessary in order to establish 
the use of speech.3  
 
Rousseau’s riddle at the end of this paragraph can be summarized as follows: 
how was the transition from the merely mimetic language based on gestures and on 
the voice of nature to a language based on sounds agreed to represent common ideas 
of the participants of that language (namely, to a language based on words) 
possible? If the first words referred to objects that were perceived by each 
                                                
2 We will not examine the differences between Locke and Condillac, or the debate between the 
latter and Buffon. From Rousseau’s point of view, it is clear that their common epistemological 
paradigm outweighs their differences, at least in what concerns the subject matter of the Second 
Discourse. We should remember that the empiricist epistemological paradigm is also shared by 
Derrida. See Gramm., p.162. 
3 SD, pp. 146-7 (148-9). My italics. 
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individual in a different manner – which can be inferred from what Rousseau says a 
few lines later – then what was the object of the common consent regarding the 
relation between a word and the idea of that object? And how can an idea become 
common or general to those first human individuals before the existence of the 
vocabulary and the articulation of propositions necessarily presupposed – as 
Rousseau also says later in the passage – for the introduction of general ideas in the 
mind? The apparent contradiction is stated by Rousseau himself, for “the common 
consent must have been motivated.” All individuals must have been aware of the 
necessity of the convention, which in itself presupposes the pre-existence of a 
communication based on other conventions, that is to say, based on other general 
agreements regarding words or, put differently, on the relation between a word and 
an idea common (general) to the participants of the agreement: “speech (la parole) 
seems to have been very necessary in order to establish the use of speech.” 
Although the solution to the problem is far from being obvious, it is implicit in 
Rousseau that we must be able to explain the appearance of the first conventional 
words without incurring the vicious cycle. The contradiction must be an illusion.4  
                                                
4 Locke describes this situation without seeing any contradiction whatsoever. “Thus we may 
conceive how Words, which were by Nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use 
of by Men, as the Signs of their Ideas; not by any natural connexion that there is between particular 
articulate Sounds and certain Ideas, for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men; but 
by a voluntary Imposition, whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an Idea. The 
use, then, of Words, is to be sensible Marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they stand for, are their proper 
and immediate Signification. (...) But though Words, as they are used by Men, can properly and 
immediately signify nothing but Ideas, that are in the Mind of the Speaker; yet they in their 
Thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things./ First, they suppose their Words to be 
Marks of the Ideas in the Minds also of other Men, with whom they communicate (...)./ Secondly, 
because Men would not be thought to talk barely of their own Imagination, but of Things as really 
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Rousseau continues:  
the first words (mots) used by men (les hommes) had in the Mind 
(Esprit) (...) the meaning (sens) of an entire proposition. 
 
If the first words had the meaning of entire propositions, then, obviously, the first 
inventors abstracted from the elements that in a grammatical sense compose a 
proposition. One can think that the first words were names as in the example of the 
word “giants” as the first name to indicate other human beings in general. We have 
already seen the difference between the figurative and proper sense of that word; 
however, although in the text of the Essay Rousseau uses the word in the plural 
(Géans), it is only in the Second Discourse that he allows us to infer what he means 
about the main question regarding the origin of languages, namely, the sense in 
which those first words referred already to general ideas. If the word “giants” 
represented also the idea of the passion (fear), and if we can think of that 
representation in terms of a proposition (for instance, “Beware the giant, for he 
might come kill us!”), then in spite of not being conscious of the categories 
involved (which Rousseau indicates to be an obvious impossibility), the individual 
must have used the word to communicate the implied generality of the idea, the 
order, and the action. It is the efficiency of this communication,5 a sort of intuitive 
capacity for elementary abstractions, that if demonstrated would attest that the idea 
and its implications were not only proper to that individual, but also to others as 
                                                                                                                                            
they are; therefore they often suppose their Words to stand for the reality of Things.” (Essay, III, 2, 
§§ 1-2). 
5 Not to be confounded with the semantic mistake of calling men “giants.”  
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well: that it was a general idea.6 General ideas must have been implied in the 
propositions meant by the first words. 
When Rousseau says that “(...) abstractions [e.g. metaphors] are difficult and 
not particularly natural Operations,” he has already shifted the context and adapted 
his terms. The first words represented the abstraction of movement and actions that 
later will be associated with special words called verbs.  
When [later] they began to distinguish between subject and predicate, 
and verb and noun (...), substantives were at first just so many proper 
names.7 
 
It should be clear by now that Rousseau means different things by “word,” “name,” 
and “substantive.” He says here that when substantives were distinguished from 
verbs, namely, when separate words were invented to parse the propositions initially 
implied in the first words, substantives referred first to particular ideas. Rousseau 
specifies later that by substantives he means “Physical substantives alone, that is to 
say (...) the most easily found part of Language (de la Langue).”8 At this stage of 
the development of languages, he says,  
[e]ach object was at first given a particular name; (...) and all 
particulars (tous les individus) presented themselves to the mind 
(esprit) [of the first Instituters] in isolation, just as they are in the 
picture (tableau) of Nature. If one Oak was called A, another Oak was 
called B.9 
                                                
6 The fact that this cannot be demonstrated, as premised in the book, must have been one of the 
reasons for Rousseau’s enigmatic presentation of something “found in purely spiritual acts about 
which nothing is explained by the Laws (Loix) of Mechanics” (SD, p. 141 (142)). Cf. also Locke’s 
Essay, III, 1, §1 and III, 3, §§ 1,6,7 and 8. 
7 SD, p. 147 (149). 
8 SD, p. 149 (151). He means, for instance, the substantive for tree, as opposed to a substantive for 
an abstract concept such as matter, the mind, or movement. 
9 SD, p. 147 (149). 
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What is striking here is that Rousseau closes the paragraph by invoking again the 
riddle suggested above as if he had not just given us the clue regarding the 
abstractions implied by the first words. He reiterates the embarrassment which 
characterizes those who confronted the problem: how did these particular 
substantives become general? What was the motivation? Etc. 
Rousseau says that the capacity to form general ideas is the difference 
between animals and human beings:  
Animals [can] not form [general ideas], nor ever acquire the 
perfectibility that depends on them. When a Monkey unhesitatingly 
goes from one nut to another, are we to think that he has the general 
idea of this sort of fruit and compares its archetype with these two 
particulars? Surely not; but the sight of one of these fruits recalls to 
his memory the sensations he received from the other, and his eyes, 
modified in a certain way, announce to his taste how it is about to be 
modified.10 
 
The same notion is in Locke: 
I think, Beasts compare not their Ideas, farther than some sensible 
Circumstances annexed to the Objects themselves. The other power of 
Comparing, which may be observed in Men, belonging to general 
Ideas, and useful only to abstract Reasonings, we may probably 
conjecture Beasts have not.11  
 
Having said that, the problem in Rousseau is completely different than in Locke, 
who arrives at his conclusions by comparing human beings in their current mental 
and physical constitution (again, Locke’s paradigm is children) to other animals. For 
Rousseau, to say that only human beings are capable of abstractions or general ideas 
                                                
10 SD, p. 148 (149-150). 
11 Essay, II, 11, §5.  
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begs the question (according to him impossible to address in a purely analytical 
manner) of how and why that capacity first appeared.12 
Earlier in the text Rousseau reminds us of the evident fact that, “since [they 
have] senses,” monkeys and other animals have (particular) ideas;  
“up to a point [they] even combine [their] ideas, and in this respect 
man differs from the Beast only as more does from less.”13  
 
It is true that Rousseau seems to want some of his readers to identify his view on the 
matter with both Condillac and Locke;14 however, his endorsement of Condillac’s 
doctrine that the difference between man and beast is only gradual is not serious. 
The difference between both thinkers becomes blatant with Condillac’s Treatise on 
Animals published in 1755.15 While exposed in a more concise manner, the doctrines 
defended by Condillac in that book are not different than in his previous Essay on 
the Origin of Human Knowledge. With the latter work in mind, Rousseau mentions 
                                                
12 Two difficulties direct the passage on the origin of languages in the Second Discourse: “The first 
(...) is to imagine how languages could have become necessary. (...) / [And], [s]upposing this first 
difficulty overcome (...), how they might have begun to get established” (SD, p. 145 (146-7)). 
13 SD, p.140 (141). My italics. 
14 Rousseau reminds us of this notion in a crucial paragraph of the Second Discourse: “Some 
Philosophers have even suggested that there is a greater difference between a given man and 
another than there is between a given man and a given beast.” (SD, p. 140-1 (141)). The sentence is 
found practically verbatim in Montaigne’s essay De l’inégalité qui est entre nous (Essais, I, 42) and 
Locke, Essay, IV, 20, §5. (Note Locke’s distance (“as some think...”) regarding what was the main 
cause of inequality for the tradition here at stake.) Montaigne bases his text on a passage from 
Plutarch mentioned by Rousseau a few paragraphs before in the Second Discourse (SD, pp. 138-9 
(139)); the passage belongs to a text by Plutarch to be named in a footnote to a direct reference to 
Aristotle in the Social Contract. For an analysis of this relation, see chapter 6.  
15 “[I]f beasts think, if they acknowledge some of their feelings, and if some beasts even understand 
the rudiments of our language, then in what are they different than man? Isn’t it only as more does 
from less?” Condillac, Traité des animaux, ed. 1796, p. 486. 
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Condillac at the beginning of his section on language in a rather specious fashion. 
He notes, in the midst of what otherwise appears to be mere praise, that also  
“this Philosopher (...) assumed what I question, namely some sort of 
society already established among the inventors of language.”16  
 
The differences between the two authors go well beyond the fundamental mistake 
that Rousseau also attributes to Hobbes and Locke. For Condillac, all animals are 
capable of having general ideas and the complexity of these ideas is proportional to 
the nature of their needs.17 The notions of instinct and reason describe, for 
Condillac, the same process of knowledge but in different degrees.18 What we call 
instinct is the capacity that all animals have, according to the “number of senses and 
needs, (...) to make comparisons and judge.”19 It is thus through habit that, for 
Condillac, all animals learn and know what they do.  
                                                
16 Here is the whole passage: “I could leave it at here quoting or restating the Abbé de Condillac’s 
investigations of this matter, all of which fully confirm my sentiment, and which perhaps suggested 
my first idea about it. But since the manner in which this Philosopher resolves the difficulties he 
himself raises regarding the origin of instituted signs shows that he assumed what I question, 
namely some sort of society already established among the inventors of language, I believe that I 
ought to supplement the reference to his reflections with reflections of my own, in order to exhibit 
these same difficulties in the light best suited to my subject” (SD, p. 145 (146)). 
17 “[E]ach species has pleasures and pains that are not the pleasures and pains of other species. Each 
has, therefore, different needs; each makes, separately, the necessary studies to its own 
preservation, having more or less needs, more or less habits, more or less intelligence./ It is in man 
that the pleasures and pains are greatly multiplied. To the physical qualities of objects he adds 
moral qualities and finds in things an infinite number of relations that do not exist to other animals. 
Thus his interests are vast and many; he studies them all, he produces his needs and passions of all 
sorts, and in both his habits and his reason he is superior to beasts” (Condillac, op. cit., p. 530). 
“Sensation, need, association of ideas: here’s the system to which all operations of [all] animals 
must be related” (ibid., p. 531). 
18 Ibid. pp. 487 ff. 
19 Ibid. p. 488. 
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“If to invent is the same as to judge, compare, discover, then beasts 
invent. They invent, even if by that we mean to represent in advance 
what one will make. The squirrel imagines (peint) the hut he wants to 
build; the bird, the nest he wants to construct. These animals would 
not make these works if the imagination had not given them the 
model.”20 
 
 Clearly, Condillac’s doctrines depend entirely on the notion that animals are 
fixed entities; different than Rousseau, Condillac substantiates the Biblical account 
of our origins suggested at the beginning of the second part of his Essay.21 Thus, it 
is clear that, for this and the other reasons just mentioned, Rousseau could not have 
been more at odds with Condillac’s investigations of the origin of languages. For 
Rousseau, the difference between human beings and beasts is gradual only insofar as 
all animals are endowed with senses, perception,22 and, in this sense, ideas; in other 
words, only inasmuch as the body is concerned. The difference with the empiricists 
on this point calls for a further digression that should help us understand how the 
capacity to be a free agent and the capacity to have general ideas – the things that 
                                                
20 Ibid. p. 476. “Beasts learn to touch, see, walk, feed and defend themselves, and watch for their 
own preservation. Thus they make discoveries, but only because they compare: they therefore 
invent; they even improve [perfectionnent]: for in the beginning they did not know all these things 
as they do once they have more experience” (p. 477). 
21 Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, II, 1, Exordium. See also Traité des 
animaux, p. 508-9, where Condillac’s argument for the difference between human beings and other 
animals concerning the immortality of the soul simply follows the Augustinian tradition and appeals 
to the divine providence: “[the] soul is not material and we should conclude, without a doubt, that 
the dissolution of the body does not entail the annihilation of the soul. Indeed, these two substances 
can exist one without the other; their mutual dependence happens only because God wants, and as 
long as he wants. But immortality is not natural to either and if God does not attribute it to the soul 
of beats it is solely because he does not have to.” Divine providence seems to be the only thing 
separating Condillac’s thought, like Locke’s, from sheer materialism. 
22 Cf. with Locke: “The power of Perception is that which we call the Understanding” (Essay, II, 
21, §5). 
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according to Rousseau mark the determinant difference between human beings and 
other animals – are related.  
Taken in isolation, Rousseau’s sentence that “it is not the understanding that 
constitutes the specific difference between man and other animals, as it is his 
property of being a free agent”23 is in full agreement with both Locke and Condillac. 
It is, however, in terms of what this property really means that they would have 
profoundly disagreed. For Rousseau, the main metaphysical problem with the 
empiricist doctrine (perhaps the problem that motivates his whole effort) is the 
account of human freedom found in that doctrine, which according to Locke’s 
chapter ‘On Power,’ the crucial text for this matter, can be summarized as follows. 
 The power of being a free agent is the power to act according to one’s will 
or to one’s mind.24 Because both will and freedom are powers, it makes no sense to 
question whether the will has freedom;25 human beings are not free in their wills, 
because the will is “nothing but a power in the Mind to direct the operative 
Faculties of a Man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction.”26 The 
answer to the question “what determines the Will?” is desire; the will is the 
particular determination of an action, whereas desire is what pre-determines the 
direction of the will.27 In order to achieve its goal, i.e. happiness,28 desire must be 
                                                
23 SD, p. 141 (141).  
24 Essay, II, 21, §12. 
25 Ibid., §§ 15,16 and 21.  
26 Ibid., § 29. 
27 Ibid., § 31. 
28 Ibid., § 41, 42. 
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guided towards the good, or the greatest good, as the Scriptures teach us;29 however, 
even when one is morally guided to recognize “the greatest apparent good,” one is 
constantly distracted by “the ordinary necessities of our lives.”30 The greatest 
expression of our freedom is to be found in the mind’s capacity to examine (judge) 
all the “uneasinesses” that affect us and “suspend the execution and satisfaction of 
any of its desires.”31  
“Examination is consulting a guide. The determination of the will 
upon enquiry is following the direction of that Guide: and he that has 
a power to act, or not to act according as such determination directs, 
is a free Agent.”32  
 
For Locke, the cause of unhappiness – lack of freedom or the impediment of 
the enjoyment of pleasure – can only be attributed to wrong judgment.33 Therefore, 
to be free is to act according to reason, for it is only through the accurate (viz. 
                                                
29 Ibid., § 33, 34, 35, 60 and 70. 
30 “[A]ll good, even seen, and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every particular Man’s 
desire, but only that part (...) taken to make a necessary part of his happiness” (Essay, II, 21, §43). 
“The ordinary necessities of our lives, fill a great part of them with the uneasiness of Hunger, 
Thirst, Heat, Cold, Weariness with labor, and Sleepiness in their constant returns, etc. To which, if 
besides accidental harms, we add the fantastical uneasiness, (as itch after Honor, Power, or Riches, 
etc.) which acquired habits by Fashion, Example, and Education have settled in us, and a thousand 
other irregular desires, which custom has made natural to us, we shall find, that a very little part of 
our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent 
good” (Essay, II, 21, §45). Cf. ibid., §§44 and 51. 
31 “This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that, which is (as I think 
improperly) called Free will” (ibid., §47). 
32 Ibid., §50 
33 “For since I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent Being really seeks Happiness, which 
consists in the enjoyment of Pleasure, without any considerable mixture of uneasiness; ’tis 
impossible any one should willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave out any 
thing in his power, that would tend to his satisfaction, and the completing of his Happiness, but only 
by a wrong Judgment” (ibid., §62). 
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rational) examination of our actions that we can avoid the errors produced by 
ignorance, inadvertency, and precipitancy.34 For Rousseau, however, free agency 
has an entirely different signification. By denouncing the flawed paradigm of the 
state of nature used by Condillac, Locke and others, he also denounces the 
explanation of freedom as the rational capacity to make desire and pleasure, or 
desire and happiness, correspond. The power of freedom and the awareness of this 
power are “purely spiritual acts” in that they must be explained before language 
(and, thus, before reason), for they are the very conditions that make the speech of 
the first individuals of the species possible. The desire that motivates the will is, at 
this stage, purely introspective, intellectual. As in Locke, freedom for Rousseau is 
also dependent on a certain knowledge of things, but at the dawn of the human 
species, the knowledge is necessarily pre-rational.  
Rousseau says that the difference between human beings and other animals is 
in the capacity of being a free agent, namely, in the recognition of one’s power to 
challenge nature or instinct; but he also says that the difference is the capacity to 
have general ideas. Human freedom is thus somehow related to the human capacity 
to have general ideas. Rousseau questions the motives for what in Locke is taken for 
granted: the invention of general terms.35 He refuses Locke’s static argument that 
human beings simply “suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds 
                                                
34 “The first therefore and great use of Liberty, is to hinder blind Precipitancy; the principal exercise 
of Freedom is to stand still, open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the consequence of what 
we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter requires” (ibid. §67). Cf. with SD note 13, 
marked originally “*b.”. 
35 Essay, III, 2 and 3. 
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also of other men”36 and inquires into what separates human thought from the 
thought of a monkey in the first stages of human development, that is to say, when 
the being is no longer a mere beast and not yet quite human. According to the 
Second Discourse, Locke’s mere supposition does not explain anything: the 
common agreement about these general ideas “must have been motivated.”  
Rousseau does not spell out what the motivation was, but from what he says 
we can infer the following. Human language is, from its outset, split by the complex 
task faced by the first human beings of having to refer to different things – namely, 
the external objects of sense-perception and the internal objects of reflection – with 
one word. The elementary self-knowledge of the first human beings started with 
their capacity to have ideas of their passions, the first of which was the idea of the 
fear of death. The naming of a passion or of a sensation could only occur because 
the sensation, or the association between a sensation and an external object of sense-
perception (as in Rousseau’s example of “Giants”), was, to a certain extent, 
common to other individuals. This common ground is what allowed the individual 
sensation to be reflected on and identified with the same sensation in others. Putting 
aside the complexity of what was actually being communicated, the name was, in 
this manner, confirmed and established. Thus, from the beginning, human beings 
have had the capacity for a kind of “general knowledge” about themselves and their 
genre as a whole. This is the main thing that Rousseau “says without saying.” What 
we called elementary self-knowledge was only made possible because individuals 
could somehow communicate and confirm their ideas before having the means (that 
                                                
36 Essay, III, 2, §4. 
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is, a “Logic of Discourse”) that traditionally we deem necessary for a 
communication of ideas. The effective communication of these ideas was precisely 
the confirmation of the common ground; and this confirmation was, in turn, what 
allowed the first individuals to recognize their power over the passions, and 
eventually over the faculties, that those ideas represented.  
The motivation for this elementary naming act of the first individuals was in 
the process itself. It cannot be explained as a simple, instinctive reaction to a need 
because we must presuppose a commencement of self-knowledge (awareness of 
death) in the first individuals of the species. At the same time, it cannot be 
explained merely in the terms of this incipient self-knowledge. We must understand 
the motivation for speech as the movement or tension created between the sensation 
of needs and the incipient self-awareness of the first individuals. Thus, the 
difference between human and animal passion lies in this dialectical character of 
human desire (hence the pressing necessity to test the internal object of one’s 
reflection), which Rousseau captures with the notion of perfectibility. 
Regardless of what the Moralists may say about it, the human 
understanding owes much to the Passions which, as is commonly 
admitted, also owe much to it: it is by their activity that our reason 
perfects itself; we seek to know only because we desire to enjoy, and 
it is not possible to conceive why someone who had neither desires 
nor fears would take the trouble to reason. The Passions, in turn, owe 
their origin to our needs, and their progress to our knowledge; for one 
can only desire or fear things in terms of the ideas one can have of 
them, or by the simple impulsion of Nature; and Savage man, 
deprived of every sort of enlightenment, experiences only the 
Passions of this latter kind; his desires do not exceed his Physical 
needs (...); the only goods he knows in the universe are food, a 
female, and rest; the only evils he fears are pain and hunger; I say 
pain, and not death; for an animal will never know what it is to die, 
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and the knowledge of death, and of its terrors, is one of man’s first 
acquisitions on moving away from the animal condition.37 
 
Let us gather what has been said so far. To study the origin of human beings 
is to study the origin of speech, for, as Rousseau affirms in the opening line of his 
Essay, “speech (la parole) distinguishes man among other animals.” In the Second 
Discourse he states that speech is characterized by the use of general ideas, and that 
it is this capacity to have general ideas that distinguishes man from other animals. 
Rousseau also notes that it is not understanding, but the capacity of being a free 
agent that separates the two realms. For Locke, the superior degree of human 
understanding in relation to beasts allows human beings to live happily and free: the 
human capacity for abstractions is, therefore, an undeniably positive thing. From 
Rousseau’s perspective, however, it is not through reason and understanding that 
man can be free. For him, the notion that human beings start tabula rasa and that all 
their ideas come from the effects of externality upon the senses would be a final 
blow to our already slim chance of freedom. Lockean freedom is, in Rousseau’s 
eyes, sufficient to satisfy only our bodily existence and, as such, it does not break, 
philosophically, with determinism. For Rousseau, freedom is a power that coincides 
with the elementary consciousness at the birth of humanity, “for it is mainly in the 
consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of the [human] soul exhibits 
itself.38” It was, then, through this elementary consciousness that the first 
individuals acquired the power to concede to or resist their own instincts; for they 
                                                
37 SD, p. 142 (143). 
38 SD, p. 141 (142). 
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could only have done it after having started to recognize these instincts, i.e. after 
having started to realize that they had the power to challenge the impulses of nature. 
We should not forget, however, the gloomy consequences that Rousseau 
associates with all this. Human perfectibility implies that the more capable we are, 
as a species, to become aware of our existence as individuals and of our differences 
with others, i.e. the more perfected or sophisticated are our languages and our 
human faculties, the greater the distance between ourselves, i.e. the more distant we 
become from the unity of the species, from the “original” situation when all 
individuals knew almost instinctively what they wanted. The more “perfected” we 
become, the less we know how to give meaning to our lives, and the more 
vulnerable and lost we, as individuals, become. In other words, the more we suffer 
with this progress, the more we seem to need, and thus to develop, the very things 
that make us suffer.39 Philosophy appears as the attempt to overcome, intellectually, 
this degenerative process. In spite of the pessimistic prospects of freedom – i.e. in 
spite of the fact that freedom became less and less likely with the “progress” of 
mankind – Rousseau’s whole effort was made in the name of this unlikely freedom 
and against the deterministic direction adopted by the empiricists or the materialists. 
The first step towards the right direction is to rectify what, in any case, remains a 
paradox for the empiricist doctrine, namely, the explanation of how the first 
individuals of the species moved from particular to general ideas. The solution to 
this paradox lies in our passage on the origin of languages in the Second Discourse, 
                                                
39 Ibid.  
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the same passage in which Rousseau seems to affirm having no answer to the 
problem. Let us then return to that text.  
In the last paragraph of our section,40 Rousseau uses two apparently 
unrelated examples, the images of a tree and of a triangle, in order to illustrate the 
difficulty. We say “apparently unrelated” because one can think that Rousseau uses 
in reality only one image throughout the entire passage. The idea of tree had already 
appeared in the examples of Oak (“If one Oak was called A, another Oak was called 
B”) and, indirectly, of fruit (“When a Monkey unhesitatingly goes from one nut to 
another, are we to think that he has the general idea of this sort of fruit...”). We can 
also speculate about whether the example of the triangle is related to the idea of 
tree, perhaps as the first graphic representation of the general idea of that object.41 
This would mean that, as with the Glaucus image, Rousseau would again be 
disguising his text with an optical illusion, by not revealing the different moments 
of the development of languages implied by the example(s). From this angle, what 
changes in the passage is not the object, but the perception and the communication 
of the ideas associated with this object (i.e. a tree), throughout the different 
moments implied by the apparently different examples.  
We should examine the examples in light of what was established before. We 
saw that if the first words had the meaning of an entire proposition, they necessarily 
implied general ideas. If speech (la parole) is what distinguished the first human 
beings from beasts, and if the first words (mots) implied general ideas, then the 
                                                
40 SD, p. 148 (149-150). 
41 Conversely, certain trees would have been seen as the first instances of objects perceived in 
particular triangular shapes. 
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capacity of forming or perceiving general ideas is what distinguished the first 
human beings from beasts.42 Moreover, if, as Rousseau affirms when he describes 
the perception of monkeys, the lack of this capacity is what stops other animals 
from modifying (“perfecting”) their language, it is clear that it must have 
characterized human beings since the inception of the species.43 Regarding the 
image in the passage, we should therefore ask what was the motivation of the first 
individuals of the species to name a tree: what was the general idea that triggered 
that necessity?44  
                                                
42 In Locke, to have an idea, is to perceive something. Animals have senses, thus they have ideas. 
But all their ideas are perceived as particular ideas. Instincts and the instinctual language of animals 
obviously refer to “ideas” or actions that are common or general to the species. However, animals 
do not perceive these general ideas as humans do, because they do not perceive their instincts as 
objects; in Locke’s view, animals do not compare ideas or discern the operations of their minds (cf. 
Essay, II, 11 §5, and II, 9). The first human beings can be seen, in this sense, as the first animals 
that start perceiving their own instincts. 
43 Recent observations have shown that some monkeys (specifically, vervet monkeys) do have an 
elementary conventional language that approaches that described by Rousseau of the first human 
individuals. In light of these observations, Rousseau’s speculation about the commencement of 
specifically human traits in apes would have to be extended to a few other animals. Conversely, in 
light of Rousseau’s account, these animals would have already started their own humanization. 
Probably the most interesting case reported so far is that of prairie-dogs. Cf. C. N. Slobodchikoff, 
‘Cognition and communication in prairie dogs,’ in The Cognitive Animal, pp. 257-264, MIT Press 
(2002). 
44 We should contrast this with Rousseau’s sentence earlier in the passage: “Each object was at first 
given a particular name without regard to kinds and Species (Espéces), which these first Institutors 
were not in a position to distinguish (...). [However], in order to subsume the beings under common 
and generic designations, their properties and differences had to be known.” Again, Locke’s 
imperfect paradigm of the origins creates the contradiction echoed here by Rousseau: “Words, says 
Locke, in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of 
him that uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelesly those Ideas are collected from the 
[particular] Things” (Essay, III, 2, §2; see also III, 3, §§ 1-5). The contradiction should be obvious 
now: if the first words were particular names, i.e. represented merely the particular idea in the mind 
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Let us first remember that, in the passage from Rousseau’s Essay, the word 
“Giants” had both an external and an internal referent: the object of another 
individual perceived as bigger and stronger, and the idea of the passion (fear) 
produced in the first individual by that perception. The external object is perceived 
by the senses, the internal by reflection. Different than Locke, Rousseau sees the 
appearance of human language in the full complexity of the phenomenon; for him, 
external and internal cannot (must not) be dissociated in order to be understood. 
Thus, on the one hand, the word is the representation of the particular idea of the 
external object perceived by the individual, and as such it is the proper name of that 
object to the individual; on the other, in order to be adopted by other individuals, 
namely, in order to become conventional, the word must, at the same time, be 
referring (as an unreflective metaphor) to an idea shared by others; the internal idea 
of the passion (fear), which was produced by the individual perception and 
expressed by the word “Giants,” works, then, as this common ground (general idea) 
that will allow the imperfect but efficient communication to take place. The passage 
from the Essay implies, therefore, Rousseau’s notion that the first words carried the 
meaning of an entire proposition. 
The thought experiment in Essay with the idea of man is reproduced, albeit 
in a more obscure form, in the Second Discourse with the idea of tree. What was the 
general idea of a fruit (e.g. acorns) that the first individuals of the species had and 
                                                                                                                                            
of the individual naming the object, and if general ideas only appeared later, then how and why were 
these supposed first individuals of the human species naming their perceptions? If we eliminate the 
faculties and the motives presupposed by Locke, what would make these individuals different than 
other animals?  
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monkeys had not? The external object must have been correlated to an internal 
sensation, and the idea of that sensation (the internal object of reflection) must have 
become the ground, as in the example of fear, for the communication between 
individuals. In an analogy with the example of “Giants,” the sensation or “passion” 
here is hunger and we can think of a word such as the word “Food” as the one 
invented to designate both the internal sensation of hunger and the external objects 
of oak’s acorns. The first general idea of a tree was in what the first individuals of 
the species “saw to be part of every tree,” namely, nourishment. After centuries of 
experiences and errors, the individuals would have recognized that the name “Food” 
was not adequate to express the idea of tree, for in the same way that not all men are 
“giants,” not all trees have edible fruits.45 
Thus, ideas start as general ideas and later become particular:  
“Every general idea is purely intellectual; if the imagination is at all 
involved, the idea immediately becomes particular.”46  
 
In the same way that, at this later stage, human beings started to be perceived in 
their differences (some as stronger than others, some as bigger than others, etc.), in 
other words, in the same way that the physical differences between individuals 
started to strike the imagination as attributes and not as the essence of man, also the 
physical differences between trees, namely, whether or not they bear edible fruits, 
and whether those that do are “small or large, bare or leafy, light or dark,” started to 
strike the imagination as attributes and not as the essence of trees.  
                                                
45 Cf. EOL, ch. 3. 
46 SD, p. 148 (150). 
 85 
But, Rousseau continues, “as soon as the imagination stops, the mind (esprit) 
can proceed only by means of discourse.” The sequence is, therefore, the following: 
once the objects to which our first abstract and general ideas were associated with 
started to be imagined in their differences, these first ideas gave place to particular 
ideas (“Every general idea is purely intellectual; if the imagination is at all involved, 
the idea immediately becomes particular”); in turn, through the formation of the 
“Logic of Discourse,”47 these particular ideas gave place to general ideas (“as soon 
as the imagination stops, the mind (esprit) can proceed only by means of 
discourse”). The difference between the general ideas at the beginning and the ones 
at the end of this sequence is the difference between the general idea of the 
sensation (hunger) that the object of a tree represented to the first individuals, and 
the general idea of a triangle, which can only exist through the enunciation of the 
definition of the triangle and, therefore, which can only have appeared after the 
development of the various elements of the “Logic of Discourse.” Thus, 
“[p]urely abstract beings are either seen in this way [e.g. a tree seen as 
only what there is in every tree], or conceived of only by means of 
discourse.”48 
 
Obviously, the general idea of triangles, which can be “conceived of only by means 
of discourse,” refers back to previous particular instances of triangular forms 
perceived in nature. At the same time, the discrimination of particular trees 
                                                
47 SD, p. 149 (151). 
48 “Every general idea is purely intellectual; if the imagination is at all involved, the idea 
immediately becomes particular. Try to outline the idea of a tree in general to yourself, you will 
never succeed; in spite of yourself, it will have to be seen as small or large, bare or leafy, light or 
dark, and if you could see in it only what there is in every tree, the image would no longer resemble 
a tree. Purely abstract beings are either seen in this same way, or conceived of only by means of 
discourse” (SD, p. 148 (150)).  
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preceded the definition, through the logic of discourse, of the general idea of tree. 
How, then, did those now called by Rousseau “new Grammarians” pass from 
particular to general names at this second birth of human language?  
“[W]hen by means which I cannot conceive, our new Grammarians 
began to expand their ideas and to generalize their words, the 
Inventors’ ignorance must have restricted this method to within very 
narrow bounds; and as they had at first gone too far in multiplying the 
names of particulars because they did not know kinds and species, 
they subsequently made too few species and kinds because they had 
not considered the Beings in all their differences.”49 
 
The means, as Rousseau indicated before, was discourse. In the passage 
Rousseau seems to imply that because a discourse can be either spoken or written, a 
spoken discourse must necessarily entail the possibility of its being written. Hence, 
the solution to the apparent paradox of how particular names became general is in 
the possible historical relation between the examples given by Rousseau of tree and 
triangle, whereby the latter would have become the written representation of the 
general idea of the former, a plausible hypothesis that, as the highly hermetic 
rhetoric of the text suggests, must have been considered by Rousseau. If it is true 
that general ideas need the help of (written) discourse to enter the mind (esprit),50 
then the written representation of trees would explain everything: “In writing one is 
forced to use every word in its general meaning.”51 
It is thus in the perspective open by the distance in time between the first 
individuals of the species and the first grammarians52 – a distance that almost 
                                                
49 Ibid. (my italics). 
50 Note that in the beginning of the paragraph Rousseau capitalizes the word. First, general ideas can 
only enter the Mind aided by words (mots); then they can enter the mind only aided by discourse. 
51 EOL, ch.5, p. 260 (388). 
52 The “enlightened minds” of chapter 3 of the EOL. 
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invisibly traverses the Second Discourse – where we should find the solution for the 
“embarrassment” caused by the question of the origin of languages. 
In sum, it was not language or externality that brought the first individuals of 
the species out of their natural state of dispersion, but a reflective process that 
gradually became instinctive (i.e. inscribed in the species) and that made possible 
the individual utterances of general ideas. Human beings started to have general 
ideas before knowing how to articulate them. The first names were expressions of 
these ideas (e.g. the idea of fear). The names were proper insofar as the subject was 
not aware of the false identity between the word and the object identified with the 
idea of the passion. Due to the complexity of the process indicated above, despite 
this false identity, communication was effective, although imperfect. It is only from 
our privileged position in time that we realize what the first individuals of the 
species could not: that at all stages of its complex development, language is marred 
by the transpositions of ideas, illusions, or errors that issue from the necessity to 
split the mind. The irony of all this, which, we tried to show, was second nature to 
Rousseau, is that with all the errors of the first development of human 
communication, individuals then were closer to knowing themselves than they were 
after they started to both become aware and “address” those errors.53 The formation 
of the “Logic of Discourse” allowed human beings to organize externality and make 
their lives more predictable, but only where externality is concerned,. In the sense 
intended by Rousseau, a discourse is based on the notion that knowledge proceeds 
from particular to general ideas. This is the logical principle on the base of almost 
                                                
53 Cf. SD, note 13 (“*b.”) and note 10 (originally marked “8”). 
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all human institutions, a principle assumed and described in detail by the 
empiricists, but which is philosophically inadequate for a discourse on a question 
that empiricism, in all its power, cannot grasp.  
We will argue in the second part of this dissertation that there is a sort of 
political interdiction inscribed in the Second Discourse that conditions Rousseau’s 
enigmatic and, in a certain way, purposefully deceitful account of the origin of 
languages and inequality. The interdiction concerns the negative consequences that 
the natural inequality implied by Rousseau would have, in principle, over his moral-
political doctrine. We will see that, in this regard, the first peculiarity of the Second 
Discourse concerns its addressees. Although the book addresses primarily a 
privileged group of readers – the scholars of Dijon, on one side, and the Magistrates 
of Geneva, on the other – Rousseau does not address the potential philosophical 
readers of his book as potential philosophers, but as potential legislators of his 
natural morality and political doctrines. His whole system seems to hinge on this 
precondition. Apparently, no one but Rousseau was meant to have access to the 
incompatible reality between philosophy and politics inscribed in his discourse.  
The intention in the second part of this dissertation will be to expose this 
hidden ambivalence in detail with an analysis of the Second Discourse’s Epistle 
Dedicatory, the text that contains the introduction to the central topic of the book, 
natural inequality. The intention will also be to better substantiate our interpretation 
so far, as well as the assumption, necessary for this interpretation, that Rousseau 
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wrote in the manner he did intentionally54 – not an easy assumption, at least not 
before the whole picture becomes clear. 
 
                                                
54 In a letter written in the same years of the composition of the Second Discourse, Rousseau 
confesses his extraordinary precautions. The whole text should be considered, but here is a 
revealing passage: “I therefore had to take some precautions at first, and I did not want to say 
everything in order to make sure that everything got a hearing. I developed my ideas only 
successively and always to but a small number of Readers. I spared not myself, but the truth, in 
order to have it get through more readily and to make it more useful. Often I went to great trouble to 
try and condense into a single Sentence, a single line, a single word tossed off as if by chance, the 
result of a long chain of reflections. The majority of my Readers must often have found my 
discourses poorly structured and almost entirely disjointed, for want of perceiving the trunk of 
which I showed them only the branches. But that was enough for those capable of understanding, 
and I never wanted to speak to the others” (Preface of a Second Letter to Bordes, translation by V. 
Gourevitch, in The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, p. 110 (103)). Thus in 
Rousseau’s texts too, single words can have the meaning of an entire proposition (SD, p. 147 
(149)). Consider also in its entirety this note from Émile already mentioned: “I have a hundred 
times in writing made the reflection that it is impossible in a long work always to give the same 
meanings to the same words. There is no language rich enough to furnish as many terms, turns, and 
phrases as our ideas can have modifications. The method of defining all the terms and constantly 
substituting the definition in the place of the defined is fine but impracticable, for how can a circle 
be avoided? Definitions could be good if words were not used to make them. In spite of that, I am 
persuaded that one can be clear, even in the poverty of our language, not by always giving the same 
meanings to the same words, but by arranging it so that as often as each word is used, the meaning 
given it be sufficiently determined by the ideas related to it and that each period where the word is 
found serves it, so to speak, as a definition. One time I say children are incapable of reasoning; 
another time I make them reason quite keenly. I do not believe that with that I contradict myself in 
my ideas; but I cannot gainsay that I often contradict myself in my expressions.” Émile, p. 108 








Passive and Active Sovereigns in the Epistle Dedicatory to  
the Discourse of Inequality. 
 
 
1. In the first half of this dissertation we have focused on the question of the 
origin of languages in Rousseau. We have showed how deconstruction is grounded 
on an interpretation of Rousseau that fails to grasp the dual sense of his rhetoric; 
and we have argued that in the passages on the origin of languages, in both the 
Essay on the Origin of Languages and the Second Discourse, Rousseau’s rhetoric 
hides a inextricable relation between the things that, as he says, distinguish human 
beings from beasts, namely, the capacity to form general ideas (the implicit 
condition for speech) and the capacity to be a free agent. In the second half of this 
work we will show how the account of the human origins contained within the 
complex rhetoric of the Second Discourse presents a political problem for Rousseau.  
If humanity starts off with and through an inequality of powers, how can 
Rousseau reconcile the meritocratic or aristocratic politics that would in principle 
result from these natural inequalities with the democratic imperative of the general 
will? We will see how this problem figures in the background of the Second 
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Discourse with an interpretation of Rousseau’s prelude to the book, the Epistle 
Dedicatory. In that text we find Rousseau’s opposition between the political and the 
philosophical senses of freedom, and between the types of individual wills or 
dispositions that generally separate human beings between those who are willing to 
be ruled and those who desire to rule. Rousseau’s central political notion of the 
unity of sovereignty is already present in the Epistle Dedicatory. However, the 
question of rulers and ruled in that text allows us to consider the general will – the 
seat of sovereignty in the Social Contract – under a new light. As such, the Epistle 
Dedicatory allows us to contemplate the problem of sovereignty from a perspective 
not entirely available in the Social Contract, i.e. from a psychological perspective. 
However, this opposition between rulers and ruled – to which Rousseau alludes 
already in the epigraph to the Second Discourse taken from Aristotle’s Politics – is 
far from being explicit in the text and can only be revealed through the approach 
suggested in our previous chapters. This will be particularly true when confronting 
Rousseau’s notes to the Second Discourse, as should become evident in our analysis 
of the first note to the book.  
In our final chapter (chapter 6), we will expand on the relation between 
human freedom and the origin of languages, by focusing on the faculty responsible 
for human perfectibility, i.e. for what Rousseau calls the main difference between 
human beings and other animals. We will then consider the epigraph to the Second 
Discourse. Even before we start with the Epistle Dedicatory, the epigraph 
introduces the context for Rousseau’s discussion of natural inequality. Aristotle’s 
treatment of the natural inequality between rulers and ruled addresses precisely the 
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question of the political necessity of democracy at stake for Rousseau; it also sets 
the stage for the fundamental relation in the Epistle Dedicatory between speech and 
politics. 
 
2. Rousseau’s doctrine of popular sovereignty depends on a principle that, in 
and of itself, is the logical negation of democratic rule. The principle, which in a 
rather cryptic form is enunciated both at the beginning and the end of the main text 
of the Second Discourse, affirms that natural inequalities among men – both 
physical and intellectual – should ideally reflect a proportional moral and political 
inequality in the city.1 The principle implies, in this way, the reversal of what an 
initial reading of the Second Discourse might suggest, namely, that inequalities 
among men only appear with civil society, that they would be negligible or 
inexistent were human beings (in their current constitution) dispersed and left 
abandoned to themselves, and thus that inequalities are fundamentally unjust.2 In 
                                                
1 SD, pp. 131-2 (idem) and p. 188 (193-4). Few commentators explore Rousseau’s views on natural 
inequalities and when they do they generally base their arguments on what Rousseau tells us about 
the figure of the great Legislator in the Social Contract as well as the many references in his work 
to the inevitable intellectual differences between human beings and the importance that they be 
somehow respected. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau goes beyond the merely empirical fact of 
human inequality; he considers natural inequalities, physical and intellectual, as being intimately 
related to the appearance of human freedom and, as such, as intrinsic to the development of 
humanity. For a consideration of Rousseau’s inegalitarianism see Arthur Melzer, The Natural 
Goodness of Man, Chicago (1990), pp. 127-8, 155-9, 158 n. 16, 237-8, and 249 n. 19. 
2 Two questions disorient the reader: are we to think of natural inequalities as genetic acquisitions, 
as transformations that occur through education in the child already in society, or as a mix of both? 
Secondly, when Rousseau says that natural inequalities appear with society, does he mean society as 
we think of it today or society in its most remote sense, literally, the beginning of human 
communication (i.e. sociability)? 
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order to grasp what Rousseau is saying, it is necessary to make a distinction without 
which the Second Discourse makes no sense. Moral inequalities can be understood 
in two essentially different ways: as a difference of power based on individual 
constitutions (i.e. as psychological and intellectual inequalities) and as a difference 
of power based on circumstances (i.e. as the result of social and economic 
inequalities).3  
To confound both sorts of inequality leads to the assumption that all moral 
and intellectual inequalities are consequences of externalities and, therefore, are 
developed with conventions and society. If we take this view to the extreme, human 
beings would, then, like other animals, be equal by nature concerning their 
intellectual potentials writ large, or their so-called souls.4 Our study of the Epistle 
Dedicatory will show that Rousseau starts actually with the opposite view: the 
underlying argument in that text points to an inevitable inequality among human 
beings concerning their basic disposition to rule and be ruled by others. We will 
                                                
3 SD, pp. 131-2 (idem). “Puissance” and “Richesse” are naturally different concepts and their strict 
opposition illustrates our point here. In the text, however, one might think that they are used 
synonymously.  
4 Starting conditions being the same for all, justice would need to be measured in terms of the 
individual’s industriousness and, at the limit, luck (or grace). Rousseau writes against the Lockean 
notion of private property as the crucial natural right. Locke’s moralization of labor apparently only 
exacerbates the disproportion between natural and conventional inequalities. Rousseau means 
specifically land property or any property that serves as ground for economic relations in a 
community. There is no property if the land in question is not part of a larger context and if the 
dominion over such a land has no political and economic implications of some kind for this larger 
context. Thus, for Rousseau, the first right to property only appears with the first political pact: no 
right and no morality are intrinsic to individual labor. The extension of the whole land delimits and, 
in a certain way, becomes the matter of the sovereign power in the state. With this in mind, if we 
think of the people as the sovereign, the whole land belonged originally to the whole people before 
it was divided among individuals, hence the natural thrust of republics. 
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approach the Epistle Dedicatory as the introduction to the philosophical premises to 
the Second Discourse, namely to the discussion of the difference between human 
beings and other animals and of the origin of inequality in the species. We will, 
thus, show that the Epistle Dedicatory should not be considered a merely political 
tract,5 but an integral part of the argument in the Second Discourse.  
Before we turn to the text, let us make two further remarks about Rousseau’s 
rhetorical strategy. First, as we have argued in the previous chapters, we must 
presuppose different lines of argument working alongside in the text. By not 
proceeding in this fashion, most of Rousseau’s interpreters end up dividing the text 
between what is seen as the argument and mere rhetoric. The main difficulty with 
this assumption is in the fact that the analysis of the composition of the text 
(divisions, notes, wording, etc.) presupposes from the start a familiarity with 
Rousseau’s hidden strategy. The analysis of Rousseau’s first note to the Second 
Discourse – placed at the beginning of the Epistle Dedicatory – will be an example 
of this: his argument can only be articulated through an interpretation that has first 
taken into account his overarching strategy about his readers.6 Indeed, in the Notice 
                                                
5 Cf. editor’s notes to the Epistle Dedicatory, Gallimard, Pléiade ed. (1964), pp. 1286 – 1293; and 
H. Meier’s notes to his edition of the Second Discourse (UTB, 1984), pp. 8 – 40. Both 
commentators take too seriously, in my view, what Rousseau says in a letter to Father Jean Perdriau 
(Nov. 28th, 1754) about the predominantly political intentions of the Epistle Dedicatory (for a new 
edition of this letter, see Meier, op. cit., mainly pp. 438, 440, 444).  
6 The fact that the Epistle Dedicatory and the Preface – and thus the first two notes of the Second 
Discourse – are placed before the Notice about the Notes (Avertissement sur les notes) suggests an 
oblique and, as we will see, deeper relation between the two texts and the rest of the work. 
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about the Notes7 Rousseau comes close to telling the attentive reader that it will be 
impossible to understand the parts before grasping the whole of his work, namely, 
that the argument of the notes can only be grasped after and in light of an 
understanding of the text as a whole.8  
Secondly, all the sources directly or indirectly mentioned by Rousseau 
should be interpreted in this same spirit. It is true that the initial impression is that 
                                                
7 “J'ai ajoûté quelques notes à cet ouvrage selon ma coutume paresseuse de travailler à bâton 
rompu. Ces notes s'écartent quelquefois assés du sujet pour n être pas bonnes à lire avec le texte. Je 
les ai donc rejettées à la fin du Discours, dans lequel j'ai tâché de suivre de mon mieux le plus droit 
chemin. Ceux qui auront le courage de recommencer, pourront s’amuser la seconde fois à battre les 
buissons, et tenter de parcourir les notes; il y aura peu de mal que les autres ne les lisent point du 
tout” (SD, p. 128). 
8 In light of the method suggested in the Avertissement, a deconstructive analysis of the Second 
Discourse would be absurd. Rousseau presents his notes as deviations from the “straightest path” 
attempted in the main text. As any attentive reader of the Second Discourse knows, the notes are not 
glossing; instead they put the main text in a different perspective: they force the more courageous 
readers, as Rousseau says, to take the longer road and re-examine parts and whole. (Cf. the 
Avertissement with the sharp distinction made by Rousseau between those among his readers who 
can and who cannot judge in the Exordium, p. 132-3 (133), and pp. 159-160 (162-163). That said, 
the opposition between the philosophical and non-philosophical readers of the text cannot be 
resolved, as has been suggested by others, by an unreflective obedience to what Rousseau 
commends in the Avertissement – i.e. by a judicious reading of the notes – as if the notes contained 
a separated doctrine (the true teaching of the Second Discourse) and, more importantly, as if the 
text of the Avertissement were, different than the other parts of the Second Discourse, liable to be 
taken at its face value. The position of the Avertissement in the book should already raise the 
suspicion of the reader, as well as the fact that an appeal to courage is also an appeal to the vanity 
of the readers. The opposition in question can only be resolved by the less apparent and much 
neglected task of understanding how the notes, each in its own way, complete the whole 
philosophical enterprise of the Discourse as conceived by Rousseau, in the integrality of the text. 
Cf. with Michel Davis, The Autobiography of Philosophy (1999), pp. 89-92, particularly notes 9 and 
14. 
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the Second Discourse was conceived and composed as a mosaic of ideas.9 However, 
Rousseau’s use of the literature at his disposal is far from being merely referential; 
Rousseau is anything but a derivative thinker and, in fact, the originality of his 
thought includes the way he makes use of the philosophical tradition to which he 
belongs. Instead of considering his sources as influences, we should presuppose that 
he knows what he has to say before deciding how to say it, i.e. before applying his 
examples. We should presuppose that the way he employs them is part of his 
rhetorical strategy, that is to say, that the strategy conditions the sources, not the 
other way around. Although our approach to Rousseau’s sources might strike some 
readers as unusual, we do not deviate from his own clues. As he explains 
somewhere else, he proceeds synthetically, not analytically.10 The main difficulty 
with his procedure – which will prove to be particularly revealing regarding 
                                                
9 On the sources of the Second Discourse see mainly Robert Wokler, Rousseau on Society, Politics, 
Music and Language, ch. 2 and 3; and Jean Morel, Recherches sur les sources du Discours de J.J. 
Rousseau sur l’origine et les fondaments de l’Inégalité parmi les hommes (1910). 
10 “In giving examples, one has to know what one is doing; giving examples simply for the sake of 
doing so is a Pedant’s occupation: I find it laughable when in so many books and in almost all 
conversations I find a few particular facts adduced in proof of general propositions. That is a 
Schoolboy’s sophism to which a judicious writer may not stoop.” Rousseau, Idée de la méthode 
dans la composition d’un livre, in The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, p. 303 (1246 
in the Pléiade ed. Vol. II). Above in this same text he says: “It is difficult to form a good working 
plan unless one has an exact Mind and a perfect knowledge of one’s material. On the other hand, 
with these two qualities it is difficult to make a bad one, provided one devotes to it all the attention 
which it requires. With the first, one takes all the parts of one’s subject into account; with the other, 
one places them in the order that shows them to best advantage and that is best suited to set them 
off and to support one another” (p. 300 (1242)). “The choice of these proofs, how they are 
organized, and the light in which they are shown is what, above all, marks out the judicious Writer 
and the skillful Dialectitian” (p. 301 (1243)). Cf. the translator’s note on pp. 407-8. Compare these 
passages with Émile, p. 345. 
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references that are left either unidentified (such as Lucretius and Machiavelli) or in 
an enigmatic form (the quote from Aristotle’s Politics as epigraph to the book) – is 
in the double task that it entails. It forces us to confront the source in question both 
historically and in the context of his strategy, the latter being generally 
characterized by the introduction of a subversive view through a language that 
dissipates the tension with his opponents. Rousseau’s strategy includes, then, 
inducing his readers to hold their judgment about whether he is siding with or 
attacking the author he refers to. This procedure – the modus operandi in the Second 
Discourse – receives its clearest formulation in the following passage of his Idea of 
a Method:  
I would begin my subject by presenting what I would like to prove in 
a manner that would make me appear conceding to my opponent far 
more things than I would concede in reality, leaving to the force of 
my arguments the right to eventually claim those factitious 
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concessions made in the beginning. This scheme still proves to be 
very effective in snaring the esteem of the Reader.11 
 
In sum, to confront the Epistle Dedicatory, we must start by presupposing the 
distinction implied by Rousseau between, on the one hand, his use of sources and 
the general arrangement of the book (the aspect that “determines the success of the 
work and the reputation of the Author”12) and, on the other, the fundamental 
arguments and the philosophical sense of that book. Put simply, we must presuppose 
a permanent detachment between what is said and what is meant: between words 
and concepts that on different levels compose his text. To start otherwise is to stop 
at every contradiction left on the surface of the text, something that can lead to the 
assumption that Rousseau was not up to the task he set for himself. Whether or not 
that was the case, his writing strategy must not be used as an excuse for an a priori 
dismissal of coherence in his work.  
                                                
11 Ibid., p. 301 (1243). The appeal to the unity of our cognitive faculties as the condition for 
operating through this method appears already in nuce in this early text:  “A subtle analogy runs 
through most of the propositions one can make about one and the same subject, a hidden connection 
which escapes the vulgar Mind but which the true genius always grasps” (ibid.). An echo of this 
procedure can be heard in an exchange between two thinkers most admired by Rousseau, which 
regardless of whether or not he had access to, underlines the spirit of his method. The passage is 
from a letter by Fénelon to Bernard Lamy and refers to the dogma held by the establishment (the 
Church) about the infallibility of its judgment concerning the meaning of a text: “You know better 
than me, my reverend father, that there is no tangible common ground between the true sense of a 
text, considered only in itself, and the personal sense of the author. (...) The author might have 
changed his heart many times while composing his text. He might have wanted to hide his thought 
to render it impenetrable. (...) All that is part of [his] text works to shape the very sense of it. These 
things can often be signs of the personal thought of the author; but they are ambiguous signs, for the 
author might either have wanted to trick [his readers], or have tricked himself.” Fénelon, Oeuvres, 
p. 593, vol. 7, Paris, 1850. On Rousseau and the “doctrine intérieure” and his strategy regarding his 
readers in general, see mainly C. Kelly, Rousseau as Author, chapters 1 and 6, Chicago (2003). 
12 Idée de la méthode, p. 300 (1242). 
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3. Rousseau’s Dedicatory to the Genevans has two parts or levels: the 
discourse itself and a discourse inside the discourse (§§14 – 21). These two 
discourses can be read as separate and independent from each other. The division 
reflects the difference between an action performed from within and one performed 
from outside the city: whereas in the main discourse (§§1 – 13, and §22) Rousseau 
addresses his public from the position of an active citizen – as it were, from within 
the city – in the parenthetical discourse (§§14 – 21) he speaks from the position of a 
citizen who, because of whatever accident, is outside. 
If, less happy or too late grown wise, I saw myself reduced to ending 
a lame and languishing career in other Climes, in vain regretting the 
quiet and the Peace of which a youthful want of prudence would have 
deprived me; I would at least have fostered in my soul these same 
sentiments which I could not put to use in my country, and, imbued 
with tender and selfless affection for my distant Fellow-Citizens, I 
would from the bottom of my heart have addressed to them 
approximately the following discourse./ My dear Fellow-Citizens or 
rather my brothers...13 
 
Moreover, the contents of the two discourses are different. Whereas in the main 
discourse Rousseau gives us a general, institutional, and idealized account of what 
would be for him the most just and free of republics, in the parenthetical discourse, 
the idealization of the Genevan republic assumes the form of practical advice to, 
and moral exhortation of, specific segments of that society. The dual character of 
the Epistle Dedicatory allows Rousseau to address his fellow citizens as if their 
country were, at the same time, a model for all times and peoples, and a historical 
reality.  
                                                
13 SDED, §13. We will refer to the ED by paragraph number, since for that text the paragraphs in 
both the Gallimard (Pléiade)  and the Cambridge editions coincide. 
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Right at the outset of the Epistle Dedicatory, Geneva is portrayed as an 
example of a city for all peoples.14 Addressing the sovereign citizens of the republic, 
Rousseau says: 
In looking for the best maxims which good sense might dictate 
regarding the constitution of a government, I was so struck to see 
them all implemented in yours that, even if I had not been born within 
your walls, I would have believed myself unable to refrain from 
offering this picture of human society to the one People which seems 
to me to possess its greatest advantages and to have best forestalled its 
abuses.15 
 
To the characteristics that would make the virtues of his motherland universal or 
eternal, one must add, as just mentioned, its historical reality.16 Geneva cannot be 
seen simply as Rousseau’s Kallipolis; it cannot reflect, in principle, an image of 
human nature in the way the paradigm in Plato’s Republic purportedly does, due to 
the obvious implications of deducing human nature (universals) from a historical 
example (particulars).17 At the same time, in order to present his Geneva as the just 
city, Rousseau must inevitably depart from an idea of human nature, a necessary 
presupposition for a social order claimed to be valid for all times and all peoples. 
Geneva is eternalized only because it reflects something supposed to be eternal. Its 
political institutions would thus best contribute to the development of man’s natural 
potentialities, and reflect, in opposition to any other example, a picture (tableau) of 
human nature. Whether the “eternal” here is a creation of God or of a human being 
remains to be seen.  
                                                
14 Geneva is only mentioned by name towards the end of the text, namely, in the discourse inside the 
discourse. 
15 SDED, §1. Cf. also SDED §12 and §15; and SD, pp. 147 (149) and 157 (160).  
16 SDED §11 and §15. 
17 Cf. Rep., 458b, 466d-e, 487d-e, 499b-d, and 541a. 
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The contradiction between the ideal and the actual Geneva disappears if one 
considers as merely diffusive rhetoric Rousseau’s injunction to the citizens to 
preserve eternally their present condition. It is, then, the imagination and the beliefs 
of the citizens that are at stake. If we do not take Rousseau’s image seriously, 
Geneva would be the most just city only accidentally, namely, only when compared 
to other contemporary examples, and for being, in its historical context, the city 
where the freedom of its citizens is, by approximation, the closest to natural 
freedom. In other words, if we think of the freedom of its citizens as an imperfect 
freedom – if we believe that the image of freedom that Rousseau depicts in the 
Epistle Dedicatory does not represent, from the perspective of the sovereign citizens, 
the image of the highest possibility of human freedom, and that it does not 
correspond to their own projected perception of freedom – then we would have to 
ascribe to those citizens a consciousness about that imperfection. And if the citizens 
of the most just republic do not see themselves as perfectly free, Geneva cannot be 
seriously portrayed to them as a timelessly just city, only as a positive accident of 
the historical process exposed in the Second Discourse. In that case, its citizens 
would be aware of the limitation that the artificiality of laws, made to correct their 
deprived nature, imposes upon their will. The situation of the Genevan citizens 
would reflect the deterministic view of the human will defended by the 
“Philosophes” attacked by Rousseau. 
If the latter view were true, the Epistle Dedicatory would be irrelevant to the 
main discussion of the Second Discourse. But if we assume that the freedom of the 
citizens is, or should be, actually perceived by them as freedom in its most absolute 
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sense (i.e. as the full accomplishment of their will), then we have to hold judgment 
about the aforementioned ambiguity of the text, and think of freedom from at least 
two perspectives: the perspective of those who perceive the law as natural due to its 
coincidence with their will; and the perspective of those who perceive the law in its 
sheer artificiality. With this distinction in mind, Geneva in the Epistle Dedicatory 
can be seen as not only the historical culmination of the process described in the 
Second Discourse, but also as the point of departure of that process: as artificial and 
natural at the same time.  
The fact that the Second Discourse starts with the idealization of the city 
should not be underemphasized. It might indeed corroborate the possibility that 
Rousseau actually departs from the general psychological structure implied in the 
idealization of Geneva in order to formulate his account of the principles of natural 
morality in Part One of the Second Discourse. In order to examine the possibility of 
what one can think of as an idealistic sense of “historicism” in the book, one must 
reflect on the relation between will and law – in other words, on the legitimacy of 
political power – from the two perspectives on freedom just mentioned. 
 
4. Most readers of the Epistle Dedicatory tend to assume, justifiably, that the 
text is generally addressed to the formal rulers of Geneva, referred to by Rousseau 
with the formal epithet, “MAGNIFIQUES, TRÈS HONORÉS, ET SOUVERAINS 
SEIGNEURS.”18 But to accept the assumption that the addressees of the Epistle 
Dedicatory are indeed the formal rulers of the city is to set aside another major 
                                                
18 Cf. the English edition of the Second Discourse, p. 352 and Meier’s, notes 23, 25, and 33 (pp. 20-
23, and p. 30). 
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consideration about the text. Seen from the perspective of their addressees, the two 
discourses that, as noted, constitute the Epistle Dedicatory create the following 
political problem. Whereas in the main discourse (§1 – 13, and 22) Rousseau speaks 
about the general, or ideal, character of the law in his imaginary city, in the 
parenthetical discourse he exhorts his fellow citizens to obey and respect the law in 
its specificity; the reflection on the law in the main discourse becomes, in the 
parenthetical discourse, a sort of unreflective wisdom about the law (“la sagesse du 
Peuple”19). If this is correct, the political problem is evident: the addressees of the 
main discourse are supposed to have a freedom, or a power, about the law in general 
that the addressees of the parenthetical discourse do not necessarily have. For this 
reason, the duality implied by Rousseau between the idealized and historical Geneva 
depends, in order to make sense and have more than a rhetorical function, on the 
possibility that the addressees of one discourse are not the same as the addressees of 
the other, and that the different epithets used in both discourses were not casually 
chosen by Rousseau. In other words, a clear distinction between the ideal and the 
historical in the Epistle Dedicatory depends on the hypothesis that the two 
discourses that constitute the text are different not only in their content, but also in 
their scope.  
To say that the addressees of the two discourses differ in their presumed 
freedom regarding the law in general is to say that they differ in their individual 
potential for political power writ large – to be more precise, it is to say that they 
differ in the consciousness of freedom regarding their private and public actions. 
                                                
19 SDED, §11. 
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The notion that the addressees of the Epistle Dedicatory are intended at once in their 
unity as people and in their different individual power, foreshadows the true topic of 
the Epistle Dedicatory, namely, the psychological-political relation of rulers and 
ruled in republics. This relation turns around the following fact: when taken to the 
limit, the freedom of rulers and the freedom of ruled become essentially or 
qualitative different. This is the conclusion that will follow from a careful reading 
of the Epistle Dedicatory and that produces embarrassment when weighed against 
Rousseau’s subsequent democratic formulae. For if there is an essential difference 
between the freedom of rulers (understood in the highest sense of the term as those 
who have the power to interpret, change, and make the most fundamental laws in 
society) and the freedom of the people, then there must be also an essential 
difference between the sovereignty of these rulers and that of the people, at least 
when we think of sovereignty in its active sense, namely, as the political and 
legislative power that both affects and responds to the general will of the people.  
In this sense, the whole question of sovereignty in the state – or of who are 
indeed the Souverains Seigneurs in the Epistle Dedicatory – must be approached 
through a psychological consideration of freedom. That is to say, the question must 
be considered in light of the several possibilities of freedom that issue from the 
ways in which the individual imagination is affected by laws in general, but 
specifically by the laws on which the general will is, so to speak, anchored. The 
problem with this view is that Rousseau’s democratic theory is predicated on the 
idea that a republican sovereignty must lie undivided in the general will of the 
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people. The question broached by the Epistle Dedicatory leads us, then, to a paradox 
regarding Rousseau’s doctrine of undivided sovereignty.20 
The difference regarding the freedoms of rulers and ruled only becomes 
essential or qualitative when the general will itself becomes the object of an action. 
But before we turn to this qualitative difference, we should briefly re-create the 
structure of what will later become the argument in the Social Contract, and 
consider the difference from within the framework of the general will. Let us 
initially put aside the problematic figure of the Legislator in Rousseau and consider 
the question of the merely gradual (quantitative) difference among the members of 
the republic regarding their consciousness of freedom about public and private 
actions. 
Depicting the tableau of his country, Rousseau says the following: 
I should have wished to be born in a country where the Sovereign and 
the people could have had only one and the same interest, so that all 
the motions of the machine might always tend only to the common 
happiness; since this is impossible unless the People and the 
Sovereign are the same person, it follows that I should have wished to 
be born under a democratic government wisely tempered.21  
 
We must ask, before anything, why a wisely temperate democratic government 
would necessarily follow from an indiscriminate identity between sovereignty and 
                                                
20 The Epistle Dedicatory opens a different, and in my view more revealing, perspective on 
sovereignty than the one found in the Social Contract. This possibility has been largely overlooked. 
For instance, Derathé speaks of the Epistle Dedicatory as a “panégyrique ingénu” and dismisses the 
difference between that text and other texts such as the Social Contract and the Letters Written from 
the Mountain (“écrits à dix ans de distance”) as a result of Rousseau’s inconsistence  or “change of 
mind” on the matters at issue. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps, Vrin 
(1979), pp. 10-11, On the question of sovereignty, see the Appendix to this work. 
21 SDED §3. My italics.  
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the (will of the) people. Can a democracy be temperate without at least some 
compromise of the identity between sovereignty and the people? The answer 
depends, naturally, on what one means by this power called sovereignty and by its 
coincidence with the will of the people. Without pushing the argument too far, we 
will start with the premise that Rousseau intentionally refers to two senses of 
“people” in the passage (people, People). The ambiguity implied in the unqualified 
identity between sovereignty and people would be represented by the two spellings 
of the word (as a general and as a proper name), which we see as a first sign to a 
more crucial distinction to be found a few lines down the text.22 
We can interpret the passage as follows. The fact that the interest (or will) of 
the people (understood as the collective imagination that passively expresses a 
general desire) must be the same as the interest of the sovereign, does not mean that 
the People (understood as the sum of individual agents of particular desires) is able 
to positively act, as if it were an autonomous body, in its own interest – an interest 
which the people only knows, in its unity as people, as an unreflective feeling or 
instinct. The distinction should become clearer towards the end of this analysis, but 
in sum it simply means that our unity as a people is based on our capacity to agree 
about what we want, not on a capacity to rationally know, as a body, how to achieve 
our common goals. Accordingly, the two senses of “people” (people, People) can be 
thought to denote, respectively, a passive and an active sense of their will. To think 
of a passive and an active sense of the will is also to think of a passive and an active 
                                                
22 Cf. section on the origin of languages in the SD with the passage from Émile quoted above, p. 
345. 
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sense of the power of sovereignty, a power which would, then, vary among 
individuals according to the lesser or greater degree of awareness of one’s own 
general will, i.e. of the extent to which that individual recognizes himself (his will) 
as the locus of the general will. Let us bracket for the moment the distinction drawn 
in the Social Contract – which, at any rate, should not be taken at face value – 
between the action of government and the action of the sovereign.23 What the 
Epistle Dedicatory allows us to conjecture is that the republic is only temperate 
when the interests of the people (as the collective imagination that passively 
expresses the general desire), not being an object of a direct action by the People (as 
the sum of individual agents of particular desires), are ordered by the person of their 
representatives. Would then the legislative actions of these representatives have, as 
actions, a more sovereign character than whatever action the united general will is 
capable of? Rousseau’s answer is clear: 
In order to forestall the self-seeking and ill-conceived projects and 
dangerous innovations which finally ruined the Athenians, I should 
have wished that not everyone have the power to propose new Laws 
(Loix) according to his fancy; that this right belong to the Magistrates 
alone; even that they exercise it so circumspectly that the People, for 
its part, be so guarded in granting its consent to these Laws , and that 
their promulgation require so much solemnity that, before the 
constitution became unstable, there had been time to realize that it is 
above all the great antiquity of the Laws that renders them sacred and 
venerable, that the People soon scorn those they see change every day, 
and that, by getting used to neglecting ancient ways on the pretext of 
doing better, great evils are often introduced to correct lesser ones./ I 
should above all have fled as necessarily ill-governed a Republic 
where the People, believing it could do without its Magistrates or 
leave them no more than a precarious authority, had imprudently 
                                                
23 Du Contract Social, III, 1. Henceforth, SC. 
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retained in its own hands the administration of Civil affairs and the 
execution of its own Laws (...).24  
 
The Epistle Dedicatory anticipates the question – only partially resolved in the 
Social Contract – of whether the undivided and inalienable sovereignty of the 
people is ultimately predicated on the condition that the active side of this 
sovereignty be not in the hands of the people, but in the hands of their single 
representatives; differently put, it anticipates the question of whether the legislative 
“action” ascribed to the people – i.e. their consent to the laws – is generally pre-
conditioned by other actions of a more sovereign nature.25 
Let us move by steps. First, the idealized version of Geneva in the Epistle 
Dedicatory might lead some readers to inadvertently absorb sovereignty into 
                                                
24 SDED § 9-10. 
25 Part of the reason for Rousseau’s oblique treatment of this question can be explained as follows. 
The doctrine of the sovereign will of the people naturally requires that the people believe in the face 
value implication of the identity, namely in their power to act indeed as a sovereign body. In the 
Social Contract, Rousseau “solves” the difficulty by suggesting that “la sanction aux Loix” (SDED, 
§11) is the fundamental activity of the sovereign (SC, II, 6). However, this should not be interpreted 
as a trick on his part. The Second Discourse shows that, for Rousseau, philosophy is not about 
insurmountable extremes, but about the permanent possibility of movement and change. What can 
be thought of as a strong element of conservativism in his politics is merely the expression of the 
character of the general will. We believe that, ultimately, Rousseau’s goal was to stimulate one’s 
sense of belonging to the state, as well as a possible ascent from what can be seen as an initially 
naïve situation to one of effective political action – an action that transcends one’s own immediate 
interests. This is one of the main issues that separates him from liberalism and from some of the 
fundamental principles of the republicanism that starts, arguably, with Machiavelli. If we openly 
ascribe to the people a predominantly, not to say exclusive, private existence in the state, they 
would not only be excused to start with the assumption that they are ignorant about how to achieve 
their common goals (general will) – i.e. that they are ignorant about political action simply – but 
also, as the main consequence of that posture, they would tend to lose sight of those very common 
goals (general will), and through political indifference and self-absorption enter a perpetual cycle of 
dissatisfactions. 
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government, believing to preserve, at the same time, Rousseau’s precept of 
undivided sovereignty: they would see the authority responsible for “the 
administration of Civil affairs and the execution of its own Laws” (i.e. government) 
as the active side of sovereignty, and the power of consent of the people as a passive 
sovereignty. That this schematic division is invalid can be attested by the Social 
Contract, where government is not assimilated to, but appears as an emanation, and 
thus an instrument, of the sovereign authority.26 But to better understand why 
sovereignty cannot split up, we should consider Rousseau’s analogy, in his article 
On Political Economy, between the constitution of the republic and that of a human 
being.  
The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs are 
the brain, principle of nerves and seat of the understanding, the will, 
and the senses, of which the judges and the magistrates are the 
organs.27 
 
The will (volonté) in question is, therefore, a function of pre-existing laws and 
customs; the will of those who create the laws and modify the customs is not 
mentioned. The analogy must take into account the fact that most human beings 
cannot clearly differentiate between what part of their individual will is passive and 
what part is active, and that free individuals tend to believe in their own self-
determination. For this reason, the free individuals in the state would also believe in 
the freedom or self-determination of the political body of which they are part. If the 
individuals believe in the autonomy of their political body – i.e. of their general will 
– it would make no sense for them to locate the principle of action of this will in the 
                                                
26 SC, II, 2. 
27 Sur l’économie politique, Pléiade edition vol. III, p. 244. 
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persons of judges and magistrates, i.e. government, which Rousseau associates with 
the organs of the senses. 
Thus the sovereign general will cannot be divided and the political 
representatives cannot represent the general will. The analogy between the political 
and the psychological constitution28 makes no sense, at least not from the 
perspective of the single human being, if we attempt to classify the different parts of 
the political body in terms of what is passive and what is active in the regime, for 
there would be no correspondence to the way things happen or are organized in the 
individual. The action of the sovereign power cannot be institutionalized and must 
be found necessarily disseminated among the citizens; it is in our human 
constitution that we all, albeit in different degrees, want to participate in the 
action.29  
                                                
28 Which can also be seen as an analogy between the freedom of a particular will and the freedom of 
the general will (i.e. the will of the political body). Ibid., p. 245. 
29 One should wonder whether also here Rousseau would differ from the reductionist view of the 
time. For men like Condillac or Helvetius, for whom human beings are virtually equal by nature, 
and for whom the will is nothing but a re-active expression of the organs of sense-perception, the 
idea of a merely formal definition of (active) sovereignty as government might have been 
unproblematic, or simply a matter of indifference. When all action is theoretically pre-determined 
and part of an endless chain of cause and effect, political action becomes the matter of a positive 
ordering of the objects of sense-perception; politics becomes economics. From this perspective, the 
concept of a sovereign action can be formalized (institutionalized) through a rational-empiricist 
approach to law and government. Sovereignty would not be in the general will any longer, but, as it 
were, in the rationality behind a political action that takes for granted what the general will always 
wants. The right to property and the quest for security and comfort become political principles 
based on universal reason and thus applicable to any human society. The political action here is 
limited to a private and public economic optimization, in a shallow sense of these notions.  
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It is true that because the human mind is both active and passive, productive 
and reproductive, both sides of the sovereign will are present in every citizen. 
However, the predominance of passivity or activity varies, for several reasons, from 
person to person. Let us think of citizens in their greater or lesser disposition to 
debate and interpret laws in general. Supposing the situation described by Rousseau, 
in which the formal rulers of the state are chosen according to their acknowledged 
merits, the unity of the general will at stake in the analogy between individual and 
state can be reiterated in the following manner. The predominantly passive will of 
the people and the predominantly active will of their representatives would be 
complementary sides of the same thing when the actions of the representatives 
slavishly reflect the general will of the people. As such, the general will of these 
representatives, although better articulated, would not be essentially different from 
the general will of the people. In other words, were representatives and people under 
exactly the same moral commands, then the undivided sovereignty of the general 
will (as both an active and passive will) would remain intact. The identity between 
sovereignty and people indicated in the Epistle Dedicatory would be preserved and 
the freedom of both rulers and ruled would be equally defined by the “honorable 
joug (...), salutaire et doux” that only the eternity of a law of laws – a law that 
unifies the desires of both rulers and ruled – can provide.30 This would come as no 
surprise, especially in light of what Rousseau says about religion in the Epistle 
Dedicatory31 – although whether those moral commands come from religion or from 
what is believed to be a rational inquiry concerning human nature does not change 
                                                
30 SDED §4.  
31 Cf. SDED §19. 
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the fact that, in the end, they can become laws obeyed with equal obstinacy. In a 
state where the highest legislators are seen as the advocates of a practical harmony 
between the general will and the supreme moral principles of which they themselves 
are followers, it is, therefore, not contradictory to affirm that the general will is the 
seat of an undivided sovereignty. 
From this point of view, the unity of sovereignty depends, to a great extent, 
on the pre-conditioning of all wills involved in the social pact. In order for the 
general will to be sovereign, the fundamental laws in the state must be perceived as 
natural limits to one’s will. There is no place in Rousseau’s analogy for a will that 
is independent from the law, namely, that perceives the law in its artificiality. Yet, 
obviously, both postures exist in any society.32  
These different perceptions of freedom in relation to the laws in a republic is 
precisely what creates a problem for the sovereignty of the general will. This is the 
question that ultimately conditions the rhetorical strategy in the Epistle Dedicatory. 
Unfortunately, the supposition that the maximum rulers of the state (should) 
legislate in blind obedience to the supreme laws of the country makes the action of 
these rulers pre-conditioned by the logic behind those supreme laws. In a word, the 
highest citizens of the state would never be able to enjoy, in that case, the highest 
possible freedom. Is it not the case, however, that if the people should not be 
expected to be philosophically aware of the conventional character of the laws that 
                                                
32 We should focus here on the moral laws that, in a state where the general will is sovereign, give, 
in principle, the direction for both public or private actions. Let us note that as a function of the 
different consciousness of freedom that each individual has regarding public and private actions, 
this distinction is inscribed in Rousseau’s strategy regarding his addressees. 
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rule their lives, the highest rulers of the republic should not be expected to be 
enslaved by their own rules? This apparent contradiction implies that the highest 
rulers are not the highest citizens, i.e. the governors (judges and magistrates), of the 
state.  
If there are supreme laws that guide both the actions of statesmen and the 
expectations (will) of the people, the true active sovereigns of society are those who 
interpret, change, and above all make those supreme laws. Therefore, if, at any 
given moment, a truly independent (free) will starts to have a determinant changing 
power over all other wills put together – i.e. a sovereign power over the very laws 
that unite the general will33 – then that is the highest sense of the sovereign will. 
When a truly free will appears in the state, the political freedom of the individual 
citizens is threatened, for the laws that guarantee that freedom (i.e. their general 
will) can be challenged.  
 
5. Right before he introduces, with his first note to the text, the paradigm for 
this paradoxical and dangerous political situation, Rousseau reiterates, in the main 
text of the Epistle Dedicatory, the idealized version of his State:  
I should have wished, then, that no one (personne) inside the State 
could have declared himself to be above the law (loi), and that no one 
(Personne) outside it could have imposed any [law] which the State 
was obliged to recognize. For, regardless of how a government is 
constituted, if there is a single individual in it who is not subject to 
the law, all the others are necessarily at his discretion.34 
                                                
33 Cf. SC, III, 10.  
34 SDED §5. The first note to the Second Discourse is given right after this text. Its content, to be 
treated in the next chapter, must be interpreted in light of the question here at stake. 
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The analogy between individual and state is only possible when the will of both 
beings perfectly coincide. Only in this ideal case the image of the republic will 
perfectly mirror the image of the single human being. In order for that to happen, 
any action over the general will (the most sovereign sort of action) must be done in 
a way whereby the unity of the wills in question is not disturbed. The perfect state, a 
state where the particular wills perfectly coincide with the general will, can only 
exist if its true masters (those responsible for the unification of the wills) stay out or 
are invisible in the state. Rousseau’s analogy shows us how, in the extreme case, the 
political freedom of the individual citizens is incompatible with free will understood 
in a philosophical sense, namely, as a will free or completely independent from the 
other wills. The main reason for this incompatibility is in the fact that whereas the 
political freedom of the citizens – understood either as a negative “limitation of the 
general will” or as a positive “obedience to the law that one prescribes to oneself”35 
– is egalitarian, the philosophical freedom of this potential sovereign actor, being 
characterized precisely by the absence of any submission to either the law or the 
general will, is by definition non-egalitarian. 
That said, if the existence in the community of a truly independent will is, 
ultimately, incompatible with the doctrine of the undivided sovereignty, it does not 
invalidate the psychological necessity of that doctrine. A radically free mind would 
be the extreme case of the various degrees of consciousness of freedom found 
among the members of a society. Rousseau does not explicitly consider this extreme 
case because of the potential threat that such an individual would pose to the laws 
                                                
35 Cf. Social Contract, I, 8. 
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that establish the ethical boundaries of political freedom. This is why the extreme 
case must not appear in a discourse about the sovereignty of the general will made 
from within the framework of that general will.  
Since, as a concept, the active sovereignty of the general will escapes the 
logic of democratic public institutions – namely, since it cannot simply coincide 
with (or be reduced to) the political power of the formal rulers of the republic (much 
as such a coincidence is desired) – it must be considered as a power that certain 
individual actors acquire, regardless of their position in the state. The perspective 
here is that of someone who knows the motives behind individual wills in general 
better than the individuals themselves. Provided that the psychological advantage of 
these single individuals is used wisely, there is no contradiction between Rousseau’s 
principle of the unity of sovereignty and their potential sovereign action, even if, in 
theory, one thing will always exclude the other. 
Before the extreme case of the radically free mind appears in the text, the 
Epistle Dedicatory invites us to consider the intermediate cases, anticipating the 
meritocratic scheme indicated at the end of the Second Discourse.36 The rank order 
implied by Rousseau points precisely to the gradual difference regarding the 
political action writ large of the individual members of society. In his last note to 
the Second Discourse, Rousseau calls for an awareness by the citizens about these 
differences.  
                                                
36 Cf. SD, note 19 (originally marked “15”). 
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[A]s all the members of the State owe it services proportionate to their 
talents and forces, Citizens ought, in return, to be distinguished and 
favored in proportion to their services.37  
 
We must distinguish here between an awareness regarding our individual actions 
(services), i.e. regarding our capacity to accomplish these actions, and an awareness 
regarding the actions of others, i.e. regarding the value of the action itself and the 
honors associated with it. One is the awareness of our duty, the other of the rewards 
proportional with that duty. In one case, the action is independent from the opinion 
of others; in the other, the action views recognition.38 Therefore, the greater or 
lesser sovereign character of an action, i.e. the degree to which it issues from the 
general will, depends on two completely different assessments. The correct 
estimation of one’s own talents and strengths, and consequently of the actions to be 
performed by that individual, has no relation with the correct estimation of the 
actions of others and of the honors given in recognition to those deeds. That the 
people recognize the merits of an action does not mean that they correctly evaluate 
the talents and strengths behind the action. In other words, the people might 
“recognize” and reward the action of someone not really responsible for that action, 
or whose talents and strengths are not proportional with the action rewarded.  
Hence, honors are important to stimulate the right actions, but it is one’s 
sense of duty that concentrates the general will in a republic. In this sense, knowing 
one’s realm of action is more fundamental than knowing what reward would be 
                                                
37 “It is to public esteem to draw the distinction between wicked and good individuals (entre les 
méchans et les gens de bien).” Ibid.  
38 We mean here citizens in general; as we shall see, not all actions that receive public recognition 
are necessarily fueled by vanity. 
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proportional to a given action. In spite of the necessity of honors in the state, no 
action can be sovereign if performed in view of the opinion of others. Instead, the 
more the action depends on the knowledge of one’s talents and strengths, the more it 
is sovereign, i.e. the more authentically and coherently it unifies the general will: I 
do what I do because, in proportion to my talents and strengths, this is the best way I 
can serve the general interest. This is the principle upon which the sovereignty of 
the general will depends. 
 It is not the psychological coherence between one’s capacities and one’s 
actions that varies in the idealized example of Geneva depicted in the Epistle 
Dedicatory; what varies is the capacities themselves, i.e. the different talents and 
strengths of the different citizens. To the extent that an identity between sovereignty 
and people is possible in the text, it will depend on the hierarchy of action 
established through the principle of distributive justice, “to each his own.” 
 
6. The manner in which Rousseau treats his addressees in the Epistle 
Dedicatory suggests this hierarchy of action, which is indeed a hierarchy of 
sovereign action. The distribution in the state between greater or lesser active 
sovereignty, or simply between the activity and passivity of its members, obeys a 
broader scheme than the formal rulers of the state addressed by Rousseau would, in 
principle, be willing to concede.  
 Rousseau alters throughout the text the epithet with which he addresses his 
public. The main difference between these forms is, precisely, in the use or 
omission of the word Souverains. Of the two discourses that compound the Epistle 
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Dedicatory, one is addressed to the “MAGNIFIQUES, TRÈS HONORÉS, ET 
SOUVERAINS SEIGNEURS,” and the other (the parenthetical discourse) to different 
parts of society not specifically referred to as “SOUVERAINS.” There are usually 
two apparent explanations for these different epithets. One is that Rousseau simply 
follows the protocol, as it were, and addresses first the citizens, members of the 
Conseil Général of the state, and then, in the parenthetical discourse, the single 
Magistrates.39 However, the Conseil Général is clearly not the seat of sovereignty 
understood in its passive sense; its members are not the people. Neither is it the seat 
of active sovereignty, for even if it were taken as the government (which it was not), 
the concept of sovereignty resists being institutionalized, as we have shown, for not 
being a merely political category. This interpretation is thus untenable. 
Secondly, one could try to by-pass the difficulty and claim that Rousseau is 
actually evoking the whole people by generally addressing them as “SOUVERAINS 
SEIGNEURS.”40 In that case, we would have to dismiss the difference between the 
two discourses that compound the Epistle Dedicatory, a difficult step if we accept 
the hypothesis that both the main discourse and the parenthetical discourse are 
intentionally directed to different addressees. We would also have to presuppose 
that, at the limit, by addressing the people as one body Rousseau would expect 
them, as a body, to respond to the implicit argument and the dialectical nature of his 
discourse, an even more unlikely hypothesis. One thing is to see the people, in the 
passive sense of their will, as the seat of sovereignty; another is to address a text 
                                                
39 This view is defended by Gourevitch and Meier (see note above).  
40 Note, however, that the most generic epithet in the Epistle Dedicatory, “Mes chers Concitoyens 
ou plutôt mes fréres,” opens the parenthetical discourse, i.e., §14. 
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such as the Epistle Dedicatory to the people as sovereign masters. The difference 
here between passive and active sovereignty is crucial.  
Rather, we should consider the logic that makes the parenthetical discourse 
necessary. In light of what Rousseau tells us in his closing note to the Second 
Discourse, if we examine the Epistle Dedicatory obliquely we see that the 
“SOVEREIGN MASTERS” can be understood as potentially the individuals who – 
regardless of their political and social status, and opposed to the conformity or 
passivity of the majority – end up carrying out, in the most conscious and measured 
way, their own free will. As such, Rousseau’s epithets would refer to different 
psychological dispositions. The terminology and the manner in which he addresses 
his public in the Epistle Dedicatory would be, then, consistent with the rank order 
that, as we have been suggesting, tacitly characterizes his republic.  
Epithets are used eight times in the text: in the parenthetical discourse, the 
epithets “Mes chers Concitoyens ou plutôt mes fréres,” “Aimables et vertueuses 
Citoyennes,” and “MAGNIFIQUES ET TRÈS HONORÉS SEIGNEURS” (twice); and 
in the main discourse, the epithet “MAGNIFIQUES, TRÈS HONORÉS, ET 
SOUVERAINS SEIGNEURS” (twice in the main text, and twice, as the opening and 
closing epithets framing the text). The mere comparison between these forms 
should, by now, illustrate our point. We can tentatively order the epithets as 
follows: the first pair would refer to law-abiding citizens and most women; the 
second pair to law-abiding magistrates and clergy, i.e. the formal rulers of the state; 
and the third pair to those among citizens and formal rulers who, being more 
conscious of their freedom, have the will to act in the name of all, in spite of, in 









principle, individual ambitions and the established conventions exemplified in the 
content of the parenthetical discourse.  
 
We are left with the two epithets framing the text, which would represent the 
two most abstract realms of sovereignty: the aforementioned passive wisdom of the 
whole people (the will of the political body), and, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, the philosophical action of outsiders.41  
                                                
41 One should suspect whether some of these “SOVEREIGN MASTERS” are potentially those 
whose “sinister interpretations and venomous discourses” must not, in principle, be heard by the 
citizens; those like Rousseau, whose “secret motives” place them necessarily outside the official 
order. In the parenthetical discourse of the Epistle Dedicatory, Rousseau casts the words of those 
invisible potential rulers or outsiders as always evil and dangerous for the public repose: “beware 
[my dear Fellow-Citizens] of ever heeding sinister interpretations and venomous discourses, the 
secret motives of which are often more dangerous than are the actions they are about” (§15). 
(Rousseau follows these words by affirming that a “good and loyal Guardian (...) barks only when 
Thieves draw near.”) A few lines below, any suspicion one could have about Rousseau’s own 
venom or secret motives innocently disappears through his forceful depiction of his father as the 
ideal citizen, and hence through his own natural inheritance of, and participation in, the honors of 
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There is a final reference in the text that can help us to illustrate the 
movement between the positions in this hypothetical rank order. In the final 
paragraphs of the parenthetical discourse Rousseau refers to those who have in 
themselves the potential, due to greater talents and strengths, either to be given the 
highest honors in the state, or to conduct, within the framework of the general will, 
the most sovereign actions in the state.42 Rousseau speaks here specifically of the 
general education of the people, and, consequently, of the customs and laws that 
constitute that education. He anticipates his endless discussions about the morality 
between the sexes, women as the matrix of moral understanding and rule in 
society,43 as well as his permanent concern with the fate of the young, victims of the 
corruption of taste brought about by cosmopolitan arts, spectacles, and luxury.44  
The main issue in the three paragraphs on customs and education that 
conclude the parenthetical discourse concerns the implicit addressees in that section 
of the text. Rousseau silently changes his terminology here. He equates the main 
receivers of that education to those with the potential to be the future preceptors of 
morality in the society. In these paragraphs, the reference to the “people” (peuple) 
                                                                                                                                            
outside perspective (see §13). Rousseau’s rather guarded exhortations of the philosophical life, as 
the highest step in our hypothetical ladder of sovereignty are expressed in the following passages:  
Discours sur les sciences et les arts, Pléiade edition vol. III, p. 29; SD, p. 132-3 (133), 153-4 (156), 
p. 157-9 (160-2), note 9 (marked originally “7”), §13, p. 203 (207). See also SC, II, 7, pp. 381-384 
and Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio (Discourses on Livy), I, 9, 2 and I, 17, 
3.  
42 SDED, §19-21. 
43 Cf. SDED §20, with SD, p. 155-6 (158). 
44 “..le puerile et funeste goût est le plus mortel ennemi du bonheur et de la liberté” (SDED §21). 
The final section of the Epistle Dedicatory represents in a way the conclusion of the diagnosis 
conducted in the Second Discourse and it can be seen as a link to Rousseau’s subsequent works. 
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disappears; instead Rousseau speaks of “Gens” (or “gens”) in four instances: “peu 
de Gens,” “Gens de Lettres,” “jeunes Gens,” and “les prétendus gens de goût.” The 
interest here is clearly less with the etymological difference of the terms (peuple, 
gens) than with the clear allusion to those among the citizens who will eventually 
occupy the higher ranks of sovereignty. Education is the vehicle to active 
sovereignty, but as such it is only effective with those naturally predisposed for the 
action in question. The principle of distributive justice is a result of the natural 
inequality thesis whereby individuals are not exclusively the product of experience 
and education. As far as talents and strengths go, individuals are unequal by nature; 
hence, the greater potential of these future guardians of society addressed by 
Rousseau might have been due to their superior natural disposition.  
If, among other things, we consider the pervasiveness of this aristocratic 
principle throughout the text of the Second Discourse, we can conclude that 
Rousseau’s first concern in the Epistle Dedicatory is not with the will of the people 
as a whole, but with that of these potential guardians of the general will who, due to 
young age or other inconveniences, must wait in the limbo, as it were, between 
rulers and ruled. This is why the text here represents a transition between the two 
discourses that constitute the Epistle Dedicatory. “Les Gens” can be seen as the 
present and future bearers of the moral bond between the laws of the city and the 
imagination of the people. And if it is possible that a magistrate be one of  “les 
Gens”, it is not a necessity that “les Gens” get involved in politics.  
The Second Discourse is a special chapter of Rousseau’s pedagogy. In the 
Epistle Dedicatory, the invisibility of his educational action can be justified by the 
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ambiguous sense of Rousseau’s confessed patriotism. There is a tension between the 
interest or reasons (humanity, friendship, and the moral virtues in general) that 
animates the “virtuous Patriot,”45 and the “tender affection” that animates the “true 
Patriot.”46 There is also a contrast between the zeal (zèle) behind the “love for the 
Fatherland,” and the zeal (zéle) of the “virtuous Citizen” with whom Rousseau 
identifies himself in the beginning of §1.47 The virtue of the “true Patriot” is, in this 
way, not evident, and if his “tender affection” is simply an affection for mankind,48 
his “respect” for the laws and conventions in general might be just a façade for an 
action that must be covert in order to be effective. Hence, the educational action of 
the “true Patriot” might collide with the “salutary trust which reason owes to 
virtue,” that is to say, with “the secret voice of conscience” and “the most respectful 
firmness” of the citizens.49 To avoid strain, his motives must be more secret to the 
people than the secret voice of their conscience; but his action must resemble that of 
a “good and faithful Guardian who only barks when Thiefs draw near.” Even in the 
idealized Geneva, “the Laws”, says Rousseau, “unite almost all of us.”50 
In conclusion, we should also add that the general importance of the religious 
and moral education of the people established in the Epistle Dedicatory does not 
contradict the principles of natural morality introduced in the main text of the 
Second Discourse. On the contrary, the Geneva of the Epistle Dedicatory can be 
                                                
45 SDED §12. 
46 SDED §13 and §22. 
47 Cf. also note 9 (“7”), §13, p. 203 (207). 
48 See end of SDED §22. 
49 SDED §15. 
50 SDED §14, my italics. Cf. with §5 and with the one-sidedness of the patriotism depicted in §2. 
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seen as the historical surrogate for the political order that should eventually result 
from Rousseau’s new morality. The society described in the Epistle Dedicatory can 
be interpreted as a society where freedom best resounds with the unity of the golden 
age of mankind celebrated in Part Two of the Second Discourse.51 The harmonizing 
function of Genevan religion and morals must be understood accordingly. By 
idealizing the political role of Christianity, Rousseau generalizes the political role of 
religion tout court. He praises Geneva52 for having preserved the spirit of 
Christianity in which the “sacred dogmas authorized by the laws (loix)” guarantee, 
through the “zealous (...) and venerable Pastors of souls,” the hopefully eternal 
“repose of men.”53 Thus, by contrasting the religion of Geneva with “the frightful 
maxims of those holy and barbarous men of whom History provides more than one 
example,”54 Rousseau anticipates, even if only in its basic elements,55 the natural 
religion or morality of pre-civil society described in the Second Discourse. 
                                                
51 Cf. SDED §14 with note 9 (“7”), p. 202 (206); and SD pp. 166-7 (170-171), 186-7 (191-3); and 
SD note 16 (originally marked “13”), pp. 219-220 (220-221). 
52 Geneva is only mentioned by name in the discourse inside the discourse (SDED §14-21) in the 
paragraphs on the themes of morality, i.e., religion, women, and the arts (SDED §19-21). 
53 Cf. with SD, pp. 187-8 (193). 
54 “and who, in order to uphold the supposed rights of God, that is to say, their own interest, were 
all the less sparing of human blood as they flattered themselves that their own would always be 
respected” (SDED §19). Cf. SD, pp. 171-3 (176-177). 






The Argument of the References behind the Epistle Dedicatory 
 
 
1. The Epistle Dedicatory is crucial to the understanding of the Second 
Discourse because it introduces, through the hidden ambiguity of the sovereign will, 
the permanent tension that permeates the book, the tension, broadly speaking, of the 
psychological in the political.1 In a democratic republic, the ambiguity of the 
psychological and political dimensions of sovereignty tends to be either forgotten or 
dismissed as contradictory by a more geometrical approach to politics. Rousseau’s 
use of Herodotus’ Otanes in his first note to the text is an illustration of this 
question.  
In the Epistle Dedicatory we have, then, an a priori inversion (or subversion) 
of Rousseau’s own doctrine of the sovereignty of the general will. As in the main 
text of the Second Discourse, the general will (the presumed seat of sovereignty) is 
                                                
1 Certainly, there are different ways of stating this tension in Rousseau, the most common of them 
being perhaps the pair “particular will,” “general will.” Again, the tension is irreconcilable if left on 
the terms of the Social Contract, where the extreme possibility of those wills is left out. It must be 
considered through the more profound investigation of the human will opened by the Second 
Discourse. 
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not a point of departure but a goal.2 The interest in the Epistle Dedicatory is that it 
lets us consider sovereignty not simply as a one-sided, static, political attribute, but 
that it can be read as Rousseau’s silent derision of what later will be seen as the very 
core of his political theory, namely, the “logical necessity” of this one-sided 
sovereignty in democracies. By inviting us to inquire about the origins of the unity 
of the general will, Rousseau makes us consider the values and “truths” that unite 
the will of the people as the product of another, independent, will.3  
 In the Epistle Dedicatory the will of the people is not a transcendental 
concept. In fact, its artificiality can be seen as the central issue in the text. Let us 
reiterate the question by briefly considering consent, the “action” which Rousseau 
officially attributes to the people thought of as one body.  
We must first reflect on the primary intention behind the consent of most 
citizens. It seems safe to assume that, in practice, most citizens will only 
wholeheartedly consent to public actions and laws that they perceive as immediately 
related to (or at least in harmony with) their individual interest. However, the more 
                                                
2 There is an inverted strategy regarding the general will to the strategy in both the article On 
Political Economy and in the Social Contract. 
3 The necessity to cover up the differences between the various addressees of the Epistle Dedicatory 
(or the readers of the Second Discourse) mirrors the necessity to protect the psychological principle 
of popular sovereignty (the principle that founds democratic rule) as if it were a transcendental 
principle of justice – namely, as if the general will were conceivable as the spontaneous expression 
of the free will of each and every individual. The inconsistency of the unqualified identity between 
sovereignty and the people appears when one considers the general will from outside – i.e. when 
one considers the whole spectrum that begins with the genesis of that will – and when one reflects 
on the two perhaps most elementary modes of human desire: one, conditioned by predispositions, 
habits, and a primary concern with oneself; the other, reflective of a general concern with the 
desires and expectations of others.  
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elusive the subject matter of these actions and laws (for instance, actions that appeal 
to beliefs about human nature and morality), the more unreflective will be their 
approval: consent will be more homogeneous, and thus general, about matters that 
require trust and faith instead of reason.4  
This initial asymmetry between the individual’s will and the general will of 
the people is neutralized, on this more elusive level, by the “coincidence” between 
individual and general beliefs, a coincidence that, on that level (and only on that 
level), makes the sum of particular wills (la volonté de tous) the same as the general 
will. For Rousseau, general consent must not depend, in principle, on a sacrifice or 
even a compromise of the individual will, but on the process that leads to that 
coincidence.5  
Consent in general should be the natural outcome of an education in the 
traditional values of the fatherland and in “the sacred dogmas authorized by the laws 
(loix).”6 It should be the outcome of a legislation that favors frugality over excess 
and autonomy over dependence. Ultimately, it should be the outcome of a society in 
which the reasonable number of inhabitants would encourage a life of dedication to 
the community over selfishness: 
                                                
4 Cf. SDED, §15; and SD, p. 183 (188). 
5 This naturally does not mean that Rousseau imagines a society with no strife and individual 
sacrifice; it means that in his understanding of happiness, the gap between private and public 
interests should be brought to a minimum. To base a regime on individual self-sacrifice – either by 
contrition or by the force of the law – is to end up with different families of dissatisfactions: in a 
word, factions. Rousseau’s distance from Lockean liberalism is in his different understanding of the 
psychology of freedom. He wants to maximize freedom by minimizing oppression while preserving, 
throughout the whole spectrum of society, the theoretical possibility that the best minds can ascend 
to the highest forms of human excellence. 
6 SDED, §19. 
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 A State where, since all individuals know one another, neither the 
shady strategems of vice nor the modesty of virtue could have escaped 
the Public’s gaze and judgment, and where this gentle habit of seeing 
and knowing one another would have made the love of one’s 
Fatherland a love of the Citizens rather than of the soil (terre).7  
 
As the general will, general consent depends, at the limit, on the minimal condition 
for such a just republic: a city small enough so that each individual knows the 
others, and where each one has a business that does not depend on the work of 
others and that corresponds to his natural potentialities, i.e. to his talents and 
strengths. In theory, this condition guarantees that the ambitions of certain 
individuals do not extend beyond the realm of their own activity, preserving them 
from the economy of domination created with the division of labor, while preserving 
the natural attachment to the other citizens as the only meaning of patriotism. 
People are free to the extent that they know what they want, and what they want 
does not create any relation of dependence or domination for them. Because 
knowing what they want corresponds ideally to knowing what they are able to do, it 
would also mean knowing, or simply intuiting, the limits of their freedom. Yet 
freedom is also the sensation resultant from the love for the things that one shares 
with other citizens: one cares for the other citizens to the extent that they love the 
same laws and values that give meaning to one’s life, their imagination having been 
educated to project those laws and values as natural and eternal. The problem here is 
that, when taken to the extreme, this understanding of freedom can be seen as the 
                                                
7 SDED §2. Cf. also SD, p. 165 (169). The use of the word “terre”/ “Terre” is explored by Rousseau 
throughout the main text and the notes – see e.g. note 4 (marked originally “*a”), p. 192-3 (198) – 
in the ambiguity between “the planet” and “soil.” See also the passages referring to the division of 
labor and political domination in Second Discourse Part Two. 
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expression of a dehumanized version of the general will: a general will of 
individuals taken as a herd, whose desires and consent simply coincide, on the 
various levels of their existence, as if communication did not naturally presuppose 
any need for consideration, as if humans were, like beasts, purely passive beings.8 
In the beginning of the Epistle Dedicatory, freedom is indeed described in 
terms of this one-dimensional desire, and thus, paradoxically, in terms of artificial 
limits to the individual’s imagination. Rousseau summarizes here the central 
problem of Part Two of the Second Discourse – that is to say, the relation between 
freedom and human desire in nascent society – by depicting, precisely, a relation 
between freedom and an unambiguous desire from which amour propre is 
strategically absent (or just inconspicuous): in a state where “neither the shady 
strategems of vice nor the modesty of virtue could have escaped the Public’s gaze 
and judgment,”9 all human passions that can lead to the deviation from the rule will 
be, hopefully, in check. Rousseau departs from this unconditional desire unstained 
by amour propre in order to introduce the identity between sovereignty and 
people.10  
                                                
8 On this issue, see SD, pp.164-6 (168-170). See also M. Davis, op. cit., pp. 90 and 108 (n.9). 
9 SDED, §2. Cf. also the Pléiade editor’s note 1 on p. 112. 
10 This one-dimensional desire makes us think indeed of Rousseau’s description of the golden age in 
Part Two of the Second Discourse. The suggestion of a society without amour propre precedes 
Rousseau’s critique of the sort of private property that appears with the division of labor, i.e. land 
property. One is led to believe that, in a way, amour propre appears with land property, for we are 
told that it is the emergence of amour propre as the conspicuous characteristic of human beings that 
creates the necessity and the conditions for the pact which artificially re-unites the will of the 
people (cf. SD, pp. 169 ff. (174 ff.)). In the Epistle Dedicatory, the initial abstraction from the 
amour propre of the citizens also seems to serve Rousseau’s depiction of a foundational moment of 
civil society; there, however, he deals specifically – though disguisedly – with the question of the 
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That said, from a philosophical point of view, patriotism is not entirely 
different than vanity or self-absorption; in fact, one thing might be considered as 
just another mode of the other. The fact that we can think of a general will that 
unifies, on the more elusive level, all individuals, does not mean that the main 
motivation behind most particular wills (i.e. behind their “consenting action”) 
remains essentially anything but selfish. That is to say, if, on the one hand, the will 
of the people as a whole can be seen as the result of common values and beliefs, on 
the other, individual actions are, by and large, prompted by selfishness. Individual 
action starts becoming sovereign (or sovereignty starts becoming active) when it 
intentionally, and not only coincidentally, reflects the general will, i.e. when it stops 
being predominantly self-referential. The education of the will of those who are 
naturally more prone to action (the most ambitious) is the most important in the 
state because, left to their natural inclination, the harm to the state, or to the general 
will, can be proportional to their appetite. With that in mind, it should be clear that 
patriotism, in itself, does not necessarily entail what we have been calling a 
sovereign action. The political action of law-abiding citizens is, from a 
philosophical point of view, pre-conditioned by the laws respected by those citizens. 
Thus within the framework of the general will, the freedom of individual wills is 
never absolute, but always relative or contextual: within that framework there is no 
free will.11 It is in this sense that, according to Rousseau, the general will originally 
did not simply emanate from an objective debate among the people, but appeared 
                                                                                                                                            
natural ambiguity of sovereignty, an ambiguity that must have started, in reality, precisely with the 
artificiality of the original pact (cf. SD, pp. 171-4 (176-178)). 
11 Or philosophical freedom. 
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only after the foreign and much longer process of binding together the particular 
wills regarding the most elusive laws and “truths.”12  
This process was set in motion by a “pact.” The mysterious character of the 
general will disappears when we learn that, in its origins, the pact – “the most well-
considered (le plus réfléchi) project ever to enter the human mind”13 – was not the 
product of a rational deliberation of the particular wills, but, as Rousseau says, of 
the “specious reasons” of one man. The pact is by definition fraudulent. It consists 
precisely of making individuals believe – through an appeal to the “universal 
justice” brought about by the new laws – that the will it affirms is genuinely (or 
naturally) their own.14 From this perspective, the most fundamental action in the 
state, namely, that of the forging of its unity, is the most illegitimate. The general 
will only seems to become effectively united, and to reflect the happiness and 
tranquility of the state, when the very origins of the pact are somehow “lost (...) in 
the night of time.”15 For this and other reasons, any power or action aimed at 
(re)shaping the public imagination by bringing together, on the most elusive 
matters, individual and general interests, would need to be as hard to pin down as 
the ultimate meaning of the new relations and laws it wants to establish, and as the 
                                                
12 Cf. SDED, §15; SD, pp. 171-4 (176-8); and SC, II, 7, §1, p. 380. 
13 SD, p. 172-3 (177). 
14 Ibid. 
15 SDED, §6; cf. also SC, II, 8, p. 385, on the memory of peoples. To use Rousseau’s formula, the 
general will is “the effect becoming the cause” (cf. SC, II, 7, p. 383); it is the transformation of 
“force in right and [of] obedience in duty” (I, 3).  See also R. Masters interpretation of Rousseau’s 
epigraph to the Social Contract, in op. cit., pp. 301-6. Masters points out that the passage taken 
from Virgil’s Aeneid refers to the “[possibility] that political right was historically or factually 
founded on force;” he does not seem to appreciate, however, the seriousness in which Rousseau 
considers the law of the stronger and the extent to which Rousseau’s political doctrine hinges on it.  
 132 
origins of the previous laws had become. Rousseau leaves in the background of his 
Epistle Dedicatory this forbidden parallel between the illegitimate action at the 
origins of civil society and the “divine” legislative action of founders. He addresses 




I should have wished, then, that no one (personne) inside the State 
could have declared himself to be above the law (loi), and that no one 
(Personne) outside it could have imposed any [law] which the State 
was obliged to recognize. For, regardless of how a government is 
constituted, if there is a single individual in it who is not subject to 
the law, all the others are necessarily at his discretion. 
 
Rousseau’s first note to the Second Discourse (originally marked “(*)”) appears 
right after this passage and therefore in the context of our current discussion.16 In a 
certain way, our discussion of the Epistle Dedicatory so far can be seen as the 
                                                
16 “Hérodote raconte qu’après le meurtre du faux Smerdis, les sept libérateurs de la Perse s’étant 
assemblés pour délibérer sur la forme de Gouvernement qu’ils donneroient à l’Etat, Otanes opina 
fortement pour la république; avis d’autant plus extraordinaire dans la bouche d’un Satrape, 
qu’outre la prétention qu’il pouvoit avoir à l’empire, les grands craignent plus que la mort une 
sorte de Gouvernement qui les force à respecter les hommes. Otanes, comme on peut bien croire, ne 
fut point écouté, et voyant qu’on alloit procéder à l’élection d’un Monarque, lui qui ne vouloit ni 
obéir ni commander, céda volontairement aux autres Concurrens son droit à la couronne, 
demandant pour tout dédommagement d’être libre et indépendant, lui et sa postérité, ce qui lui fut 
accordé. Quand Hérodote ne nous apprendroit pas la restriction qui fut mise à ce Privilége, il 
faudroit nécessairement la supposer; autrement Otanes, ne reconnaissant aucune sorte de Loi, et 
n’ayant de compte à rendre à personne, auroit été tout-puissant dans l’Etat, et plus puissant que le 
Roi-même. Mais il n’y avoit gueres d’apparence qu’un homme capable de se contenter en pareil cas 
d’un tel privilege, fut capable d’en abuser. En effet, on ne voit pas que ce droit ait jamais causé le 
moindre trouble dans le Royaume, ni par le sage Otanes, ni par aucun de ses descendants.” SDED 
note 1 (originally marked “*”). 
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introduction to the issues represented by this note. Rousseau borrows an example 
from Herodotus to tell us about a man who, having the right to be the king, did not 
want to command, but did not want to obey either. All that man desired was for him 
and his descendents to be free from any submission to the ruling power, which was 
granted them provided that the laws were always observed.  
Even if Herodotus did not tell us the restriction placed on the 
Privilege, it would necessarily have to be assumed; otherwise Otanes, 
not recognizing any sort of Law (Loi) and not having to account to 
anyone, would have been all-powerful in the State, and more powerful 
than the King himself.17 
 
Rousseau implies a radical distinction between absolute and relative freedom. The 
distinction here is between a privilege that would give one man power over all the 
others, regardless of their desires and their common laws; and a privilege that would 
give a man power over all the others (including rulers), but only in so far as their 
desires and their common laws would allow. Considering that the “restriction” 
imposed on Otanes is not perceived by him as oppressive to his freedom (as 
Rousseau suggests in the note), we can think of the two privileges just mentioned as 
representative of, respectively, the freedom of the tyrannical soul and the freedom 
of the democratic or law-abiding soul.  
It is not hard to see that the types of person that these two senses of freedom 
characterize become inhuman in their extreme versions. In each of these extreme 
positions we would have a complete psychological enslavement resultant, if nothing 
else, from the impossibility of communication or dialogue: in one, through the 
radical isolation of an absolute, despotic will; in the other, through the complete 
                                                
17  SDED note 1 (“*”).  
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indistinguishableness in a community of equals. Rousseau situates “the wise 
Otanes” on the axis between these two poles. Hence, by calling the intermediate 
position wisdom, we can draw the following scheme: on the upper half, we have 
those who predominantly tend to impose their desire (the predominance of the “rule 
of desire”); on the lower, those who, under a blind allegiance to the law, 
predominantly tend to defend their equality (the predominance of the “rule of law”). 
Put simply, whereas here the desire of the individual is the law, there the law 










We can also say that while the absolute freedom of the tyrannical soul expresses a 
natural inequality between human beings, the relative freedom of the law-abiding 
soul expresses their equality, or the need thereof. Far from excluding each other, the 
two types show how a study of the situation illustrated in note “(*)” should consist 
 
                                     + 
 
 
  Desire to rule (others)       
 
                                     _ 
_ 
 
Necessity (desire) to  




             Wisdom 
 
           Enslavement 
  Enslavement 
 135 
of looking at one extreme in the light of the other and at the various situations that 
can emerge in between them. 
What is, then, this wisdom that Otanes seems to incarnate? How can 
someone, at the same time, observe a law that unites the general will and be free to 
change that law without contradicting that will? There only seems to be a balance 
when the problems with one position are seen from the perspective of the other. But 
this is not enough. The intermediate position can also mean a privation of freedom 
when, at the limit, one’s relations to others become a matter of complete 
indifference, either as a lack of desire for any sort of ascendancy over others, or as a 
lack of desire to belong, in whatever way, to the community (i.e. to submit with 
others to a common set of conventions). The wisdom represented by Otanes is 
simply not compatible with radical isolation, with any sort of asceticism,18 or even 
with a purely contemplative life. It requires a distance from the extreme possibilities 








                                                
18 Certainly not if we follow Herodotus. Cf. Histories, 3.84.1. 
    –                 +                  – 
 
Practical wisdom 
(Indirect ruling, belonging) 
No interest in belonging  
(to others), no law 
No interest in ruling others, no eros 
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 Due to the essentially political character of Otanes’ activity, the wisdom 
represented by him can only be linked to freedom if it becomes practical, i.e. if in 
some way it is translated into the sort of action with which it is concerned, even if 
this action would need to occur as an indirect form of ruling and belonging. To say 
that the belonging is indirect, is to say that the practical interest in others implied by 
Otanes’ wisdom is only in appearance pre-determined by the laws and powers of 
others. The interest (will) here is, at least in theory, as free as it can be. Otanes 
would be, therefore, in a sort of synoptic position in the state, namely, in the 
privileged position from which he would see all other positions without himself 
being seen. 
If we turn to Herodotus, we learn that for both Otanes and Darius the 
political power of the king is absolute and can affect the customs and ancient laws 
of the country (nomaia patria).19 Thus, the privilege given to Otanes and his 
descendents – to be free and independent from the king – can in principle be seen 
also as a privilege that concerns the laws in general. This is, at least in one way, in 
contradiction with the “restriction” imposed on Otanes that he and his descendents 
observe the laws.20 Rousseau says in the note that the acknowledgement of law and 
public institutions should be taken as an obvious restriction to the privilege 
conferred to Otanes, even if Herodotus had not mentioned it. He explores the 
ambiguity of Herodotus’ text by suggesting that the “acknowledgement” by Otanes 
                                                
19 Hist., 3.80.5 and 3.82.5. Cf. also the implications of Darius’ discourse in 3.72 (see below). 
20 Ibid., 3.83.6. 
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is of a completely different sort than the acknowledgement by the other citizens.21 
The restriction is obvious because it would be absurd to openly give a man absolute 
independence in the state without making him the king. Yet, the privilege conferred 
on Otanes ultimately amounts to that. (Let us not forget that the problem of a 
divided sovereignty is precisely the context in which note “(*)” is inserted.) Hence, 
now the question of sovereignty re-appears in another light: to a man in Otanes’ 
situation, who holds the sovereign power? As his will is not contingent on any other 
will, he is the one who creates the conditions for his and his descendents’ freedom. 
The sovereign power is on his hands.  
If we superimpose this situation with the sovereign will of the Genevan 
people, we see how the submission to the law – a law which, in Otanes’ case, is at 
his mercy – can be proclaimed tongue in cheek. Rousseau assures us that a man to 
whom such a freedom is awarded would not, in principle, have any interest in 
abusing it. If indeed this man has no desire to act and rule directly through politics – 
and if he has a clear understanding of the necessity to observe both the sacred 
dogmas of the state and the authority of the sovereign, while being aware, at the 
same time, of their conventionality – then both the “privilege” (formal freedom) and 
the “restriction” (observance of the laws) in question would certainly be redundant 
for him. In other words, there would be no privilege and no restriction at all. In fact, 
Rousseau suggests that a person can only be awarded such a privilege when the 
privilege is indeed known by the community to be redundant for that person, 
                                                
21 “But it was scarcely likely that a man capable in a case like this of being satisfied with such a  
prerogative (d’un tel privilége) was capable of abusing it.” SD note 1 (“*”). Cf. also SD, pp. 153-4 
(156).  
 138 
namely, when the person is known for her “wisdom.” But he leaves completely to 
the reader the implication that Otanes’ wisdom does not cancel his power or the 
responsibilities that come with it, not to mention the implication of the possibility 
that a man in Otanes’ position might end up being less wise than Otanes was said to 
be. 
Rousseau uses the example of Otanes to present a third, rarer and less 
tangible, prospect of freedom. The manner in which he tells us about Otanes should 
not make us overlook that a man in his condition would be conscious of his freedom 
and power to act upon the customs and ancient laws of the country without being 
noticed. In sum, he is free from the beliefs in the values and “truths” that make 
political life possible and meaningful; he is fully conscious about the illusions that 
drive most people’s desires and about the natural necessity of conventions for civil 
life. Rousseau’s Otanes is outside the laws while, at the same time, submitted to 
them. In his sovereign power, he would only act indirectly and for the benefit of his 
posterity. His freedom is as absolute as the freedom of a tyrant and as lawful as that 
of the most law-abiding citizens. 
That said, we must turn again to Herodotus’ text to find that, there, Otanes 
appears actually as the incarnation of the republican spirit in its unqualified form 
(radical egalitarianism) and, for that reason, as the representative of a position 
incompatible with the “temperate” republicanism advocated by Rousseau.22 There is 
a silent criticism by Rousseau of Otanes’ politics in Herodotus, which is indicative 
                                                
22 Cf. Hist., 3.80.1 ff. with SDED §6; for the problem of innovation and the criticism of Athenian 
democracy, cf. §9 with Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, I, 25. 
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of Rousseau’s reluctance to expose the main weakness of the regime he defends and 
to confront in an explicit manner the main question of the passage at stake, namely, 
the nature of sovereign power in republics.23 What follows is an attempt to 
understand Rousseau’s “criticism” of Otanes’ position in Herodotus. 
Otanes’ defense of democracy appears as a reaction to his own experience of 
the unjust rule of absolute power under men like Cambyses and Smerdis the Magus. 
For Otanes, there is no distinction between monarchy (or tyranny understood as 
absolute sovereignty of one man) and despotism.24 He does not believe that a man 
can be a king without becoming envious and proud: a king is always going to be a 
despot because all men, regardless of their different qualities, are equally 
corruptible. Otanes would agree with Hobbes that it is in man’s nature to be at war 
with all the others when abandoned to himself and left in a state in which his 
immediate desires are the source of the only absolute and sovereign power. Yet, 
Otanes differs and in a way is more modern than Hobbes in one fundamental point. 
He accuses monarchs of changing the customs and ancient laws of the country.25 He 
does it, however, without seeing that his radical republicanism would also bring 
                                                
23 Rousseau’s criticism of Athenian democracy and his open preference for Sparta in the Second 
Discourse (as well as in other works) should be a sign that the “wisely temperate democracy” he 
defends is more temperate than one might initially think (cf. SDED §20; SD p. 134-5 (135); SD, pp. 
175-6 (180-1) and p. 182 (187)). The challenge for Rousseau is in how to endorse the general 
opinion that the political regime based on equality is the one closest to nature, and at the same time 
“expose” the artificial core of this idea.  
24 Hist., 3.80.2. Cf. with Rousseau’s distinction between “legislator,” “tyrant,” “despot,” and “king” 
in SC, II, 10, p. 390 and III, 10, p. 423. 
25 Ibid., 3.80.5. 
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changes, and perhaps the most profound changes, to these customs and laws.26 By 
understanding that the people should possess the sovereign power in a literal 
sense,27 Otanes defends a government that, having reason or open debate as the 
unifying principle of ruling, would ultimately dissolve traditional beliefs through 
the new belief that all political deliberation (qua articulation of the supreme 
political power or sovereignty) can and must obey a rational or dialogical process.28 
If reason is the only unifying principle, desires become epiphenomena that pertain 
exclusively to the individual or private realm; for all political purposes, for Otanes, 
the maxim “Fais à autrui comme tu veux qu’on te fasse” would suffice.29  
                                                
26 Reminded by Darius in 3.82.5. Cf. with SDED §9. 
27 “hen gar toi polloi heni ta panta” (3.80.6). 
28 The impossibility of a rational-philosophical state is explored by Rousseau in SD, pp. 179-181 
(184 – 186). “The frightful dissentions, the infinite disorders which this dangerous power would 
necessarily entail, show more than anything else does how much human Governments needed a 
more solid base than reason alone.” This seems also to be the opinion of Herodotus after his 
contrast between the geometrical thinking of Otanes and the more practical or efficient Darius; see 
Hist. 3.72, 3.80, and 3.85-86.   
29 In Part One of the Second Discourse (SD, p. 154 (156)), Rousseau contrasts the Christian maxim 
(“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”), “this sublime maxim of reasoned justice,” 
with “this other maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect but perhaps more useful than the 
first: Do your good with the least possible harm to others.” According to the first maxim (“Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you”), individual desires that deviate from the rule appear, 
in principle, under the sign of evil (or, at least, selfishness) and must be tamed by the geometric 
rationality of egalitarian justice; the maxim is focused on the limitation of one’s desire (i.e. the 
desire of the other) without which anything appears to be permissible; it denotes thus a sharp 
opposition between freedom (or what Rousseau would probably call the superficial impression of its 
possibility) and repression. The second maxim (“Do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you”) is focused on one’s good, which can be thought to be equated to a truer sense of one’s 
freedom; and because the only limitation to the pursuit of one’s good comes from the possibility of 
a concern with others that would arise with natural compassion, there is no repression. But the 
superiority of the second maxim is not only psychological. The “maxim of natural goodness” 
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The attempt to resolve the political problem with a simple equation between 
the people and the state (hen gar toi polloi heni ta panta) would fail precisely for 
disregarding the necessity to preserve the ambiguity of popular sovereignty implicit 
in Rousseau’s Epistle Dedicatory. The blind allegiance to the rule of equality 
(isonomia) – a value that on its surface appears to the people as a good beyond 
reproach – together with the vulgarization of the political debate, produce a false 
sense of unity in the community (a false consensus) which ends up going against the 
interest of the people and corrupting the common structure of their desire.30 No 
matter how fine and noble Otanes wants the concept of isonomia to be, it must not 
become the moral reference.31 It cannot replace, as it were, the supposedly less fine 
and certainly less geometrical conventionality of customs and ancient laws, for the 
mere fact that these things are generally not perceived as contingent, but as natural 
laws.32 In Otanes’ radical republicanism, all laws would become, in the end, 
extensions of the fundamental law of equality. Laws would become representative 
of the human functions and faculties that are identical to all men (i.e. bodily 
                                                                                                                                            
accounts for the action of those few human beings who make the common good the 
uncompromising object of their desire; those like Otanes who would only act for the benefit of their 
posterity. The difference between the two maxims is ultimately in the existence of a higher principle 
of human action than one’s personal designs. This difference condenses Rousseau’s attack, on the 
one hand, on the simplistic and insufficient morality of the Church and, on the other, on the “moral 
individualism” predicated on liberalism. On Rousseau’s maxim of natural goodness, see the note in 
Émile, pp. 340-1. 
30 To advance the context of the discussion below, see Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, I, 16, 3, on 
the impossibility of friendship in new republics. Henceforth, DL. 
31 Hist., 3.80.6. 
32 For Rousseau, these are the things that unite the will of the people. SDED §4 and §15. 
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necessities by and large) and individual desires would become nothing but residues 
of the main political process.  
We can sum up Rousseau’s position against radical republicanism (or, for 
that matter, against radical Enlightenment) as follows. If the realm of desires is 
simply identified with the unrestrainedness of the private realm, an excessive need 
for freedom becomes tantamount to the excessive demand for different objects of 
desire caused by the explosion of individual desires in the society; this need for 
freedom would be excessive in that it would fragment, instead of unite, the will of 
the people, creating an insurmountable gap, so feared by Rousseau, between the 
laws of the country and the individual desires of the citizens, and resulting in 
psychological oppression rather than in actual freedom for the citizens.33 Rousseau 
is perhaps the greatest thinker and defender of democracy, but only by being its 
greatest critic. The notion that, from a political-psychological point of view, 
equality and freedom in excess lead to oppressive enslavement is central to, albeit in 
apparent contradiction with, the main argument of the Second Discourse. 
Rousseau’s struggle against the morals and politics of the Enlightenment – in both 
senses of what would become the right and the left – as well as anything that in him 
can appear as a nostalgic defense of ancient virtue, meritocracy, and sumptuary 
laws, must be understood through this notion. 
Therefore, by not seeing that the ruler must not think of sovereignty as an 
absolute concept in order for the state to be well governed – that is to say, by not 
seeing that sovereignty must always consist of a hidden negotiation between the 
                                                
33 Cf. also DL, I, 3, 2. 
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passive will of the people and the active mind of the ruler, and never of a reduction 
to one or the other – Otanes misses the fact that there are not only good and bad 
monarchies, but good and bad democracies as well.34 He does not see that even 
excessive prudence in political deliberations can be detrimental to the general 
interest.35 His own system, taken at face value, could have been in the end more 
oppressive to the people and more disturbing to the customs and laws of the country 
than the tyrannies he condemns. The sovereignty of the people is not necessarily a 
quality of democracies because a democracy easily becomes a tyranny of the 
multitude when its laws are generally perceived as excessive, artificial, and 
oppressive. For Rousseau, the will of the people can be sovereign regardless of the 
official form of government.36 The difference between a nominal (theoretical) and 
an actual sovereignty of the people is, again, crucial. The idea here is that some 
monarchies are more democratic than some “democracies.” The good ruler must 
know that the difference between good and bad government is, before anything, a 
difference that regards the general principles of ruling. And in addition to knowing 
that the unity of the general will lies in the customs and ancient laws of the country, 
he must also know how to preserve that unity in the course of his actions.37  
                                                
34 Hist., 3.80.3. 
35 Hist., 3.72.3. 
36 For Rousseau’s discussion about the natural source of political authority as well as the difference 
between despotism and kingship, see SD, pp. 175-182 (180 – 187); cf. with pp. 164-5 (168). See 
also SC, III, 10, p. 423, and ch.6 below. 
37 See Hist., 3.82.  
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It is in Darius where we find the correction to Otanes as well as the principle 
of ruling which, in spite of its crudeness, must be observed by those who hold the 
highest sovereign power.  
There are many things, says Darius, that cannot be demonstrated in 
words, but only in actions; and there are other things that can be put 
into words, but without anything [immediately] evident [to most 
people] arising from them. (...) [So] if it is necessary to lie, then lie. 
We are all after the same thing, whether we lie or speak the truth. 
Some win credence and advantage by lies, while others obtain 
advantage and become more trusted by telling the truth. Thus we 
approach the same ends by different means; and if the hope of 
advantage were taken away, he who tells the truth would be as ready 
to lie as the liar to tell the truth.38  
 
The passage must be interpreted in the large context of what a political action 
means. The principle pronounced by Darius states that actions about the 
fundamental things are not up for debate, because the argument of actions that 
regard the fundamental things is not always translatable into an intelligible 
discourse, and is rarely straightforward. Thus, the action and authority of the highest 
sovereign power – again, understood as the power over the customs and ancient 
laws of the country – cannot depend on a consensus that might presumably result 
from rational debate, precisely because the unity and efficiency of the action reside 
in a foresight that is hardly passive of being debated.39 In order to, as it were, avoid 
the debate, it is necessary to neutralize the questions or convince the other parties in 
the fastest and most efficient way. It is in this sense that deception can be beneficial 
                                                
38 Hist., 3.72.2-5. Cf. with SC, II, 7, p. 383. 
39 It can neither depend on discursive reason nor on the wish of the gods (fortune). See Hist., 3.85-
86. 
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when needed for the completion of a just action.40 Darius’ principle becomes central 
for our discussion when we think of the action of the sovereign power as the action 
of those who, regardless of their direct involvement in government, transform “lies” 
into “truths,” and move, in the most fundamental sense, the customs and laws of a 
people – those who, through the new morals and values engendered by the stories 
they tell us, unite (or divide) the trust and beliefs of their posterity. 
Thus, if Rousseau presents Otanes as the initiator of a new order of freedom 
for his posterity, he does it against Otanes’ own terms. Although on the surface 
level of his example Rousseau makes Otanes’ lawfulness the embodiment of 
republican freedom, he offers to the more attentive reader the possibility to consider 
all the issues at stake here in a completely different light.41 In Herodotus, the limits 
of Otanes’ politics – the reason why Otanes must stand outside the official order – is 
given by his failure to perceive the impossibility to democratize his own 
consciousness of freedom and to found a new republican government purely on the 
basis of that consciousness and rationality.  
It is in this sense that when we read Rousseau’s use of Otanes through 
Herodotus, the temperate element of the republicanism that he (Rousseau) makes 
Otanes represent appears, unexpectedly and quite ironically, in the outrageous 
Darius. We can say, then, that Rousseau’s rhetorical strategy in the Epistle 
                                                
40 Cf. DL, II,15. 
41 Note that the text of note “(*)” differs from the text of the main discourse. It is not declamatory 
and its impersonal indirect discourse puts it outside the rhetorical frame of the main text. The 
question of the addressees re-emerges here. Is this first note to the Second Discourse “addressed” 
yet to another kind of Souverains Seigneurs? Can it be addressed to the Souverains Seigneurs that 
are outside our suggested ladder of sovereignty?  
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Dedicatory is devised in the spirit of Darius, not of Otanes. His artifice to reform or 
temper Otanes’ rationalism anticipates what is still to come in the Second 
Discourse. Rousseau’s Otanes can be thought of as the prototype of the man of the 
Enlightenment whom he would ultimately like to reform. The manner in which he 
presents Otanes – by patronizing him, on the one hand, and (indirectly) exposing his 
failure, on the other – foreshadows his strategy regarding his highest readers. The 
problem of the “Philosophes” perceiving the limits of discursive reason, and the 
political implications of their failure, is indeed one of the recurring themes in the 
Second Discourse and certainly the one that receives Rousseau’s most subversive 
treatment.42 
 
3. Again, Rousseau is perhaps the greatest defender of democracy only 
because he is its greatest critic. Otanes’ democratic dream was sheer madness; it 
missed the fundamental political principles of true republicanism. We should also 
say that, from a metaphysical point of view, Rousseau’s critique of Otanes’ 
excessive rationalism approaches his silent rebuke of Lockean or Montesquieuian 
liberalism. In both cases, the highest sense of freedom is reached by the exercise of 
what we can think of as the vulgar understanding of reason (in politics, by the 
attempt of a collective deliberative action43). When individuals are seen as the sole 
masters of their will – when they are measured by their power to determine their 
individual good and to calculate the means to achieve it – all human enslavement 
                                                
42 Cf. SD, pp. 143-4 (145); 148-9 (150-151); 183-4 (188-189); 186-7 (192-193); 189-190 (195-196); 
209-210 (212-213); 215-6 (217-218); 216-7 (218). See also R. Velkley, op. cit.; note 22, p. 164.  
43 Hist., 3.80.6. 
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(understood roughly as any repression of those powers) is seen as unnatural and 
unjust, for going a priori against the interest of the individual. Thus in both 
Herodotus’ Otanes and the liberal thinkers the freest regime is seen ultimately as a 
republic ruled by a rational and pragmatic legislation that optimizes the power 
(right) of its citizens to express their individual wills. From such a perspective, 
democracy is natural due to the supposed natural right of individuals to equally 
pursue their own interest and preserve their “free will.” In Otanes, this is 
represented by his unqualified endorsement of direct democracy and the rule of 
equality under law (isonomia), whereas Locke settles the issue through his argument 
of the natural freedom and equality of man, as well as the ensuing transformation of 
Hobbes’ natural right of self-preservation (Locke’s doctrine of private property).44 
                                                
44 Politically speaking, Locke is certainly very far from Otanes. However, in spite of his low 
opinion of direct democracies, Locke’s political theory depends on the notion of democratic consent 
as the original act of civil society. See Locke’s Second Treatise on Government §§58, 61, 63, 74; 
87; cf. §91 with Otanes’ speech; and §§95, 96, 99 with §§105, 106, 110. Regardless of what is said 
in §112 of the Second Treatise, Locke is not, in the end, that far from Filmer – his target in the first 
of the Two Treatises of Government – on the issue of consent. As with Rousseau, the main 
difference between Locke and Filmer occurs on a more profound stratum and it is not made entirely 
clear in Locke’s Treatises. Indeed, any reader of the Patriarcha can see that Filmer’s defense of 
monarchy is nothing but a condemnation of despotism. “Albeit Kings, who make the Laws, be (...) 
above the Laws, yet will they Rule their Subjects by the Law; and a King, governing in a settled 
Kingdom, leaves to be a King, and degenerates into a Tyrant, so soon as he seems to Rule according 
to his Laws; yet where he sees the Laws Rigorous or Doubtful, he may mitigate and interpret. (...) 
And although a King do frame all his Actions to be according to the Laws, yet he is not bound 
thereto, but at his good Will, and for good Example: Or so far forth as the General Law of the 
Safety of the Common-weal doth naturally bind him” (Patriarcha, ch. III, 6; London (1680)). 
Filmer suggests in this and other passages that a wisely ruled state is monarchy with a republican 
spirit and with the sovereign power remaining always indivisible in the hands of one. Cf. II, 1; II, 6 
– 7; II, 9; II, 14; II, 15; II, 16; III, 1; III, 10 – 14;. Cf. also I, 1 (“all other shews and pretexts of 
Liberty, are but several degrees of Slavery, and a Liberty only to destroy Liberty”) as well as 
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All this, one might claim, is very similar to what Rousseau says. For him, 
however, the different wills of individuals in the original position implied by Otanes 
reveal a scale of the freedom, power, and consciousness that they enjoy, something 
that must be the matter of philosophical and political consideration. Let us briefly 
focus on this digression about Rousseau and Liberalism before we turn to the 
reference to Machiavelli in the Epistle Dedicatory. In order to understand 
Rousseau’s distance from both Otanes and Locke, we need to presuppose the 
general distinction advanced above between passive and active will, i.e. between a 
will simply and its enactment. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau speaks of natural 
right in its broadest and most elementary sense, as a right of beings to the 
fulfillment of their own sensations and desires (in a word, of their sensibilité); or 
still as a right of beings to the experience of their own freedom and existence. The 
main consequence of this view is not so much, as announced in the Preface to the 
Second Discourse, that animals also participate in natural right, but that human 
beings participate in natural right only qua animals – namely, only in their sentient, 
instinctive, or passive (re-active) capacity.45 Differently from other animals, the fact 
                                                                                                                                            
Lucan’s epigraph on the opening page of the Patriarcha with Locke’s First Treatise, ch. I and II. 
For the different editions of Filmer’s works see the introduction to 'Patriarcha' and Other Writings, 
in Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed. J. P. Sommerville (1991). See also 
Patriarcha, ch. III, 4 and Aristotle’s Politics 1314a 40. Locke’s account of the origins of 
government should not be simply merged, as seems to have been his intention, with his critique of 
hereditary monarchies.  
45 SD, pp. 127-8 (126). This radical idea is present throughout the book: natural right must include 
animals in order to include most human beings, for most human beings are, in a certain way, in an 
equivalent or even inferior condition to other animals. See SD, pp. 138-9 (139); pp. 140-142 (141-3, 
section on perfectibility); and pp. 206-7 (210). (Rousseau contrasts the words “bête” (or “Bête”) and 
“animal;” bête in French can also mean a stupid person or someone without “esprit.”) See also in 
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that we humans have desires does not naturally endow us with a right to act in the 
name of these desires, for the same reason that it does not naturally endow us with 
the knowledge about the general conditions necessary to make our individual 
pursuits meaningful and good. If human beings, as we see them today, are for 
Rousseau unequal by nature regarding their potential for action writ large, they will 
also be unequal regarding the right to those actions. This makes us think that, for 
Rousseau, human beings (qua rational and social beings) have ultimately no natural 
or universal right of any kind to their individual action. For it would be absurd to 
grant the same right to all individuals as if they had the same potentialities, the same 
criteria for choice, and as if the product of their individual choices had, from a 
political point of view, a merely economic value. It is only through the abstraction 
of the general will as the unity of sovereignty that individuals who share in that will, 
participate in a right seen by them as a right of the whole species – in that sense, a 
"natural" right.46  
                                                                                                                                            
the Pléiade edition, the editor’s note 3, pp. 1296-7, for a partial bibliography on natural right and 
Rousseau. 
46 Cf. with L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, Chicago (1953), p. 286. Strauss regrets the fact 
that Rousseau ultimately fosters historicism and political extremism by keeping together the 
foundations of science (modern natural science) and philosophy (pp. 263, 277). According to 
Strauss, Rousseau’s appeal to ancient thought (e.g. Plato, Plutarch, Epicurus) is a palliative to his 
final dissolution, through the implacable historicism in his thought, of the idealistic basis of natural 
right: “In Rousseau’s doctrine of the state of nature, the modern natural right teaching reaches its 
critical stage. (...) [For him,] man’s humanity is the product of the historical process” (pp. 273-4). 
Rousseau breaks, as is well known, with Hobbes and Locke who predicated natural right on 
calculative reason; for him the action that guides self-preservation is instinctive well before being 
reflective. Reason is not an attribute of l’homme Sauvage, thus it cannot be the basis for natural 
right. (Strauss says that “in Hobbes, reason, using her authority, had emancipated passion; passion 
acquired the status of a freed woman; [but, different than in Rousseau, in Hobbes at least] reason 
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Rousseau conveys the idea, central to his political theory, that the original 
pact was based on an appeal to the equality of all participants and effected through 
their consent, and thus that the original or most natural form of government is, in 
that sense, democracy. Yet in Rousseau’s account of both the beginning of 
sociability (“the first developments of the heart”) and the beginning of political 
societies, consent or the mere recognition of authority is much less a matter of 
reasoning (freedom of choice) than of the “heart.” “Natural democracy” must be 
“tempered” because, by nature, governments need a more solid ground than the 
rationality of their participants. The relation to authority in nascent political 
societies needed to be equivalent to (not to say a natural continuation of) the 
sweetest human feeling, i.e., paternal love. The original democracy is less a form of 
government than, as Rousseau shows in Part Two of the Second Discourse, the spirit 
of association engendered by the sovereign will of one. As a form of government, 
democracy is not natural, and thus, in itself, not more just than the other forms. In 
other words, justice and freedom do not necessarily depend on the form of 
                                                                                                                                            
continued to rule, if only by remote control.” P. 252.) It can be argued, however, that Rousseau 
understands that he cannot confront the pervasive view of his time by constructing his political 
doctrine upon, so to speak, ancient principles of aristocratic natural right. I believe that his overall 
strategy is motivated by his view of the current state of European culture – namely, by what he 
probably saw as the unstoppable forces driving the Enlightenment and thus the inevitability of 
historicism (the basis of which had, in any event, already been established by Montesquieu) – and 
that these principles of aristocratic natural right are preserved, as is his separation between wisdom 
and science, at a higher level of his thought. The discussion about sovereignty in the Epistle 
Dedicatory is the introduction to – and to a great extent an attempt to elucidate – this apparent 
paradox. (See also Strauss, op. cit., pp. 262, 276, 293-4.) Note also that Rousseau leaves out of his 
title the part of the question proposed by the Academie de Dijon regarding natural law. For an 
alternative, though not less problematic, interpretation of Rousseau’s state of nature see V. 
Gourevitch’s article ‘Rousseau’s Pure State of Nature,’ Interpretation, 1988, vol. 16, n.1. 
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government, but on how well the indivisible unity of the active sovereign power 
mirrors the unity of the people.47  
                                                
47 Cf. SD, p. 171-4 (176-8); and p. 164 (168) with 177-181 (182-6). Cf. what Rousseau says about 
Athenian democracy in SDED §10 (“such must have been the rude constitution of the first 
governments arising immediately from the state of Nature”) with the notes below. Unlike Locke, 
Rousseau’s necessity to blur the discussion of whether the first governments were monarchic or 
democratic also pertains to his strategy regarding his addressees. The difference between the two 
thinkers on this issue can be thus stated. Locke treats consent as a fixed category and the hallmark 
of political freedom. Rousseau does not contradict the general sense of Locke’s consent theory and 
to a certain extent he subscribes to it; but whereas for Locke the expression of the will behind the 
individual’s consent reflects the highest degree of freedom, for Rousseau, the different conditioning 
and predisposition of individual wills reflect different degrees and kinds of freedom. For Rousseau, 
the democratic principle at the outset of political societies is not in the consent of the majority (a 
consent that presupposes open debate and deliberation), but in the action that unites the general 
consent, as it were, from outside – an action that receives the “express and unanimous consent of 
humanKind.” Political society does not result from a spontaneous collective agreement, but from 
“the most thoughtful project ever to have entered the human mind.” (Cf. SD, pp. 171-2 (176)) with 
Locke’s Second Treatise, Ch. VIII.) Also, for Locke, property is by definition prior to government, 
which allows him to locate the true beginning of political societies (i.e. government) in the 
collective agreement of all men “to joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, 
and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater 
Security against any that are not of it.” (Second Treatise, § 95; compare §§ 105 and 106 for the 
distinction between “the Original of Common-wealths” and “the beginning of Politick Society.”) For 
Locke, it is clear that adult human beings generally know what they want; the active consent of the 
people is driven by their rational concern with the preservation (security) of their properties (or 
simply, their self-preservation) and contrasts with the “tacit Consent” conferred to single rulers in 
the patriarchal “Golden Age” of pre-civil society (ibid., §§ 94, 111). For Rousseau, the original goal 
of civil society was not to secure the natural right to property, but to secure the property and 
authority of the most powerful men; the general consent concerning the fundamental things is, for 
him, always “tacit.”  
This whole question can be articulated in light of their views on education, that is to say, their 
different conceptions of freedom can also be explained by their opposed understanding of child 
psychology; already in the Second Discourse Rousseau treats freedom as primarily an attribute of 
children’s, not adults’ minds. Cf. SD, pp. 178-9 (183-4) and  182 (187). 
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Rousseau’s eulogy of freedom in the Epistle Dedicatory as a good 
enslavement to the law (“the salutary and gentle yoke”)48 announces what will be 
his response in the Second Discourse, and throughout his works, to the explosion of 
passions and the predominance of body over soul, that is to say, to the bad 
enslavement produced by the soft moral principles of liberal thought. It is true that 
the moral and political importance of the unity of sovereignty had already been 
attested by practically all major political thinkers since Jean Bodin, even if 
Rousseau takes a radical step by seemingly merging moral and political power in a 
same body, and by officially attributing this unified sovereign power to the will of 
the people. It is also true that, in a certain way, the importance given to the moral or 
psychological sense of sovereignty allows us to find greater affinities between 
Rousseau and theorists of absolute monarchy than with the fathers of liberal society. 
This is why one must be suspicious when in Part Two of the Second Discourse 
Rousseau evokes “the proofs of Locke and Sydney” in his condemnation of 
despotism, which is usually read as an outright condemnation of Robert Filmer’s 
Patriarcha.49 Filmer’s book, as Rousseau’s, is also an attempt to articulate the 
                                                
48 SDED, §4. 
49 SD, pp. 177-8 (182). We should also beware of Rousseau’s direct attack on Filmer in his article 
On Political Economy, of the same year of the Second Discourse (Pléiade ed., p. 244). A special 
attention to Rousseau’s wording in these passages is crucial. Two main reasons should raise our 
suspicion. The first one has already been stated; Rousseau’s insistence on the moral unity of 
sovereignty is clearly incompatible with the liberalism of Locke and Montesquieu. When obedience 
to the law becomes a function of the instinct of self-preservation, the unity of sovereignty becomes 
a problematic if not obsolete philosophical notion. The second reason is Rousseau’s treatment of the 
origin of government. In this section of the Second Discourse (p. 177-9 (182-4)), Rousseau muddles 
the distinction between paternal authority and arbitrary power. This happens after we are told that 
“nothing in the world is more distant from the fierce spirit of Despotism than the sweetness of this 
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difficulty regarding sovereignty. Filmer follows the tradition of the divine right of 
kings and defends monarchy as the natural form of government for being the only 
coherent way to preserve the unity of sovereignty. Rousseau’s republican 
(democratic) solution to Filmer’s argument against the fragmentation of sovereignty 
is radically different from the solutions proposed by Locke and Sydney, which he 
apparently endorses in the Second Discourse. Instead, he confronts the problem 
posed by Filmer on Filmer’s own terms; for both thinkers the tension between the 
passive and active senses of sovereignty cannot be undone without injury to the 
system. 
To conclude our digression, let us also say that Rousseau’s attack on 
classical democracy and “the dangerous innovations which ruined the Athenians,” 
as well as his insistent tribute to Spartan institutions corroborate our point: the 
                                                                                                                                            
authority [i.e. Paternal authority]”. Rousseau seems to side with Locke and Sidney (named in the 
passage in the Second Discourse, but not in that in the article On Political Economy) for their 
alleged proofs against those who derived government (Rousseau says “Gouvernement absolu et 
toute la Société”) from paternal authority. In the article On Political Economy, Rousseau calls 
Filmer’s Patriarcha a “hateful system” (Filmer is mentioned by name there, but not in the Second 
Discourse) for not making explicit the distinction between “économie publique” and “économie 
particuliere;” but he does not decry Filmer for his defense of paternal authority as the source of 
government. In the same passage, Rousseau opposes Filmer to Aristotle, who dedicated Book One 
of the Politics to the elucidation of precisely that distinction – in Aristotle’s terms, the difference 
between despotikos (rule of particulars) and politikos (public rule). But on the question of the 
origins of government, Aristotle was of Filmer’s opinion! (Politics, 1252b18). For these reasons, 
one must hold judgment on both Rousseau’s praise of Locke and Sidney in the Second Discourse, 
and his attack on Filmer in On Political Economy. Note also that Rousseau apparently defends the 
“common opinion” (SD, p. 179 (184)) attacked by Filmer right at the outset of the Patriarcha (I,1), 
before and after having shown its impossibility. All this, however, does not invalidate Rousseau’s 
critique of the hereditary monarchy defended by Filmer. Cf. also Filmer, Patriarcha, I, 4-5; I, 8-10; 
II, 1; II, 4; II, 13-4.  
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example of Sparta is relevant insofar as we perceive the elements that, in 
Rousseau’s terms, made Sparta (an elective monarchy) more democratic than 
Athens.50 The mistake of the Athenians was to believe, like Otanes, that the people 
can legislate in an active way, by proposing and making new laws; they believed 
that the active sovereignty could in fact be attributed to the people, and thus that it 
could be fragmented in all particular wills without injury to the state.51 
 
4. Rousseau’s example of the expulsion of the Tarquins in the Epistle 
Dedicatory is a reference to Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, the founding book of 
                                                
50 SDED §9. See also SDED §6, SD, p. 132-3 (133) and p. 142 (143); and First Discourse, pp. 12-
13 (Pléiade ed.). Cf. in the Second Discourse Rousseau’s use of the terms progress 
(progrés/progrès) and change (changement); see SD note 9 (“7”) pp. 197-9 (202-203) and 202 
(206); on the question of political innovations, see also Machiavelli, DL, I, 7, 3; I, 9, 4; I, 18, 2. 
51 As in the Epistle Dedicatory, it is not Athens, but Sparta and Rome that are the republican models 
in Machiavelli’s Discourses, the other fundamental reference in Rousseau’s text. Cf. DL, I, 2, 1; I, 
2, 6; I, 5, 1 – 2; I, 6, 1 – 4; see also Rousseau’s Political Fragments, in the Pléiade edition, vol. III, 
pp. 538 ff.. Sparta is praised in the Epistle Dedicatory in the paragraph about women, for being a 
state where the women were the bearers of morality and, in this sense, the seat of reason(ableness). 
SDED §20. In Rousseau’s idealized republic, the rational “love of the laws in the State and Concord 
among Citizens” taught by the (spartan) women of Geneva tames the private dimension of amour-
propre, taking precedence over natural family bonds. For Sparta and Rome as models that depended 
on deception and forgetfulness, see Machiavelli, DL, I, 9, 4, and I, 25, 2, with Rousseau’s First 
Discourse, p. 12. In respect to Rousseau’s defense of Spartan institutions it is enough to say that for 
the same reasons that the idea of a literal return to nature is for him absurd (see SD, p. 203 (207)), a 
return to those ancient institutions would be too. To read Rousseau as a nostalgist is not to read him 
as a thinker of his times, and to miss his emphasis on the necessities caused by history. Cf. SDED 
§20; and SD, pp. 134-5 (135), 175-6 (180-1) and 182 (187). 
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modern republicanism.52 Machiavelli’s Discourses can also be interpreted as an 
articulation of the paradoxical problem of political power in republics. For both 
Machiavelli and Rousseau, the main question concerns the psychological results of 
politics rather than the different forms of government, although, different from 
Machiavelli, Rousseau does not leave a place for the randomness of hereditary 
monarchy.53 That said, both thinkers agree that democracy is, in its psychological 
results, superior in principle to the other classical forms of government, for being 
the form that, through the rejection of the artificial hereditary system, potentially 
optimizes freedom in the state. They also agree about danger of the idealization of 
republicanism (radical republicanism) and that the adoption of egalitarianism as a 
“sacred cause” would give rise to an unprecedented amount of difficulties (for 
which the Second Discourse as well as Rousseau’s other political writings stand, 
perhaps paradoxically, as remedy).  
In a note to the Social Contract, Rousseau affirms that “the expulsion of the 
Tarquins was the true period of the birth of the Republic.”54  He speaks of a natural 
progression from democracy to aristocracy, and from aristocracy to monarchy, from 
within that (republican) period, which came to an end with the dissolution of the 
State under the despotism of Tiberius. Rousseau dedicates a good part of Book IV of 
the Social Contract to the post-Tarquian institutions of the Roman republic. His 
                                                
52  SDED, §6; DL, I, 16,1; see also I, 3, 2; I, 4, 1; I, 9, 2. Rousseau assesses Machiavelli’s “secret 
intention” and the philosophical prominence of the Discourses over the Prince in a passage added to 
the 1782 edition of the Social Contract. See in the Pléiade edition, p. 1480 (note “a” to p. 409).  
53 The order that emerges with the Second Discourse is not anymore an offshoot of traditional 
religion and finds its moral rudiments in “nature.” 
54 SC, III, 10, p. 421-2. 
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remedy is directed not only against sectarianism,55 but also against the dissolution of 
a unified sovereignty that can result from, as it were, excessively mixed regimes. In 
the chapters on mixed governments of the Social Contract, Rousseau defends 
temperate governments that are simple in form.56  
In the Epistle Dedicatory, Rousseau mentions the expulsion of the Tarquins 
after affirming that freedom is a function of habit or education, and that what can be 
initially interpreted as liberation can become a yoke heavier than the one removed a 
little before.  
Once the Peoples get used to Masters, they can no longer live without 
them. If they try to shake off the yoke, they end up even farther away 
from freedom: by taking freedom for a boundless license, which is 
actually its opposite, their revolutions almost always deliver them to 
seducers who only make their shackles heavier.57 
 
This is almost exactly what Machiavelli says in chapter 16 of his Discourses, 
entitled ‘A People Used to Living Under a Prince Maintains its Freedom with 
Difficulty if by Some Accident it Becomes Free:’  
Infinite examples read in the memories of ancient history demonstrate 
how difficult it is for a people used to living under a prince to 
preserve its freedom after, for whatever accident, that people acquires 
freedom, as Rome acquired it after the expulsion of the Tarquins. 
Such a difficulty is reasonable, for that people is nothing but a brute 
animal that, although of a ferocious and savage nature, has always 
been nourished in prison and servitude; [an animal] that after having 
been freed in a pasture and abandoned to its fate, becomes prey of the 
first one who tries to re-shackle it, for neither being accustomed to 
                                                
55 Cf. his note on SC, II, 3, p. 372. 
56 SC, III, 7, 8, 9, pp. 413-420. These chapters should be read as a correction of Montesquieu and in 
light of Rousseau’s doctrine of sovereignty. Therefore, they are not a mere endorsement of De 
l’esprit des loix. Cf. Émile, V (Pléiade edition, vol. 4, p. 836) with the conclusion to the Social 
Contract, IV, 9, p. 470. See also Machiavelli, DL, I, 3 and I, 4. 
57  SDED, §6. 
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feed itself, nor knowing the places where to hide./ The same happens 
to a people that, being used to living under the government of others, 
not knowing how to judge whether a public action is defensible or 
offensive, not knowing princes nor being know by them, returns 
quickly under a yoke generally heavier than the one it had removed a 
little earlier from its neck.58 
 
 Machiavelli argues that the rulers of either republics or monarchies must 
obey the same principle of ruling. The principle consists of taming the multitude, or, 
as he says, making the people friendly to oneself.59 In order to do that, the ruler 
must know, first and foremost, the difference between the general nature of the 
desire of two kinds of person, particularly in relation to freedom. Machiavelli 
explores in this chapter a difference that he establishes in the beginning of the book 
between those who desire to be free to command (the desire of others), and those 
who desire to have a secure life and be free from the oppression of others.60 
However, unlike in the earlier chapters of the Discourses, in chapter 16 Machiavelli 
explicitly states this difference from the perspective of the ruler, namely, from the 
perspective of someone who needs to “befriend” or satisfy, in principle, all parts. 
Yet the radical detachment of the extraordinary ruler, from whose perspective 
Machiavelli here speaks, does not allow him to truly befriend anybody; he must 
seduce his people and unite their imagination through the trust acquired by his 
apparent reverence for, and wholehearted endorsement of, the customs and laws he 
promotes. In this sense, the ruler might make use of religion and the name of God, 
                                                
58 DL, I, 16, 1-2. Cf. also with DL, I, 47, 3. 
59 DL, I, 16, 4. 
60 Cf. DL, I, 4, 1; I, 5, 1-2; see also Machiavelli’s Dedicatory Letter to the Discourses. Cf. also 
Barbeyrac’s Epitre Dédicatoire to his edition of Pufendorf’s Les Droit de la nature et des gens 
(another permanent reference for Rousseau), pp. iv – v, ed. 1732. Cf. with Darius’ discourse in 
Herodotus quoted above. 
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but only in order to uphold religion and unite the people.61 Machiavelli is very clear 
that even if the ruler’s deceptive and ambiguous actions, as well as the constant 
revision thereof, might cause a reordering of certain aspects of religion (i.e. of the 
customs and ancient laws of the people), they should never be simply against 
religion. On the contrary, as the product of the highest understanding in his 
hierarchy of power, the action of the highest kind of ruler is aimed exactly against 
what Machiavelli sees as the main cause of corruption in the state, namely, the 
dissolution of religious values and the oppressive situation created by an excessive 
fragmentation of the general desire.62  
In the Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli gives us a hierarchy of human power 
in terms of the meaning, intensity, and extent of one’s action upon the customs and 
ancient laws of one’s country. The unity of sovereignty in the state depends on the 
collective effort to secure these customs and laws, and the portion of each citizens’ 
merit regarding this effort is always proportional to each one’s business and 
strength.63 On the top of the pyramid, Machiavelli places the heads and orders 
(ordinatori) of religions, followed by the founders of either republics or kingdoms. 
Their difference is stated in this passage:  
if one who wishes to order a city well had of necessity to lay down the 
kingdom, he would deserve some excuse if he did not order [that city] 
so as not to fall from that rank [i.e. so as not to destroy the kingdom]; 
but if he is able to both hold the kingdom and order the city, he does 
not merit any excuse. In sum, those whom the heavens give such an 
opportunity may consider that two ways have been placed before 
                                                
61 Cf. DL, I, 10, 1; I, 11, 3-5; I, 12, 1; I, 15, 1; I, 55; I, 58, 3; II, 19. 
62 Cf. DL, I, 2, 3; I, 9, 2; I, 16, 5; I, 18, 3; I, 25; I, 57; I, 58, 4; III, 27; III, 29. Cf. with Rousseau’s 
Preface to Narcisse in Pléiade edition, vol. 2, p. 971. 
63 DL, I, 10, 1.  
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them: one that makes them live secure and after death renders them 
glorious; the other that makes them live in permanent anxiety, and 
after death leaves them a sempiternal infamy.64  
 
The expediency and power (“opportunity”) of men like Numa and Romulus, the 
founders of the Roman republic, is rare and not heritable. To take literally the 
political problems in one’s own hands is to make the success of one’s actions 
dependent upon the continual renewal of one’s public recognition as the ruler, 
which, due to the principles of ruling needed to order a city, becomes a source of 
continual anxieties and sempiternal infamy for that person.65 Numa is not superior to 
Romulus for being more naturally gifted, but for having chosen to secure the 
fundamental laws of the Romans through measures that did not depend on the 
political process tout court, and whose effect lasted well beyond his existence as a 
man.66 Indeed, Machiavelli presents the two strategies as if they were a matter of 
choice for the ruler, and as if the choice for a secure life and a glorious death were 
obviously the best one. That said, the obvious choice here hides the true reason of 
its superiority, namely, the fact that a city only effectively becomes a republic  – in 
the precise sense of the term, i.e. the people as the seat of the undivided sovereign 
power – when it is actively ruled from outside the ordinary political process. 
                                                
64 DL, I, 10, 6. My italics. 
65 Note in particular the sequence of Machiavelli’s argument from DL, I, 8 to I, 12; the chapters 
about the founders (I, 9 and I, 10) are preceded by a chapter that condemns lies in republics, and 
followed by chapters on the political importance of religions, regardless of whether they are true or 
false (see mainly I, 12, 1 – a chapter in which Machiavelli also curiously praises the Swiss for their 
ancient virtue as opposed to the bad customs brought about by the Church). On the principles of 
ruling, see also DL, I, 9, 2; 11, 3; 18, 4; 25; 48; II, 15; III, 40; 41;44; 48; 49. 
66 DL, I, 11, 5.  
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The notion that to live and die free in a republic is, as Rousseau suggests, to 
be subjected to the honorable, salutary, and gentle (doux) yoke of the laws67 – in 
other words, the notion that political freedom is a function of the coherence between 
the general desire of the people (the collective expression of their customs and 
ancient laws) and the actual legislation of the city – is enunciated throughout 
Machiavelli’s Discourses.68 Again, both thinkers speak of the corruption of the city 
in terms of the psychological effects caused by the disharmony between the laws 
that limit the scope of one’s action, and the laws that limit the designs of one’s 
imagination. This idea appears with all its force in the following passage of 
Machiavelli’s Discourses.  
[A]s good customs have need of laws to maintain themselves, so laws 
have need of good customs to be observed. Besides this, orders and 
laws made in a republic at its birth, when men were good, have no 
purpose later, when they have become wicked. If laws vary according 
to the accidents in a city, its orders never, or rarely, vary; this makes 
new laws insufficient because the orders, which remain fixed, corrupt 
them./ (...) If Rome wished to maintain itself free in corruption, it was 
necessary that it should have made new orders, as in the course of its 
life it had made new laws.69  
 
Rousseau is not explicit about the distinction made here by Machiavelli between 
“law” and “order” (i.e. between political legislation, or political action simply, and 
the customs and ancient laws of the country – nomaia patria).70 Evidently, the unity 
of the citizens and their love for the fatherland, to which Rousseau refers in the 
                                                
67 SDED, §4. 
68 See, in addition to DL, I. 16, 1, also I, 1, 5; I, 3, 2; I, 57; I, 58, 4. 
69 DL, I, 18, 1-3. Cf. also DL, I, 3. 
70 Again, Rousseau seems to limit this fundamental distinction to the almost negligible difference 
between an old and a new spelling of the word (Loy/loi). In the Second Discourse we find the 
following spellings of law/laws: loi, Loi, loy, Loy, and Loix.  
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Epistle Dedicatory, depend on laws that transcend, in both the extent and depth of 
their effects, the ordinary legislation of the magistrates. In other words, they depend 
on laws that transcend the sort of legislative action which, being immediately 
associated with certain individuals, is as vulnerable to “accidents” as are the lives of 
those individuals.71 The difference between the two senses of law (leggi and ordini) 
is left in nuce at the beginning of §6 of the Epistle Dedicatory: the good laws 
(bonnes loix) that a new republic might have – i.e. the customs and laws that shape 
the imagination and direct the interest of the citizens – might stand in the way of the 
new laws made by a new government: 
I should not have wished to live in a newly established Republic, 
regardless of how good its laws (loix) might be, for fear that, if the 
government were perhaps constituted differently than it should have 
been under the circumstances, either by being ill-suited to the new 
Citizens or by the Citizens’ being ill-suited to the new government, 
the State might be liable to be upset and destroyed almost from 
birth.72 
 
For both Machiavelli and Rousseau the relation between these two senses of 
law is what determines the degree of either freedom (well-being) or oppression in 
the State. In Part Two of the Second Discourse, Rousseau’s critique of the artificial 
division of labor and of the disrespect for natural inequalities that appears with the 
economy of land property is based precisely on the disproportion between these two 
senses of the law. The core meaning of his critique of the substitution of a 
succession by merit or virtue for a succession (made possible by economic power) 
                                                
71 One must keep in mind not only the distinction between the general “action” of the sovereign 
body, the particular action of government, and the general action of the legislator, but also the 
different actions of different kinds of legislators. 
72 SDED §6. 
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by mere blood relation is that the latter breeds a dissension between rulers and ruled 
that can ultimately lead to a state of license and extreme individualism (alienation). 
When later, through this process, freedom and democracy become mere slogans in 
the state, they become corrupted versions of the notions that those words represent; 
they become, ultimately and paradoxically, instruments used for manipulation and 
oppression of the many.73 
At the end of §6, Rousseau says that the independence of the citizens in a 
republic must be wise (sage) if they are to be truly free, i.e. if they are to have full 
conscience of themselves and thus of the limits of their freedom. Freedom is a 
condition made possible by an education that conducts all citizens into seeing 
themselves in light of the morals and myths that shaped their common past; it is the 
condition that gives them the right to legislate and, therefore, that legitimates their 
sovereign power: “who better than them can know the [most] convenient conditions 
under which to live together in the same society?”74 Then again, to know the 
conditions under which one wants to live is not the same as to know how to achieve 
them.75 In the first part of the Epistle Dedicatory, Rousseau affirms that he  
                                                
73 In the Second Discourse, the economy of land property is the source of the first contract (political 
law), and thus the beginning of the distinction between the two senses of law here at stake. See SD, 
pp. 169-174 (174-178). For corruption by hereditary succession see pp. 181-2 (186-7) and 184-6 
(190-1); and Machiavelli’s DL, I, 2, 3; I, 18, 3; I, 47, 3. Cf. also Machiavelli’s discussion of the 
agrarian laws and the necessity to limit property of land in the state: DL, I, 1, 5; I, 5, 2; I, 6, 1-2; I, 
7, 3; I, 16, 5; I, 17, 1; I, 37. 
74 SDED §8, p. 114. 
75 “De lui-même le peuple veut toujours le bien, mais de lui-même il ne le voit pas toujours.” SC, II, 
6, p. 380. 
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should above all have fled a necessarily ill-governed Republic where 
the People, believing it could do without its Magistrates, or leave 
them no more than a precarious authority, had imprudently retained in 
its own hands the administration of Civil affairs and the execution of 
its own Laws (Loix).76  
 
The knowledge of the conditions implied here seems to be closer to knowing what 
one does not want rather than what one positively desires. The legislation of the 
citizens consists, then, of a sort of “negative action.” The legislative power of the 
people consists, for Rousseau, of only the “actions” that can be coherently 
performed by the people as a body: the sanctioning of the laws. Legislation here 
means the tacit or expressed consent that emanates from the people as a body and 
the observation of the orders that make that body one.  
Rousseau condenses the ambiguity regarding the absolute and limited 
character of the knowledge of the people in a flagrant Machiavellian expression. He 
speaks of the “wisdom of the People” (la sagesse du Peuple).77 The notion is meant 
as a power that the people can express as one body, not as individuals. As such, one 
must first speak of the wisdom of the people from the perspective of the rulers of 
such people, i.e. the rulers of the body. Also in Machiavelli, the people is seen as 
the body of a being whose head or reflective mind lies elsewhere.78 Again, if one 
literally imagines the people as a living body, one must grant that, as a body, it is 
not conscious of its actions. Hence, the wisdom of the people, from which the unity 
                                                
76 SDED §10. My italics.  
77 In the text of the Epistle Dedicatory, the words sage (or sagesse) and peuple appear 16 times 
each, the number of Machiavelli’s chapter to which Rousseau refers with the example of the 
Tarquins. SDED §11 and Machiavelli’s DL, I, 58.  
78 Cf. the references to the Social Contract and On Political Economy above with DL, I, 44; I, 57; I, 
58, 4.  
 164 
of their sovereignty depends, is not acted out as a discursive or deliberative process, 
but as the reactive expression of the moral elements that, broadly speaking, unite the 
people. As such, the ruling power of the people is not the expression of their ability 
to communicate individual opinions, but of their collective response to the laws that 
are presented to them. The will of the people should only “rule” as a compass for 
those responsible for making and advancing those laws.79 If this is true, we should 
consider – thinking of Machiavelli’s well-known adage – in what sense the people 
are “wiser and more constant than the prince.”80 In the Discourses, Machiavelli says 
that the desire or will of the people – thinking of the people’s immediate or 
“instinctive” expression as a living body – is more predictable (varies less) than the 
passions of a single human being; moreover, the rule of the people in a republic can 
be criticized without fear, whereas “princes are always spoken of with a thousand 
fears and a thousand hesitations.”81  
Democracy is nominally superior to monarchy for being psychologically 
more effective, namely, because it more effectively promotes stability and freedom 
                                                
79 For the same reason that the people, united in their general will, have the sovereign power in the 
state, they have the legislative power; however, their legislative power is as passive as is their 
sovereignty. The legislative “action” of the people is not the action that harmonizes the two senses 
of law mentioned above. The latter is the art of the legislator described in the Social Contract. Note, 
however, that the art of bringing together the two senses of law – an essentially political activity – 
is entirely different than the production of the laws in the highest of those two senses. Cf. SC, I, 
Introduction, p. 351. 
80 DL, I, 58. 
81 DL, I, 58, 4. The political use of fear is, of course, extensively explored by Machiavelli; however, 
in the more general psychological implications of their politics, he seems to be much closer to 
Rousseau than to Hobbes. See DL, I, 6, 2 (“Since the plebs neither had nor feared rule .... they could 
live united a long time”); cf. also DL I, 8, 2.  
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for the members of the republic. I say “nominally” because, as already indicated, in 
both Machiavelli and Rousseau the polemic concerns less the simple forms of 
government than whether the locus of the political power in the state (i.e. 
sovereignty) is in the general will of the people or in the will of single individuals. 
As in the discussions about Otanes, the opposition in question is not about how 
many should officially have the ruling power; it is not between the more technical 
distinctions of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, but rather between the more 
complex notions of political or republican rule (politikos) and despotism.82 
The irony with the expression “the wisdom of the people” is in the fact that 
the people, thought of as a body, is not capable of the general or abstract thinking 
implied in principle by the notion of wisdom. The action of the people is limited to 
identifying the surface of what is offered to them as good or evil, in a similar 
instinctive way that the various animals of a species are drawn to one kind of 
nourishment rather than another.83 The autonomy of the people as a whole can be 
seen as equivalent to the (unreflective) autonomy of the “Savage man” (l’homme 
Sauvage), or simply of a beast, when we think of the laws that guide the people as 
being as natural as the laws that guide that being.84 Therefore, the people in its 
                                                
82 We will go back to this distinction in our discussion of the epigraph to the Second Discourse in 
chapter 6. Cf. DL, I, 2, 2, with the way Machiavelli generally opposes republics to principalities in 
the book. DL, I, 4, 1; I, 54; I, 59.  
83 Cf. DL, I, 16, 1.  
84 Yet, if a beast can serve as metaphor for the multitude, the only animal that can serve as metaphor 
for the whole state is the animal that compounds the state, namely, man (l’Homme). If the analogy 
is correct, the difference between the interest of the people and the interest of the whole state is 
equivalent to the different constitutions of animal and human desires, which, at the top of their 
potentialities can be stated as the difference between the instinctive desire to be secure and free 
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unity is wise only in the sense that beasts (or men in their unreflective, most 
primitive state) are wise: for knowing instinctively what their good is. In that sense, 
the wisdom of the people is absolute knowledge.  
Naturally, however, from the perspective of the individual, the wisdom of the 
people is always partial, and thus never true wisdom, simply because it is not a 
quality of a reflective being. For both Machiavelli and Rousseau, the vulnerability 
of the wisdom of the people appears precisely when, in the confusion between 
private and public interests, individuals start acting as if they were, in their unity as 
people, such a reflective being. That happens whenever laws stop being respected 
and individuals start believing in the possibility of actually ruling themselves “as a 
people.”85 This is why Rousseau blurs the difference between a characteristic of the 
people taken as a body and a characteristic of single individuals: the vast majority of 
individuals will never be morally autonomous, because the principle of the action 
(i.e. the rule) regarding the fundamental notions that unite them – an action that 
engages, commits, but also frees them – lies elsewhere.  
That said, the wisdom of the people depends on a strong ethical component. 
In order for a people to be both united and capable of enjoying freedom, the single 
individuals must have a fair idea of their situation in relation to others; namely, not 
                                                                                                                                            
from oppression of others, and the intellectual desire to be free to command others for the benefit of 
the whole. Ultimately, the parallel between a living being and the state must take into account the 
quality that separates the living being that compounds the state (human being), taken in its highest 
form, and other living beings – it must take into account philosophical freedom. However, within 
the boundaries of Rousseau’s idealized republic – the republic described in the first part of the 
Epistle Dedicatory – freedom is merely political: it is the sweet submission to the laws. 
85 Cf. SDED §9-10 with DL, I, 47. Cf. also DL, I, 2, 3; I, 18, 3; I, 53; I, 58, 3; and I, 58, 4: “[A] 
prince that can do what he wishes is crazy; a people that can do what it wishes is not wise.”  
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only must they know in what sense they are equal to others, but also, perhaps more 
crucially, in what sense they differ from others. This eventually will endow them 
with a “robust temperament” and the capacity to live a “wise independence.”86 This 
“intuitive wisdom” of the citizens has, for the republic, far greater weight than the 
“practical wisdom” that the individual magistrates might have.87 Republicanism is 
not only defined by the sovereignty of the will of the people, but also, as seen 
above, by one’s awareness about his or her limitations concerning certain actions. It 
is defined by a qualified respect for inequalities and for the power and esteem that 
these inequalities entail.  
Still from the perspective of the individual, for both Machiavelli and 
Rousseau, the main difference at stake on the matter of popular wisdom is not the 
difference between the autonomies of rulers and ruled, but about the energy that 
fuels the different wills of the individuals.88 A good republican education would 
consist of preparing the citizens to choose according to their talents, strengths, and 
the constitution of their desire. Naturally, those who want more, tend to end by 
having more, and in the process of their education this difference ends up being 
determinant for their greater or lesser intellectual power, regardless of the realm of 
their action. These inequalities, whether they are natural or acquired, do not have to 
                                                
86 SDED §6. 
87 The virtue of the magistrates must simply (slavishly) reflect the wisdom of the people. SDED 
§11. There is no place for true individual wisdom in the idealized Geneva. 
88 In SDED §18, Rousseau addresses specifically the magistrates of the city, referring to the 
remaining citizens “et même les simples habitans” as their “égaux par éducation, (...) inferieurs par 
leur volonté.”  
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become sources of tension among the citizens.89 Feelings of honor, admiration, 
pride, or envy, always present in political societies, would not undermine the 
republicanism here at stake, unless they become, in a major sense, dominant in the 
state. The problem for our two philosophers – perhaps the source of most political 
problems – happens when a minority of individuals, whose desire is by far more 
active than the average, receives either no or “too much” education. By becoming 
either tyrannical or inquisitive in their souls, these individuals become potentially a 
threat, in one case, to the laws of the state, in the other, to its orders. These are the 
extreme cases where an initial difference in the intensity of erotic energy can lead to 
a struggle between the absolute freedom of some and the relative freedom of others.  
Rousseau’s explicit invocations of Machiavelli in the Social Contract should 
be enough to demonstrate the affinities between the two thinkers. But the particular 
character of the Second Discourse transforms the relation between them. It is not an 
accident that Machiavelli is not mentioned by name in the Second Discourse. 
Together with the reference to Herodotus, the reference to Machiavelli illustrates 
the hidden argument of the Epistle Dedicatory and places the main text of the 
Second Discourse in an unexpected context. The opposition between the absolute 
freedom of some and the relative freedom of others sets the ground for the 
consideration of the sense of freedom left out in the Social Contract: the quasi-
sacred unity of sovereignty and the ensuing distinction between sovereignty and 
                                                
89 At least not when the predominant religion in the state does not become a cover-up for the open 
cult of materialism, as feared by Rousseau. In a world where we are all equal by nature (at birth and 
in death), inequalities become inevitably the source of injustice, oppression, and resentment unless 
they are seen as the result of labor and industriousness. 
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government in the Social Contract leave no space for the philosophical sense of 
freedom.90 
If we leave it to the political doctrine of the Social Contract, we must 
presuppose that even Rousseau’s “great Legislator” is expected to subscribe to the 
natural morality preached in the Second Discourse.91 This is precisely the riddle that 
frames the rhetoric used in the Second Discourse, of which the Epistle Dedicatory is 
the introduction. Moreover, the perspective opened by the Epistle Dedicatory 
transcends the more predominantly political dimension of ruling and being ruled of 
                                                
90 “The philosophical sense of the word freedom is not my subject here.” Cf. SC, I, 8, p.365. 
91 In the chapter ‘On the Legislator’ (SC, II, 7), Rousseau says that “he who dares to carry out the 
institution of a people should feel capable of changing, so to speak, human nature.” He leaves the 
possibility that the action of the legislator (or at least a certain kind of legislator) be interpreted as 
philosophical action, thus as an action issued from philosophical freedom. However, the Social 
Contract does not allow us to articulate, even on its more subterranean level, this fundamental 
question. We must at least conjecture the possibility that, given the great differences as texts 
between the Social Contract and the Second Discourse, the “great Legislator” refers primarily to the 
potential legislators of the human heart who, in theory, will have adopted the principles of natural 
morality taught in the Second Discourse (e.g. the natural goodness of man). We have attempted to 
show that the Second Discourse offers us a more profound account of the question of philosophical 
ruling or legislation than does the Social Contract. The chapter ‘On the Legislator’ in the Social 
Contract is, naturally, addressed primarily to the readers of that book, not of the Second Discourse. 
Thus, the main goal of that chapter must be to inspire, insofar as the figure of the Legislator is 
concerned, readers contemplating the philosophical possibilities contained in the Social Contract, 
not in the Second Discourse. Following a different interpretation, R. Masters believes that Rousseau 
develops a “science of the legislator.” Masters claims that Rousseau dogmatically endorses and 
departs from the precepts of modern physics to establish his system. He attributes to Rousseau a 
seriousness about the more positivist passages in his work that simply cannot be the case if the 
dialectical sense of Rousseau’s overall strategy is taken into account. In our view, Masters fails to 
see that there are different types of legislators and legislations implied by Rousseau, and that the 
difference between Rousseau and Machiavelli on this matter cannot be established by a simple 
parallel of the “category” “legislator” in the two thinkers. Cf. R. Masters, op. cit., pp. 354-368; 421-
5. 
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the Social Contract. Rousseau’s goal in the Second Discourse is vastly more 
ambitious than in any of his works. There, the opposition master-slave is 
intellectualized; it refers to the different, though not necessarily contrasting, sorts of 
lawmakers that constitute a state: the philosophical and the dogmatic rulers of the 
human heart. The Epistle Dedicatory makes us consider the action of rulers in 
general from a philosophical perspective. It makes us consider sovereignty through 
the philosophical sense of freedom and, as such, it introduces the metaphysical 
question of free action (or of the action of a free will), which orients Rousseau’s 








On the Principles of Rousseau’s Discourse:  
Perfectibility and Inequality. 
 
 
1. Due to the comparatively little space dedicated to explicit metaphysical 
questions in his works and to the elusive language used in those discussions, the 
attempt to comment on Rousseau’s metaphysics might be regarded as a fruitless 
task. As we have shown above, if we want to grasp the conceptual articulation of his 
philosophical thinking, we must bracket his apparent contradictions and proceed as 
he does in the Second Discourse, i.e. by drawing hypotheses about how to connect 
the contrasting arguments, and by testing these hypotheses at the end of the whole 
discussion.1 It is, then, with this precaution in mind that we should approach the 
core notion of what we can call Rousseau’s negative metaphysics, namely, the 
notion that human beings are essentially unequal in their ambitions and powers.2  
                                                
1 Rousseau ends Part One of the Second Discourse with the idea that to philosophize is to move 
beyond the facts and to conjecture about the general ideas that unite them (pp. 159-160 (162-3)). On 
the question of philosophical method, see also Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature 
(1754), III and L. 
2 Apart from the passages in Émile mentioned below, see also Rousseau’s Letter to M. de 
Franquières (Pléiade ed., vol. 4, pp. 1135-6) for the theoretical impossibility of a purely analytical 
metaphysics. The language of metaphysics must always pass by “the political”, or by what 
Rousseau calls “the most useful and the least advanced of all human knowledge seems to me to be 
that of man.” (SD, p. 124 (122)). 
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The individualism attacked by Rousseau is predicated on the idea of a 
spiritual (metaphysical) equality among human beings. According to this view, a 
fully developed education in reason, an education, in principle, open to all, leads to 
the highest form of human existence. But to perceive and compare our differences 
with others is rarely to judge these differences correctly, and to account for natural 
inequalities under the obligation of isonomia is an even harder challenge. How can 
the true rulers of society (the active sovereign wills in the society) make the 
situation fair and desirable to all, without ending up themselves seduced, directly or 
indirectly, by the softness of an egalitarian metaphysics? This is the dilemma of 
republicanism. Rousseau’s necessity to cover up the ambiguities about the 
addressees of the Epistle Dedicatory – or the readers of the Second Discourse in 
general – mirrors the necessity to state the psychological principle of popular 
sovereignty (democratic rule) as if it were a metaphysical principle of justice, in 
other words, as if it were a pure principle of politics.  
Yet, the metaphysical principle that commands Rousseau’s thought is the 
antithesis of what became the commanding principle in liberal democracies. In this 
chapter, we will consider Rousseau’s principle of natural inequality in two steps. 
First, we will go back to the question of perfectibility and the origin of human 
faculties in Part One of the Second Discourse. Rousseau’s depiction of perfectibility 
as “the source of all human miseries”3 is directly related to the unbalances caused, 
from the beginning of the species, by the natural inequalities among individuals. 
The artificiality, conventions, and deceptions, namely, the progressive estrangement 
                                                
3 SD, p. 141 (142). 
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from nature produced through the new human powers4 did not appear because of an 
inherent failure or ambiguity in those powers, but because of the effect that the 
asymmetric development of those powers had eventually on the species as a whole, 
i.e. because of inequality.  
We will conclude our analysis of natural inequality by considering 
Rousseau’s epigraph to the Second Discourse. The epigraph is taken from a 
discussion of how private ruling differs from public (political) ruling, from Book 
One of Aristotle’s Politics. Our analysis will show that the passage situates the 
context for the discussion that Rousseau’s rhetoric dissimulates. Aristotle’s 
treatment of the natural inequality between rulers and ruled addresses precisely the 
question of the political necessity of democracy at stake for Rousseau. 
 
2. What is original and what is artificial in the current nature of human 
beings?5 In the Second Discourse, Rousseau criticizes his predecessors for 
attributing to human beings in the hypothetical state of nature moral faculties and 
feelings that were only acquired with society and which are, therefore, potential 
characteristics of the current nature of human beings.6 As we have already seen, 
Rousseau criticizes Hobbes, Locke, and others for depicting human beings in the 
state of nature as if those human beings had always been formed, internally and 
                                                
4 The means through which human beings eventually “relapsed lower than the Beast itself.” Ibid. 
5 “[I]t is no light undertaking to disentangle what is original from what is artificial in man’s present 
Nature” (SD, p. 125 (123)).  
6 SD, pp. 131-2 (132). 
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externally, as we see ourselves today.7 In order to think of what is original in the 
current nature of human beings – namely, of what has not changed since the 
beginning of the species – we must imagine a being that lacks all the acquired 
potentialities of human beings as we see them today, with one exception: the 
capacity of both the species and the individual to develop those potentialities.  
[E]ven if the difficulties surrounding all these questions left some 
room for disagreement about this difference between man and animal, 
there is another very specific property that distinguishes between 
them, and about which there can be no argument, namely the faculty 
of perfecting oneself; a faculty which, with the aid of circumstances, 
successively develops all the others, and resides in us, in the species 
as well as in the individual, whereas an animal is at the end of several 
months what it will be for the rest of its life, and its species is after a 
thousand years what it was in the first year of those thousand.8 
 
The opposition between the current nature of human beings and the moment 
in time when the individuals of the human species were still, as in other species, 
virtually undifferentiated – i.e. equal in their potentialities – is not a matter of mere 
speculation for Rousseau. The different examples given in the notes to the Second 
Discourse attest to the unlikelihood of “the experiments that would be necessary to 
know the man of nature.”9 One thing would be to study an individual born in civil 
society but abandoned as an infant in the woods and fed by wolves; another, would 
be to find in nature, and study, the first individuals of the species. Rousseau 
speculates that the latter could have been the case in his account, in note 10 
                                                
7 SD, p. 134 (134). Rousseau here is certainly far from following Descartes’ purely physiological 
understanding of external and internal conformations (“the external shape of the members and in the 
internal conformation of the organs”) in Discourse on Method, Part Five, §3. Noted by translator of 
English edition, p. 356. 
8 SD, p. 141 (142). 
9 SD, p. 125 (123-124). 
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(originally marked “8”),10 of the descriptions of apes by European explorers. Indeed, 
he opens Part One of the Second Discourse11 by attributing to Aristotle the view that 
human beings must have suffered profound physical transformation in the course of 
their progress or evolution. Although Rousseau affirms that we can only draw 
conjectures about what was “the first Embryo of the species (espéce)” and how it 
has evolved, he does not question, or conjecture, the idea that this first Embryo of 
the species was a being with a different constitution than that of human beings as we 
see them today.12 This is a crucial point that has been generally overlooked. 
Rousseau’s note to this passage in the text (note 3, originally marked “*3.”) makes 
things even more ambiguous. In it, he speaks of man (l’homme) already in his 
current nature; he adopts an empiricist perspective to corroborate the traditional 
view that human beings are by nature bipeds.13 However, by merely alluding to the 
initial difficulty with the evolutionary thesis, Rousseau establishes that thesis as a 
more fundamental paradigm than the one used by tradition. The speculation on the 
apes in note 10 (“8”) takes into account these two senses of the state of nature.  
To the objection that in view of the temporal gap that separates the two 
moments Rousseau would not have meant with his example in note 10 (“8”) the 
thesis that the first human beings were ape-like, it should be sufficient to indicate 
the following. If, as Rousseau affirms, there must have been, through the long 
progress of the species, internal and external transformations in its individuals, these 
                                                
10 SD, pp. 204 ff. (208 ff). 
11 SD, p. 134 (134) 
12 Cf. with SD, p. 159 (162). 
13 Cf. with Aristotle’s Parts of Animals IV, 10 – noted by translator in the English edition of the SD. 
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transformations must not have occurred homogeneously across the board. To 
presuppose an evolution of the species is evidently to presuppose also various 
degrees of transformations determined by different circumstances; it is also to 
presuppose different constitutions for different groups of individuals originating 
from the same mother species. That individuals that somehow remained at the 
threshold of this chain of events – or, at any rate, at an earlier stage of the process of 
human perfectibility – could still exist in nature, was then a theoretical possibility. 
Hence, Rousseau’s suggestion that the orangutans reported by the voyagers might 
have been those individuals is not absurd. In addition to this possible but unlikely 
hypothesis, Rousseau notes the importance of an even more unlikely experiment 
(stated in a rather indirect form due perhaps to its outrageous character), necessary 
to attest that, regardless of its internal and external difference with the current 
nature of human beings, the being in question would have belonged to our species. 
The experiment suggested by Rousseau would be equivalent today to the following 
thought experiment: imagine different beings believed to belong to late stages of the 
species that immediately pre-dated homo sapiens, such as homo erectus, were found 
in nature; one way to confirm or exclude the thesis that these are actually the first 
individuals of the human (homo) species would be to somehow mate them with 
women and see if they breed. Rousseau alludes here, not without some irony, to 
both the biological and cultural obstacles to such an experiment.14 
                                                
14 Cf. SD, p. 208 (211). Note that Rousseau follows Buffon in what the latter calls “the most solid 
point of Natural History,” namely the notion that the unity of the species is given by the 
individuals’ capacity of reproduction: “C’est donc dans la diversité caractéristique des espèces que 
les intervalles des nuances de la Nature sont le plus sensibles et le mieux marqués, on pourroit 
même dire que ces intervalles entre les espèces sont les plus égaux et les moins variables de tous, 
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The least we can say about all this is that the state of (proto-) human beings 
right before the development of specifically human powers such as elementary self-
awareness and awareness of death (“the pure state of nature”) is as conjectural as 
the capacity of perfectibility attributed by Rousseau to the first human beings, again 
as both species and individuals.15 If we cannot speculate or imagine the progress 
from beast to human, our individual capacity to perfect ourselves can only be 
understood as having been sent from the Heavens. This seems to be a logical 
necessity and it is up to the reader to decide which position Rousseau has seriously 
adopted. 
                                                                                                                                            
puisqu’on peut toûjours tirer une ligne de séparation entre deux espèces, c’est-à-dire, entre deux 
successions d’individus qui se reproduisent et ne peuvent se mêler, comme l’on peut aussi réunir en 
une seule espèce deux successions d’individus qui se reproduisent en se mêlant : ce point est le plus 
fixe que nous ayons en Histoire Naturelle, toutes les autres ressemblances et toutes les autres 
différences que l’on pourroit saisir dans la comparaison des êtres, ne seroient, ni si constantes, ni 
si réelles, ni si certaine.” Buffon, Histoire Naturelle, article ‘L’asne,’ t. IV, ed. 1753, p. 385-6. See 
also Émile, pp. 579-580, and Rousseau’s comment about Buffon, “le Pline de notre siècle,” in 
Lettres Morales, Lettre 3, Pléiade ed., vol. 4, p. 1096, with SD Preface, p. 125 (123-4). For a 
contrasting view on this crucial issue, see V. Gourevitch, ‘Rousseau’s Pure State of Nature,’ 
Interpretation, 1988, vol. 16, n.1, pp. 23-59; Gourevitch’s argument is corrected by R. Velkley in 
op. cit., p.38, note 22. For a defense of the notion of evolution from apes to human beings in 
Rousseau, one can refer, in addition to his other work cited above, to R. Wokler’s article on the 
subject, ‘From the Orang-utan to the Vampire: towards an Anthropology of Rousseau,’ in Rousseau 
after two hundred years, ed. R. Leigh (1982), pp. 109-115. Wokler claims that “Rousseau’s homme 
sauvage was really an orang-utan,” but unfortunately he did not consider Rousseau’s intended 
ambiguity on the matter. The same can be affirmed of Roger Masters’ treatment of the state of 
nature and human perfectibility in op. cit., pp. 106-204 and 430-3. See also Buffon’s article ‘Les 
orang-outangs ou le pongo et le jocko,’ in Histoire naturelle, t. XIV, ed. 1766, pp. 43 ff. For the 
idea of succession in nature, see the questions raised by Diderot, op. cit., LVII and LVIII. See also 
Émile, p. 830. 
15 Cf. also SD, p.134 (134) with p. 159 (162). 
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We can explain the relation between the two main senses of the state of 
nature in the Second Discourse (the state of “the first Embryo of the species” and 
the current natural constitution of human beings) in the following manner: any 
“virtual faculty”16 (or potentiality) seen as a characteristic of the first human beings 
must have been previously developed and acquired by the whole species. The 
expression hides the ambiguity: a faculty must be developed before it becomes 
virtual. Hence, one must also speculate about the development of perfectibility itself 
as a characteristic of the species before it became a potentiality in single individuals 
– therefore as a characteristic of nature tout court. In this sense, perfectibility can be 
seen from two perspectives: as a dialectical principle of adaptation present within 
the code of all species; and as the capacity to choose that is motivated by the 
particular passions and experiences of one individual, a capacity specific of human 
beings.  
Thus if, from the perspective of the single individual, reflection can be seen 
as the faculty employed by that individual in order to perfect his own condition, 
from the perspective of the human species, the appearance of that faculty can be 
seen as a transformation of an instinct that eventually “backfired” for having 
caused, ultimately, the liberation of the individuals from their previous animal 
instincts and the substitution of those instincts with conventions.  Thought of as a 
unique human capacity, perfectibility ends up deviating the interest of particular 
wills from the, so to speak, general will of the species. By hesitating about what was 
                                                
16 A faculty that, depending on the necessity and the will of the individual, can either stay latent or 
be actualized in different degrees. See SD, pp. 204-5 (208). Note also the contrast between “facultés 
naturelles” and “facultés artificielles,” in pp. 128 (127) and 134 (134). 
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once an innate or instinctive idea of an object, the individual human being opens the 
infinite road to his own perfectibility. But, unfortunately, individual perfectibility 
does no mean perfectibility of the sum of individuals, i.e. it does not mean 
(anymore) the perfectibility of the species. Instead, the fragmentation of the mental 
unity of the species (i.e. of the unreflective unity of desires and designs) caused by 
the development of perfectibility, the longing for the non-present, and the ensuing 
engendering of amour propre, ends up compromising the very freedom that it 
creates, by transforming human beings into imbeciles.17 Perfectibility is, ironically, 
the principle of corruption of the very things it makes possible: the idea and the 
quest for happiness. 
The relation between the two moments in question is, therefore, crucial: in 
order to reflect on the current nature of human beings18 one must conjecture a state 
of nature that stages the transition, as it were, from non-human to human beings. By 
preserving these two moments, Rousseau alternates between an idealized treatment 
of human nature and a dialectical speculation about the origin of the human species. 
Rousseau’s interest in the genesis of human inequality is ultimately an interest in 
the unique formation of the human soul as opposed to the (soul of) other species. 
This is what guides his moral teaching in the Émile. Thus, a philosophical inquiry 
into freedom and imagination depends on the question of what is original and 
artificial about these powers in the two senses of the state of nature. The freedom of 
a being whose awareness was entirely limited to the perception of his present 
                                                
17 SD, p. 141 (142). 
18 The current nature of human beings as species encompasses – without canceling – the historical 
or cultural differences between say Europeans and Native Americans (“savages”). 
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existence19 – the freedom of living in the pure instinct of the species – is slowly 
replaced by the necessity to confront the element of unpredictability introduced by 
the new inequalities within the species, whereby each individual tends to become a 
world within itself.20 This was a slow and subtle process, and the inequalities in the 
first stages of these modifications must have been, as Rousseau tells us, negligible. 
Yet, if we compress the immense period of time in question, we realize that 
individuals had eventually to develop a new sort of cognitive ability regarding the 
actions of others. Fear of the unknown now also characterizing how some 
individuals perceive their kin, the new ability will consist of an expansion of the 
faculty that had started to make these individuals aware of their limited existence, 
i.e. of externality and their difference with others. As we saw in Part One, for 
Rousseau, this new cognitive faculty precedes the appearance of instituted 
languages and thus cannot be identified with reason, at least not reason understood 
in its narrow relation to instituted languages. We will treat foresight (prévoyance), 
the intuitive power to anticipate the non-present and devise future situations, as the 
human capacity to imagine actively, in both a productive and a cognitive sense. 
Confronting the materialist claim that all intellectual faculties can be mapped 
down to sensations, in the Émile, Rousseau gives us his most important, albeit 
concise, treatment of this fundamental faculty: to compare or to judge is to imagine 
                                                
19 Cf. SD, p. 143 (144). 
20 The capacity of elementary abstraction of the first human beings coincides, thus, with the 
beginning of the inequalities in the species. The first intellectual inequalities, Rousseau seems to 
suggest, appear in the contrast between young and old; the anticipation of one’s fateful future 
appears first with the ancient. Cf. SD, p. 136-7 (137). 
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one object over the other.21 Following Rousseau’s reasoning, this active sense of the 
imagination only gradually became a power characteristic of the whole species, and 
thus the name we give to this power leads almost inevitably to misunderstanding. 
What we call it, then, is actually irrelevant; what matters is to understand what is at 
stake: a power that allows the individual to perceive other individuals and things in 
general as being outside of himself,22 and to compare and judge these other 
individuals and things in their relation to himself, i.e. in light of the whole of his 
experiences, though primarily in light of this fundamental experience of 
individuality, i.e. of the self. 
Through my intelligence, I am the only one who can inspect the 
whole. What being down here other than man knows how to observe 
the others, measure, calculate and predict their movements, their 
effects, and combine, so to speak, the sentiment of common existence 
with that of his individual existence?23 
 
In this rather comprehensive sense, imagination can be seen as the human ability 
that stretches the perception of existence (sentiment d’existence), an expansion that 
allows human beings to move from a general to a particular situation or idea.24 
                                                
21 Cf. Émile, p. 571. Our terminology here is not in contradiction with what Rousseau says. On the 
contrary, by distinguishing between active and passive imagination one can overcome the ambiguity 
implied in the generality of the concept. 
22 Émile, pp. 571 and 573. 
23 Émile, p. 582. 
24 Rousseau describes his writing procedure, namely, his own cognitive use of imagination, as being 
equivalent in form to that of the first human individuals. He too uses single words with the meaning 
of full propositions; he too moves from general images to a particular knowledge: “by arranging 
[language] so that as often as each word is used, the meaning given it be sufficiently determined by 
the ideas related to it and that each period where the word is found serves it, so to speak, as a 
definition.” Émile, p. 108 (345). Cf. also the passages from his Preface to the Second Letter to 
Bordes and his Idea of a Method cited above. 
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To better grasp the cognitive character that Rousseau ascribes to imagination, 
let us reconsider the place of Condillac in the passage on the origin of languages of 
the Second Discourse. As we saw in chapter 3, Rousseau evokes Condillac’s work 
in a rather positive tone. However, for Rousseau, Condillac’s solution far from 
avoiding determinism, makes it more absolute. Rousseau’s discussion of the origin 
of languages touches the heart of a lifelong quarrel with the advocates of what he 
generally calls materialism. It is thus in a negative or ironic sense that we should 
read the opening lines to the passage: 
I could leave it at here quoting or restating the Abbé de Condillac’s 
investigations of this matter, all of which fully confirm my sentiment, 
and which perhaps suggested its first idea to me.25 
 
For Condillac, as for Locke,26 the unity of being is the body. Humans are 
higher beings because of the unique constitution of their bodies, which allows them 
to explore their unique sense of touch. Indeed, Condillac criticizes Locke for not 
being radical enough, i.e. for not extending to human faculties his attack on innate 
ideas. Whereas Locke keeps apart sensation and reflection, Condillac takes to the 
                                                
25 SD, p. 145 (146). In the years that preceded the Second Discourse, there was an obscure dispute 
between Condillac and Buffon about the differences between human beings and beasts, which 
became more explicit with the publication of Condillac’s Traité des animaux, in 1755. In the second 
note to the Second Discourse (note 2, originally marked “*2.”), Rousseau had already evoked 
Buffon by quoting an inspired passage on the “sens intérieur” that separates human beings from 
beasts. Although in the Second Discourse he seems indeed to praise Buffon for his notion of a “sens 
intérieur” in human beings – the basic idea rejected by Condillac, in the first part of the work 
mentioned, due to the dualism that it implies (hommo duplex) – in a later, private note to a book that 
sums up the materialist claim (Helvétius’ De l’esprit), Rousseau derogatorily indicates that there is 
no philosophical difference between the two authors. See Notes sur ‘De l’esprit’ d’Helvétius, 
Pléiade ed., vol. 4, p. 1129. 
26 Essay, II, 27, §6 
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extreme the notion that all knowledge arises from experience. More importantly, for 
him our capacity to think can be deduced from the particular constitution of the 
human body. Touching is experimenting, erring, and therefore acquiring knowledge; 
thus, reflection itself can be traced back to our unique sense of touch. Condillac’s 
turn from Locke on this point has one particularly significant consequence: it allows 
materialism to be paired with the notion that, from an intellectual point of view, all 
men are created virtually equal, something inconceivable not only for Locke, but 
also for someone like Diderot.27 For Condillac, in their natural state, human beings 
are virtually equal regarding their intellectual capacities.  
Condillac traces the origins of human languages back to a “language of 
action” that appears through the necessity (although he speaks of compassion) to 
share the experiences acquired individually.28 Yet, as in Rousseau, it is only with 
the institution of a language capable of representing particular objects with signs, 
that humans take the decisive step away from an otherwise predominantly animal 
condition. Language thus understood allows human beings to reason among 
themselves, acquire more complex and lasting knowledge, and therefore perfect 
their cognitive faculties. Reason, for Condillac, is the highest human faculty, for 
being the faculty through which human beings become active and free from the 
more predictable life of beasts.  
In contrast to his praise of reason, Condillac treats imagination as the crucial 
human faculty at the source of both our misery and our improvement. To the 
dangers of imagination noted by Locke – for whom imagination (“Invention, 
                                                
27 Diderot, op. cit., LIV and LV. 
28 Cf. Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, Second Part, ch. 1, §1-2. 
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Fancy”) is not related to freedom and certainly not to cognition, but is associated 
with, not to say reduced to, our use of memory29 – Condillac opposes a higher, 
cognitive sense of that faculty. For him, we can use our imagination in a voluntary 
way in order to associate ideas, and “[l]anguage is the most evident example of 
associations that we form voluntarily.”30 Rousseau was clearly invested in much of 
what Condillac had to say on this matter, but for him Condillac’s correction of 
Locke was plainly insufficient. The cognitive function attributed by Condillac to 
imagination respected a scheme whereby human beings and other animals differed 
in their intellectual powers only by degree. In its highest capacity, imagination can 
only awaken (re-produce) our ideas and give its assent to the truth, which, in turn, is 
properly grasped only by empirical analysis.31  
Condillac’s determinism put him in the same predicament as Locke’s. In the 
Émile, Rousseau shows that human beings err because their judgment is mixed with 
conventions and prejudices that distort their perception of things, namely, the 
artificial languages they are forced to adopt, the image they make of themselves, 
and their opinions.32 While for Condillac, reason and instituted signs are potentially 
the remedy for the mistakes that originally arise with the exploration of touch, for 
Rousseau, human error appears, as we saw in our treatment of the origin of speech, 
as the results of those very conventions, i.e. of reason and its instituted signs. It is 
not understanding, as Locke affirms in the very first sentence of his Essay, nor is it 
                                                
29 Locke, Essay, II, 10, §8. 
30 Condillac, Essai, I, ch. 9. 
31 Ibid., I, 4; I, 10-11. 
32 Émile, pp. 572-3. 
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language (reason), as wants Condillac, that marks the difference between human 
beings and beasts, but again the capacity to be a free agent and the progressive 
awareness of this freedom.33 The ego is the transformative experience based on 
which freedom and human cognition (self-knowledge) become possible: 
It is necessary (...) that I first examine myself to know the instrument 
that I want to use and to what point I can trust that usage.34  
 
Judgment naturally presupposes the senses, but it is not, as Condillac would 
have it, a mere mode of the senses. For Rousseau, to judge is “to give a sense to this 
word is;” it is to actively compare, to imagine “one object over another;” it is an 
activity or a movement in us that finds its source and energy nowhere else but in 
ourselves; finally, judgment is the act of “an intelligent force that superposes and 
then pronounces itself.”35 It is true that, in a way, we are enslaved by our senses, for 
we are not free to feel or refrain from feeling. However, it is also true, at least for 
Rousseau, that this enslavement is not necessarily absolute. The origin of languages 
and reason lies in a more fundamental capacity that starts to take shape with the 
appearance, in our distant ancestors, of elementary self-reflection. The capacity to 
be free agents means that we are, in principle, free to decide whether, and up to 
what point, we want to examine, act upon, and transform our experiences in their 
relation to each other. This capacity became inherent to the disposition of human 
beings or to the way their wills are enacted; it does not depend on education in order 
to exist, albeit without education it will likely remain dormant in the individual. 
                                                
33 SD, pp. 140-1 (141-2). 
34 “Il faut (...) tourner d’abord mes regards sur moi pour connoitre l’instrument dont je veux me 
servir, et jusqu’à quel point je puis me fier à son usage.” Émile, p. 570. 
35 Ibid., p. 571 (my italics). 
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Hence, together with our original capacity to produce our own ideas, human 
freedom precedes the institution of signs: it precedes what is artificial in the current 
nature of human beings.  
For Rousseau, human beings have established conventional languages (of 
which reason, as understood by Condillac, is one of them) because they could judge 
what they imagined, that is to say, because the first ideas that started to distinguish 
them from beasts were not direct outcomes of their senses, like in beasts, but of the 
passions that their elementary reflection produced.36 Rousseau’s attack on the 
doctrine that “to judge is to feel” (i.e. that we are ultimately passive or re-active 
beings) confronts his opponents on the deepest implications of their thought. 
Although in part he does it in the manner of his opponents – namely, by presenting 
evidence from experience or by recurring to equivalent experiments of thought37 – 
he defends, against them, the existence of innate faculties and ideas in living 
beings.38 Rousseau is naturally aware of the unpalatable character, from the 
                                                
36 Ibid., p. 573; cf. also pp. 581-2 and 586-7. See SD, p. 142 (143) and our discussion in chapter 3. 
37 Cf. Émile, p. 585. 
38 Rousseau leaves to his readers the crucial distinction between the general active principle in 
living beings and the active intelligence of human individuals. See on this regard Émile, pp. 574 
with 576. It is true that it is harder to conceive of innate ideas in human beings than it is to conceive 
them in beasts. What would be the equivalent in us to the idea of a spider net to a spider? Yet the 
difficulty should not make us dismiss the question. We saw how, for Rousseau, man’s capacity to 
perfect his own life as an individual is what distinguishes him from beasts. This specific human 
capacity becomes innate to the species, but it also becomes dependent on society in order to be 
activated. Hence perfectibility becomes dependent on, or intrinsically linked to, the conventions that 
it helps to create. The cyclical process is gradual: the more human beings advance through their 
perfectibility, the more the faculty becomes conditioned by those advancements in order to be 
triggered. That said, to say that perfectibility becomes innate is to say that at least part of the 
motivation behind it must also be innate. Its triggering was and is only possible because the 
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perspective of the dominant radical empiricism, of the dualist hypothesis regarding 
the principle of movement in living beings (soul and body as different substances). 
However, his arguments about these things are aporetic. They are limited to 
exposing what cannot be the case, such as the application of Cartesian method and 
Newton’s laws of movement to entirely philosophical and metaphysical questions.39 
                                                                                                                                            
individual has in himself part of the motivation for doing it. As we saw in Part One, the motivation 
is in the innate passions, in the ideas of these passions – or, more precisely, in the dialectical 
process that presents these passions to us as ours – that became the first objects of reflection and, as 
such, the first triggers of individual perfectibility. It is in this sense that the motivation for 
individual perfectibility, and for the communication of its findings, is related to self-knowledge: it 
is the desire to know how to comply with the demands of the new passions. “We seek to know only 
because we desire to enjoy. (...) The Passions, in turn, owe their origin to our needs, and their 
progress to our knowledge; for one can only desire or fear things in terms of the ideas one can have 
of them, or by the simple impulsion of Nature.” SD, p. 142 (143).  
39 “Experience and observation made us know the laws of movement; these laws determine the 
effect without showing the causes; they are not sufficient to explain the system of the world and the 
march of the universe” (Émile, p. 575). Roger Masters misses Rousseau’s point in his critical 
assessments to his exhaustive work (op. cit., pp. 428-30); he also provides an inadequate account, in 
our view, of the relation between the Vicar’s metaphysics in Émile and the Second Discourse (pp. 
66-74). Masters follows Leo Strauss’s well-known account in Natural Right and History. He claims 
that Rousseau’s arguments in the Profession of Faith (mainly, pp. 573-595), particularly Rousseau’s 
treatment of communicated and spontaneous motion, “have been rendered not merely dubious, but 
simply ridiculous by the subsequent developments in the natural sciences” (p. 429). Masters either 
disregards or cannot see that what Rousseau says about spontaneous movement concerns the 
question of free will specifically, and has, as we have said, an aporetic character. Rousseau’s central 
claim in the passage is that there his arguments are not really scientific and that the question at 
stake cannot be properly addressed by the methods or language of modern science; in other words, a 
speculation of purely metaphysical character such as the one regarding the nature of movement, 
both in living beings and in general, cannot be contradicted nor corroborated by scientific theories. 
Masters not only misses the dialectical sense of the discussion, but also he bases his argument on 
scientific facts – such as the assumption by modern physics of the internal motion common to all 
atoms – that are both considered and set aside as irrelevant to the subject by Rousseau himself 
(Émile, pp. 577-8). See also on this matter Diderot’s critique of Maupertius in op. cit., L and LI; and 
LVI. 
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Rousseau’s goal was to subvert the current situation. He wanted to show primarily 
that the true philosophically unpalatable, rather, unintelligible, hypothesis lay in the 
principle of the self-moving matter, the cornerstone of the sensationalist doctrine.40  
Rousseau concludes the section on the origin of languages in the Second 
Discourse by affirming the impossibility that languages would have been born and 
established through purely human means.41 There are two ways of interpreting his 
conclusion: either languages were sent from the Heavens or their development 
coincided with the development of the human species out of an initially non-human 
situation. Rousseau indicates that, as Hobbes and Locke, Condillac’s account of 
human nature presupposes that human beings have always existed in their current 
constitution.42 Radical empiricism seems to force us to start with an image of 
paradise whereby human beings are all potentially equal in the capacity that 
distinguishes them from beasts, namely, the capacity to reason through instituted 
signs. If we follow Condillac, we have to conclude that language and reason were a 
gift from the Heavens, one of the “hypotheses” that Rousseau, for strategic reasons, 
wants to preserve in the Second Discourse.43 
Rousseau is rather interested in the untold story to which he alludes in the 
passage, a story less compatible with the empiricist dogma, due to the purely 
speculative or conjectural element that its articulation would imply. By that we 
                                                
40 Émile, pp. 574-6 and 584-5; on innate ideas in human beings see pp. 584 and 598; on instinct, see 
the note on p. 595 with the passage that precedes it on p. 593, where God is described as a “purely 
intuitive” being. 
41 SD, p. 149 (151). 
42 SD, p. 144 (146). 
43 See note on the immortality of the soul for Condillac in chapter 3. 
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mean the transition from non-human to human beings, i.e. the gradual and uneven 
appearance of self-awareness, active imagination, and perfectibility, the different 
aspects of the process of development, in the human species, of the individual 
capacity to stretch the perception of one’s existence and anticipate the non-present 
by either fearing it or desiring it. These things were either denied or inadequately 
explained by the materialists. Rousseau’s speculation, being the product of the very 
faculty that it wants to grasp – a cognitive faculty that moves from general to 
particular ideas – resists by definition being translated into the more straightforward 
analytical language characteristic of Condillac and, in general, Eighteenth century 
followers of Locke and Newton. It is true that, as in Condillac, for Rousseau too the 
origin of human language must be studied as the origin of human cognition, but 
their understanding of what is ultimately implied by this notion of cognition differs 
profoundly. Rousseau’s correction of Condillac’s dogmatic rationalism gives us the 
key to understanding what is, at the same time, the what and the how of the inquiry 
in the Second Discourse. Rousseau conjectures, indeed, as Diderot,44 a continuity or 
progression between beast and man; yet, for him, the break between the 
“essentially” animal and the “essentially” human was far more profound than it was 
for any of his opponents and friends. The essential difference is, precisely, in the 
unique character of human cognition. 
 
3. In its cognitive connotation, imagination is the faculty that allows 
Rousseau to superimpose the ambiguities that appear through his inquiry, and to 
                                                
44 Cf. Diderot, op. cit., LVII. 
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confront subjects that, by their nature, resist straightforward analysis. The cognitive 
sense of imagination delimits not so much discursive reason, but the general 
conditions or the common ground for the eventual analytical discussions of these 
subject-matters. We can think of Rousseau’s understanding of this faculty as the 
retrieval of the daimonic element in philosophical thinking, or in thinking tout 
court. The place that Rousseau attributes to imagination in his archeology is entirely 
coordinated with the necessity to articulate a philosophical, and not only a political, 
sense of freedom – that is to say, to give a philosophical account of human free 
will.45 Rousseau’s philosophical freedom goes against the belief that the human will 
is necessarily pre-determined either by bodily passions or by applied reason, i.e. by 
relations that through reason can be deduced from bodies in general. This 
philosophical sense of freedom becomes viable again when we see that the 
fundamental principle of human action – the power that makes such freedom 
possible – cannot be explained through observation or experience of bodies qua 
bodies.  
The great irony in Rousseau’s account of our origins, especially when 
considered from the point of view of his opponents, is precisely in the ambiguous 
character of perfectibility, the faculty that, in principle, set human will free. The 
first important cultural consequence of freedom was not philosophy, but 
dependence. With the expansion of inequalities, freedom did not beget more 
freedom, but enslavement. “Why, asks Rousseau, is man alone liable to become 
                                                
45 The opposition between political (egalitarian) and philosophical (non-egalitarian) freedom is 
established, as we have showed, in the introduction to the Second Discourse, i.e. the Epistle 
Dedicatory. 
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imbecile?”46 Rousseau describes in the Second Part of the Second Discourse how 
this relation between freedom and imbecility reaches its climax when politics is 
invented. The conflicts and the consequent enslavement implied in that relation 
made some human beings, at this advanced stage of human development, realize 
that in order for freedom to be associated with justice and peace, the individual 
freedom of one must be thought through the collective freedom of all.47 The “wise 
Laws” that will now assure the political freedom of the majority were the creation 
of the political thought of these human beings. As such, the philosophical sense of 
freedom of these first rulers starts with their incipient political concerns. Philosophy 
starts as political philosophy. 
For Rousseau, the ethics offered by his opponents is plainly insufficient in its 
political-psychological implications, for they miss, precisely, the principles behind 
Rousseau’s account of the emergence of politics. Instead, the politics resulting from 
their bad point of departure favors, ultimately, a separation of the individual from a 
true sense of belonging to the community. The excess of individual desires and the 
ensuing dependencies engendered by the economy of constant innovations, 
characteristic of the new liberal ethos, renders impossible a real autonomy of both 
citizen and state.48 We will see next how the fact that Rousseau opens the Discourse 
on Inequality with a sentence, in epigraph, taken from Aristotle’s Politics is not a 
coincidence with what we have just suggested, namely, that the philosophical 
                                                
46 SD, p. 141 (142). 
47 SD, pp. 172-3 (177). 
48 Accordingly, liberalism would favor further enslavement and an ephemeral sense of freedom at 
best.  
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exercise of our free agency starts, for him, as political thought. The passage from 
the Politics not only focuses on the question that Rousseau’s opponents had failed to 
address – namely, the question of the autonomy of both citizens and state – but also 
it situates the context for Rousseau’s discussion of natural inequality before he 
starts with the Epistle Dedicatory: 
 An animal [or living being] consists primarily of soul and body, of 
which the former is by nature the ruling and the latter the ruled factor. 
And to discover what is natural we must study it preferably in things 
that are in a natural state, and not in things that are degenerate. 
Hence, in studying the human being we must consider one who is in 
the best possible condition concerning both body and soul, (...) for in 
those who are corrupt or in a corrupt condition, it might be said that 
the body often rules the soul due to their bad and unnatural state.49 
 
The passage refers to Aristotle’s treatment of the natural inequality between 
rulers and ruled, the fundamental relation in the Epistle Dedicatory. Rousseau uses 
only the second sentence of this passage as epigraph to the book. It occurs right at 
the first pages of Book One of the Politics, in a discussion about how private ruling 
differs from public (political) ruling.50 More precisely, it occurs within a discussion 
about whether a certain kind of slavery is natural, namely, about whether some 
human beings are more naturally disposed to being ruled than others, and thus 
whether that condition is for those human beings desirable and advantageous.51 
                                                
49 Aristotle, Politics, 1254a34 – 1254b1.  
50 This is exactly how Rousseau describes the subject of Aristotle’s book in the article On Political 
Economy, p. 244. See our note in ch. 5 on the use of Filmer and Aristotle in Rousseau’s article. 
51 In a footnote to his interpretation of the epigraph used in the Social Contract, R. Masters calls our 
attention to “the importance that Rousseau attaches to the epigraph of a work” (‘The Structure of 
Rousseau’s Political Thought,’ in Hobbes and Rousseau, New York, 1972, p. 408). According to 
this principle, Rousseau must have used all his epigraphs in a coherent way. Thus if the epigraphs 
of Émile and the Social Contract condense ultimately the overall intention in those books, so should 
that of the Second Discourse. However, Masters seems to contradict his own principle when he 
 193 
The best condition for any living being is the natural one, and the natural 
condition of any living being is one in which the soul (the principle of life) rules 
over the body. Perhaps the full sense of the Aristotelian notion would require a 
longer investigation into what Aristotle means by soul and being; nonetheless, the 
text of the Politics gives us sufficient elements to understand the political teleology 
that emerges from this principle.52 Aristotle notably tells us that human life can only 
exist in the state (polis),53 i.e. that the humanity of the single individual is 
predicated upon his community with others. The reason why the human soul should 
rule the body must be found, then, in the very definition of man (anthropos). In 
order for it to achieve its best possible condition, the soul needs to be in the city and 
exercise the faculties that, by allowing individuals to establish relations of 
comparison and pronounce judgments about what they find useful, just, and good, 
make them different from other animals.54 But Aristotle also says that a part cannot 
logically have a different end (telos) than the end of the whole to which it belongs. 
                                                                                                                                            
interprets Rousseau’s epigraph to the Second Discourse, or at least the context from which the 
sentence is drawn, as the standpoint that Rousseau denies, rather than elucidates, in that book (R. 
Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, pp. 111-8). The passage by Aristotle appears in 
Grotius’s discussion of the difference between human beings and other animals regarding natural 
right. (De jure belli ac pacis, I, 1, 12, 3; noted by both Gourevitch and Meier). Grotius uses the 
sentence, which in Aristotle precedes the famous passage about the political nature of man, in order 
to illustrate his thesis that in the state of nature man is a sociable being. 
52 We cannot give here a competent discussion of free will and the productive sense of imagination 
in Aristotle. As an introductory text to these notions see Metaphysics, 982a1 - 983a24, particularly 
in relation to Book One of the Politics.  
53 Pol.,1253a26-28 
54 Pol., 1253a2-20. In the Politics, Aristotle speaks of the nature of human beings as we see them 
today, not from an evolutionary perspective, as Rousseau suggests he does in the beginning of the 
Second Discourse (SD, p. 134 (134)).  
 194 
The best possible condition for the individual soul is, therefore, defined by the best 
possible condition for the whole of which it is a part (i.e. the state); it is defined by 
the independence or self-sufficiency (autarcheia) of that whole.55 The best 
individual condition is given by “that for the sake of which the individual exists,” 
but such a capacity only makes sense in the political context of the individual’s life. 
Thus a life dedicated to the search and enjoyment of essentially private goods 
becomes “impossible” or, according to Aristotle, sub-human. Because there cannot 
be a full individual self-sufficiency in the city, freedom is always tied to demands of 
the general interest (common good) and never absolute.56 We can say that, for 
Aristotle, human nature is defined by a certain kind of enslavement or dependence, 
without which we simply stop being human. If an absolute freedom can only be 
conceived from the perspective of either beasts or gods, freedom only exists to the 
extent that we remain bestial or become divine. Thus if we think of the best regime 
as a regime that optimizes freedom, we can see that the main problem at the 
beginning of Aristotle’s Politics is the same as in Rousseau’s Second Discourse, i.e. 
the coordination of this unity or self-sufficiency of the state with the particular 
freedom or will of its members. If our interpretation of the Epistle Dedicatory is 
sound, the parallel between the two texts is striking. And if that is the case, we must 
                                                
55 Put differently, if the end of the whole is self-sufficiency, the end of the part cannot be its own 
self-sufficiency, but something that contributes to the self-sufficiency of the whole. See Pol., 
1252b35. 
56 “It is evident that the city is natural and prior to individuals; for if one is not self-sufficient when 
existing on one’s own [i.e. independent from the city], one holds the same relation to the whole as 
do the other parts. An individual who is either not capable of taking part in the community, or who 
is self-sufficient to the point of not needing anything, is not a part of the city: he is either a beast or 
a god.” Pol., 1253a24-29. 
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consider the possibility that Rousseau’s interpretation of the Politics – namely, of 
the discussion in Book One framing the passage he quotes – resonates with his own 
views about inequality and the difference between man and beast.57 
Before anything, one must realize that Aristotle’s discussion of slavery is not 
limited to the usual sense of the notion, i.e. the “institution of slavery.” He admits 
that slavery can be understood in two fundamental ways: natural slavery and slavery 
by law or convention. Hence, in the Politics, the term (to douleuein) refers to two 
completely different states.58 Aristotle agrees that “institutionalized slavery” 
(established by law) creates, in principle, a relation of oppression that cannot in 
itself be advantageous or just; but against those who believe that all slavery is 
against nature, and that human beings are essentially equal, he shows that the notion 
can denote a general condition which, in different degrees, is natural to many if not 
most people.59 Let us focus on what he means by natural slavery.  
Aristotle treats the relation between ruler and ruled as a natural outcome of 
the natural inequalities among human beings.60 Human beings are different among 
themselves in the qualities of body and soul, but they are also different – as opposed 
                                                
57 What follows is less an attempt to understand Aristotle than to understand what might have been 
Rousseau’s interpretation and use of the Politics. 
58 Pol., 1253b20 and 1255a4. 
59 Cf. Pol., 1252a31, 1252b1, 1254a21, 1254b16, 1255b20 with 1255a4 ff. In a section on friendship 
in N. Ethics, 1161b5, Aristotle distinguishes between “slave” and “human being” in the same 
person. To befriend a slave qua a human being is, necessarily, to befriend someone who is either 
not aware of his condition of being a slave or who is not aware that he is seen as such by the person 
befriending him.  
60 Contrast the references in the previous note with Rousseau’s SD, p. 138 (139), and with Locke’s 
Second Treatise, §22-23, and § 61-63. See also R. Velkley’s treatment of the passage in op. cit., ch. 
2, pp. 32-5.  
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to other animals – in the way and degree in which their bodily passions respond to 
their intellects, regardless of the potentialities that they might possess. Aristotle 
distinguishes between despotic and non-despotic rule through an analogy between 
an animal and the state. He distinguishes between the absolute (despotic) rule over 
the being as a body and the non-despotic rule over its particular appetites. 
It is in an animal that it is first possible to discern the rule of a master 
and that of a statesman: the soul rules the body in the manner of a 
master, and the intellect (nous) rules the appetites in that of a 
statesman or a king.61 
 
To affirm that, in animals in general, nous (intelligence) rules orexis (appetite) in a 
political and kingly way is to indicate the standard – a sort of instinctive command 
in animals – that human beings tend to deviate from, both in their relations towards 
others and in their self-ruling. The difference between man and beast is logos 
(speech), which is what allows the intelligence of one individual to affect the way 
others deal with their desires. The heart of the matter here is not the inevitable 
enslavement of mankind, i.e. the inevitable conflict between our desires and our 
mind, but the different kinds of enslavement, and thus of political situations, 
determined by this relation between nous and orexis. For both Aristotle and 
Rousseau, the heart of the matter is in the general relation between ruler and ruled.  
Slavery, Aristotle says, is a condition caused by a natural disposition of 
individuals who – due to nature, education, or both – have the rule of their action 
dictated predominantly by their passions and not by their intellect and reason.62 In 
order to effectively become a part of the state, or, as Aristotle suggests, in order to 
                                                
61 Pol., 1254b4 
62 See Pol., 1254b16-19. 
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behave humanly, these individuals find the direction and the limits to such a rule 
outside of themselves. For them, slavery is natural. 
For one is a slave by nature who is capable of belonging to another 
(given that one belongs to another only if one has this capacity [of 
belonging to another]) and who participates in reason by feeling 
without having it.63 
 
Aristotle suggests that, at least in one way, this condition places such human beings 
closer to beasts than to other human beings who, not being capable of passively 
adopting the discourse of others, are guided primarily by their own intellectual 
activity. Yet, this radical opposition hides more than what it shows: the capacity of 
belonging to another is in a way something natural to all human beings and 
participation in reason is, evidently, a relative, not an absolute thing. Aristotle also 
indicates that psychological or intellectual differences among human beings are not 
less frequent and less natural than bodily differences, reminding us that to see the 
beauty of a soul is not as easy as to see the beauty of a body.64 Hence, if the 
difference between the slave by nature and the free (or beautiful) soul is so neat, and 
if the free soul is, as one is led to think, an unusual phenomenon in the state, how 
should one interpret the situation of the vast majority of citizens? If what Aristotle 
says is that slaves are as distant from non-slaves (i.e. free souls or human beings at 
their best) as the body is from the soul and as a beast is from a man, then the radical 
opposition would leave us with the problem of the cases in the middle. Cases in the 
middle between slavery and freedom are logically cases of a certain kind of slavery, 
or of an imperfect freedom, be it of the body, be it of the mind. Because these cases 
                                                
63 My italics. See the entire passage in Pol.,1254b16-26. See also 1254a14-17.  
64  Pol., 1254b27 ff. 
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represent the condition of the majority of people, then, according to Aristotle’s 
“psychological definition” of slavery, the majority of the people is, to some extent, 
necessarily enslaved by nature, not only in general – i.e. with respect to their bodily 
necessities – but, in different degrees, with respect to their minds. Human freedom 
should be understood not so much from the difference between man and beast, but 
from the difference between the freedom of beasts and the freedom of gods.65 
                                                
65 “Those who [in comparison with other men] are as different as the soul is from the body and as 
man is from beast (...) are slaves by nature; for them, it is advantageous to be ruled by this kind of 
ruler.” See also 1254a21-26.  We can read Aristotle’s premise as follows. The difference between 
two human beings is either the same or greater than the difference between one of these human 
beings and a beast when the life of the human being in question is determined by his bodily passions 
and capacities. Rousseau reminds us of this notion in a crucial paragraph of the Second Discourse: 
“Some Philosophers have even suggested that there is a greater difference between a given man and 
another than there is between a given man and a given beast.” (SD, p. 140-1 (141)). The sentence is 
found practically verbatim in Montaigne’s essay De l’inégalité qui est entre nous (Essais, I, 42) and 
Locke, Essay, IV, 20, §5. (Note Locke’s distance (“as some think...”) regarding what was the main 
cause of inequality for the tradition here at stake.) Montaigne bases his text on a passage from 
Plutarch mentioned by Rousseau a few paragraphs before in the Second Discourse (SD, pp. 138-9 
(139)); the passage belongs to a text by Plutarch to be named in a footnote to a direct reference to 
Aristotle in the Social Contract: “Aristote (...) avoit dit aussi que les hommes ne sont point 
naturellement égaux, mais que les uns naissent pour l’esclavage et les autres pour la domination./ 
Aristote avoit raison, mais il prenoit l’effet pour la cause. Tout homme né dans l’esclavage nait 
pour l’esclavage, rien n’est plus certain. Les esclaves perdent tout dans leur fers, jusqu’au désir 
d’en sortir; ils aiment leur servitude comme les compagnons d’Ulysse aimoient leur abrutissement.” 
(SC, I, 2, p. 353). We must bracket for the moment Rousseau’s theoretical necessity in the Social 
Contract to affirm his doctrine of natural freedom and criticize those who have taken the effect 
(slavery) for the cause (society), like Aristotle and Hobbes (see also, in the same volume, Social 
Contract, 1º version, p. 288), even if the criticism does not touch the main premise defended by 
Aristotle and confirmed by Rousseau (“Aristote avoit raison”), namely natural inequality. We can 
and should abstract from society when inquiring about the origins; however, in the Social Contract 
Rousseau departs from an understanding of human beings as we currently perceive them, not in 
their pre-human indistinguishableness. Hence if we must start with natural inequalities, we must 
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The political difficulty with all this is the following. To the extent that 
human beings are enslaved (i.e. to the extent that their disposition towards some 
form of physical or mental enslavement is natural), they must be ruled by an 
                                                                                                                                            
presume that a certain degree of slavery and domination is also natural. Rousseau’s natural morality 
is the universal substitute for this natural tension in the human species.  
With the references to Plutarch’s passage, Rousseau does more than just confirm the notion that 
those to whom slavery becomes natural are closer to beasts than to man; he also points to the 
qualitative difference between the two states. In Plutarch’s text, entitled in French Que les bêtes 
usent de la raison, Ulysses’ companions, now transformed into various animals by Circe, are shown 
to prefer their new condition to their previous one. Circe challenges Ulysses to change his 
companions’ will to remain beasts; she confers one of them – made into a pig (Gryllus) – with the 
capacity of both understanding and using human language, so that he can explain to Ulysses why 
their new condition is superior to that of human beings. In sum, Gryllus’ argument is that human 
beings are slaves by nature due to their permanent necessity to live for the opinion of others, and 
that the so-called human virtues (courage and temperance in particular) are characteristics of beasts, 
not of human beings: only in beasts the intellect rules appetite in a spontaneous and harmonious 
manner. Ulysses does not contest the argument that human life is for most individuals a life of toil 
and torment, but he leads Gryllus into a crucial contradiction that allows the talking-beast to 
perceive in what sense the human condition is superior to his own. Beasts are in a way endowed 
with a capacity for reason (logos) and understanding far more effective than that of human beings; 
from a negative perspective, the difference between beasts and human beings is precisely that 
human logos can err, due to the admixture with passions that come out of inequalities within the 
species (Cf. with Émile, pp. 572-3). From such a perspective, human beings are, at best (i.e. 
whenever they achieve what they want in spite of their passive perception or dogmatic use of 
reason), on the level of beasts. Yet whatever the logos of beasts is, it is not human logos. Individual 
beasts have no mind of their own and follow the universal law of their species. Gryllus is forced to 
realize through his blunder at the end of the text (the passage quoted by Montaigne and Rousseau) 
that the human species is the only species that reproduces within itself the natural differences that 
exist between other species (e.g. between the intellectual characteristics of foxes and sheep). The 
human condition becomes more interesting when one realizes that the tension between the lowest 
and the highest is only available to the human animal. To bring together Aristotle, Plutarch, and 
Rousseau on this point, we can say the following. Human logos (thought of both as discourse and 
reflection) becomes the qualitative difference between the two states when it is articulated as the 
faculty of interaction that allows human beings to become conscious of their freedom in relation to, 
and in light of their differences with, other individuals of their species. 
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absolute power, like the soul rules the body. In a republic, this power is transcribed 
in the impersonal force of the laws; i.e. there is, in principle, no arbitrary coercion 
between rulers and ruled. At the same time, the appetites or desires of the human 
beings that constitute the state should receive a political and kingly (i.e. non-
despotic) treatment. What, then, does this general sense of slavery mean?  
A few lines above in the Politics, Aristotle speaks of slaves as necessary 
instruments (organa) for life or a good life.66 He says that slaves are instruments of 
action (praxis) and not of production (poiesis), a difference that can be explained 
precisely in terms of how one sees the relation between body and soul in these 
individuals. Aristotle says that it is natural for the soul to rule over the body, and 
that in the same way that a part belongs, wholly, to something else, the slave 
belongs, wholly, to the master. If the slave belongs wholly to the master and if the 
goal of the master is both, to do things in the best way (i.e. according to nature) and 
to achieve the best possible state for the whole over which he rules, then it is 
necessarily in the interest of the master to rule over his parts as he rules over that 
whole, i.e. by conducting them towards their best possible state.67 The ruling over 
the slave should, then, according to Aristotle, be coherent with the capacities of the 
human being that that slave is. In a word, the art of ruling (slaves) should not 
include coercion, for before one knows what those capacities are, one cannot know 
if the individual is indeed a slave, i.e. a slave by nature.68 The main difficulty posed 
by Aristotle is not whether slavery is just or unjust; the main difficulty is in how to 
                                                
66 Pol., 1253b25 ff. 
67 Cf. passage in the Politics with the beginning of the N. Ethics, 1094a10-27. 
68 See Pol. 1255b11-15. 
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know, given the pre-existing relations of power in society, who is and who is not 
what he calls a slave by nature.  
To use the slave as an instrument of action (praxis) is to use him in his best 
capacities, i.e. it is to give him the activity most coherent with the natural relation 
existent between his body and his soul. This seems to be the difference between the 
two kinds of instruments. Whereas to use the slave as an instrument of action is to 
engage his soul or will in the work at stake, to use him merely as an instrument of 
production would be to employ the slave as if he did not have in himself the 
principle of his action – it would be to employ him simply as an inanimate 
instrument or a soulless body.69 The telos in this last situation would consist of the 
isolated product of the work in question, a work conceived without taking into 
consideration the soul of the worker – more precisely, without taking into 
consideration the relation between his body and soul. In contrast, the good master – 
whose relation towards his slave should not be different from that between a master-
craftsman (architekton) and his subordinate70 – must not overlook, but include the 
coordination of the soul of his subordinate as part of his ultimate goal. It is through 
this coordination that an individual with a natural disposition towards being ruled is 
able to escape his otherwise inevitable fate in society – i.e. the “bad and unnatural 
condition” of the body ruling the soul.71 It is, thus, through this coordination 
between body and soul that this individual will accomplish, by ruling (acting) over 
                                                
69 Cf. N. Ethics, 1161a31-1161b5. 
70 See Pol. 1253b22-1254a18. 
71 Pol., 1254b1. 
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his own body, his natural end as a being: “that for the sake of which he exists.”72 
The end of the good master must include, then, finding a natural balance for that 
animated part of the whole that his “slave” is.  
It is only in this sense that the slave should be seen as a property (ktema). 
Aristotle’s treatment of private ruling as the art of mastery over slaves (the 
difference between oikonomia and despoteia becomes subtle, although, as indicated 
by Aristotle, the former is technically a broader term73) makes us think of a parallel 
with the ruling of children. Indeed, if we think of the correct spirit of paternal power 
(for Aristotle, the foundational power of political associations), the parallel is not 
that surprising. The master must own the slave’s mind before wanting to rule the 
slave’s body; put differently, he must first see the individual as an extension of his 
mind, not of his body.74 By understanding the various degrees of this state as 
characteristic of the human condition in general, Aristotle’s definition of the slave 
as an instrument of action and not of production amounts, in this sense, to a 
subversion of the merely institutional (and unjust) sense of slavery. Throughout the 
passage about the instrumentality of slavery, Aristotle speaks of the situation of the 
slave (doulos) and the subordinate (huperetes) of a master-craftsman as equivalent, 
                                                
72 Pol., 1252b35. 
73 Cf. Pol., 1253b1-22 and 1255b30. 
74 See Pol., 1254b3ff., for Aristotle’s correction of the despotic rule. Later in the Politics, Aristotle 
says that properties, although essential for the city, are not part of the essential unity that constitutes 
the city. The city is constituted essentially by the communion of equal citizens; therefore, citizens 
cannot be slaves (a sort of property) or at least must not think of themselves as such. It is 
interesting, however, that Aristotle does not mention slaves among the allegedly essential things for 
the city that are not part of the essential unity of the city. Cf. also 1328a21-1328b22, a passage that 
corroborates the view that on the question of property and the oneness of the state Aristotle would 
side with Rousseau rather than with Locke. 
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and in his clearest and broadest statement on the matter, he says that “the slave is a 
subordinate in things concerning action.”75 One is tempted to expand this definition 
by saying that for him the “slave” is any subordinate who is used as an instrument 
of any action for life or the good life – therefore political and moral actions too.  
According to this interpretation, the best condition, for Aristotle, would be 
one whereby all human beings that constitute the state are ruled, in principle, in a 
political and kingly manner. For both Aristotle and Rousseau political freedom is 
the outcome of a voluntary, spontaneous or natural enslavement to a law whose 
source and force lie outside the individual.76 In this sense, one can say that all 
members of the state are limited in their freedom, on the one hand, by the particular 
rule (or logos) that best suits one’s natural constitution,77 and on the other, by the 
general rule of the state. Thus, not only those who are slaves by nature (namely, 
those who have their bodies as either the ultimate means or the ultimate end for 
their actions) must follow the rule of their masters, but these very masters will have 
to follow as well a the rule of a logos that will often transcend their understanding.  
Although a citizen can be economically free or self-sufficient, as a citizen he too 
must always be ruled.78 
                                                
75 Cf. Pol., 1254a6. 
76 Cf. SDED §4-5 and Social Contract, I, 8. 
77 Cf. Pol., 1252b1. 
78 Aristotle’s psychological treatment of slavery leads us to the following conclusion. Individuals 
differ in their greater or lesser capacity to be ruled by others, or in their greater or lesser necessity 
to allow, so to speak, the nous of others to harmonize their own passions. Human beings do not 
have, like other animals, a sort of instinctive intelligence that rules automatically over their 
appetites. Therefore, the human intellect must receive the proper training, or ruling, so that the 
individual passions can be controlled and the individual become part of the state. This does not 
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 Together with our interpretation of the Epistle Dedicatory, and of 
Rousseau’s references to Herodotus and Machiavelli, the passage of the Politics 
from which the epigraph to the Second Discourse is taken reveals the logic behind 
Rousseau’s rhetorical strategy. The question here is less about the value of this 
interpretation than it is about whether the epigraph illuminates, as a good epigraph 
should do, the road opened by Rousseau in the Second Discourse. The relation 
between Rousseau and Aristotle on the question of natural inequality and the 
relation between rulers and ruled seems to be evident. If, on the one hand, 
Aristotle’s treatment of rulers informs the spirit of Rousseau’s future legislators 
about both the content and the form of their actions, on the other, it gives Rousseau 
the political-psychological principle that guides his written discourse and that 
allows him to address his different readers, including his future legislators, as a 
ruler of rulers. As such, the logic that Rousseau’s rhetorical strategy obeys is 
fundamentally a political logic. He uses the principle illustrated by his references to 
Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Aristotle, in order to found, almost as a religious 
founder, his own political order. This is how, we believe, his necessity to conceal in 
                                                                                                                                            
mean, as assumed in modernity, that a proper education can emancipate any human being. For 
Aristotle, the natural inequalities among human beings place those who have their bodies as either 
the ultimate means or the ultimate end of their actions (those whose higher contributions to the state 
are made through the use of their bodies or in view of bodily satisfactions) in a situation similar to 
that of beasts – at least in what concerns their relation to the state (see 1254b16-1255a3). The 
correct spirit of ruling is, thus, necessary to avoid that these human beings end up falling in a 
condition lower than that of beasts, which, in their turn, do not need political institutions or speech 
to achieve their best individual condition: “for if man is the best of animals when perfected, he is 
the worst when separated from law and justice” (1253a32). 
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his work this visceral relation between his egalitarian politics and his non-
egalitarian speech should be understood. 
We conclude with a remark about political freedom in democratic republics, 
the main practical difficulty in both Aristotle and Rousseau. In Book Six of the 
Politics, Aristotle says that freedom is the basic presupposition of democratic 
republics in general.79 He says that freedom is the goal of every democracy, and by 
freedom he means here the possibility “to live as one desires.”80 Yet, we saw how in 
the beginning of the Politics Aristotle affirms that only the city can be independent 
or self-sufficient, and that its members should work towards that self-sufficiency 
and with that self-sufficiency in mind, not their own (i.e. not the satisfaction of their 
immediate desires). In his discussion of slavery, and perhaps due to the very nature 
of that discussion, Aristotle does not voice but only implies the otherwise intuitive 
notion that in order for individuals to work, at their best, towards a higher goal (i.e. 
towards a good that is not only private) they must do it voluntarily. Human beings 
should lead their lives without feeling coerced by an alien force, without feeling that 
they are being ruled. They must have in themselves the principle of their 
communitarianism. In other words, individuals will only work at their best, for the 
benefit and independence of the state, if the work in question coincides, at least in 
part, with what they intimately want to do. The best regime requires, thus, in that 
                                                
79 Cf. Pol., 1317a40. 
80 Cf. Pol., 1317b10. 
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respect, free individuals: the best regime is democracy, or a certain type of 
democracy.81 
Aristotle says that political freedom in democratic republics is characterized 
by “being ruled and ruling in turn.”82 From the perspective of the people in general 
(to plethos), freedom is found in their perception of equality and number, not of 
merit, as the grounds for justice; each citizen shares equally in the general ruling 
and, consequently, in the general obedience to the rule.83 In this way, the people as a 
whole is ruled and rules in proportion: equality is the essence of political freedom. 
We can, therefore, interpret “being ruled and ruling in turn” as also a variable ratio 
in individuals between the extent to which one is ruled and the extent to which one 
rules. That said, the notion contrasts with what Aristotle affirms in Book One. He 
opens the Politics by saying that there is a qualitative, and not merely gradual 
(numeric), difference between public ruling (political or kingly) and the private 
ruling of a master or a father; he also says that in the same way that kingly rule is 
not appropriately defined as the mere imposition of one’s will, political rule is not 
appropriately defined as “ruling and being ruled in turn.”84 Indeed, the logical 
conclusion of Book One is that due to the natural inequality of human beings 
                                                
81 But for a democracy to be just, the popular element in it must be “tempered.” For Aristotle’s 
treatment of the different types of democracy and other regimes in general, see Pol., 1290a30ff. and 
1317b15ff.  
82 Cf. Pol., 1317b1. 
83 On the two senses of political equality, see also Pol., 1301b25-39. Cf. with Otanes’ one-
dimensional isonomia in Herodotus, Hist., III, 80 (see above) and Rousseau’s last note to the 
Second Discourse on distributive justice, pp. 221-2 (222-3). 
84 Pol., 1252a4-22. Note that in the chapter ‘On Monarchy’ of the Social Contract – the chapter in 
which he calls Machiavelli’s The Prince the book of republicans – Rousseau speaks of the “art of 
obeying” as propaedeutic to the art of ruling (SC, III, 4, p. 411). 
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political rule can never be equally shared. Aristotle’s emphasis on the qualitative 
difference between public and private rule shifts the focus from the difference in the 
number of individuals ruled to the difference in the spirit behind the ruling action.  
Aristotle begins by shifting the focus on the ruled to a focus on rulers. He 
argues that private and public ruling are different not only in terms of the number of 
people ruled, but in the essence of the ruling action. Yet, as we saw, there is an 
aspect of private ruling that should not be essentially different from the political and 
kingly rule of a statesman. At the same time, it seems to be a natural aspect of 
politics that all ruling has an element of despotism – although the “despotism” in 
question here is not oppression, but the limit enforced almost impersonally through 
the outcome of a successful persuasion, namely, general rules, opinions and laws.85 
Hence, in the same way that we can think of the slave and the free individual in the 
same person, we can also think of the political, or kingly, and the despotic rule in 
the same ruler.86 This is why the formula used to define popular freedom cannot be 
used to define political rule. The perspective adopted in the opening book of the 
Politics is the perspective of the ruler qua ruler for whom the paradigm of justice 
and action lies beyond the dullness of mathematical equality, towards an equality 
that instead takes into account the natural differences among human beings 
regarding body and soul.  
                                                
85 In the Social Contract, Rousseau says that the despot, different than the tyrant, “est celui qui se 
met au dessus des loix-mêmes” (SC, III, 10, p. 423). The despot makes the rules, the tyrant 
contradicts them. 
86 Cf. with Pol., 1255b15. 
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Aristotle begins the Politics with the despot (the private ruler) and ends it 
with the legislator (nomothetes), whose art is, according to Book One, also 
“despotic.” It is necessary to learn what the difference between private and public 
ruling is in order to know how to rule in a democratic republic. In the psychological 
sense of Aristotle’s discussion, the same free and equal individuals “ruled” by the 
politikos can be thought to be “enslaved” to others (or to the same politikos) who 
hold, so to speak, the intellectual principle of their action. Whether the ruled see 
themselves as enslaved or free individuals is something that will be determined less 
by the sort of person that their ruler is than by his awareness of the ambiguous 
nature ruling. The political ruler must be above all a psychologist, for the ruling of 
people is always both private and public at the same time.87  
Aristotle does not voice the notion that dedication to the common good 
should be voluntary because the will in question here is, also for him, a sort of 
fiction. It is a product of the work of the political ruler, or legislator in general, 
upon the imagination of his people,  
for the best things are those at the same time private and common to 
all, the things that the legislator should create in the souls of human 
beings.88  
 
Political rule, different from despotic or absolute rule, is a rule about and not against 
the desire of others; it is a rule that takes into account the general importance of that 
                                                
87 For the education of rulers as opposed to the education of the ruled, see mainly Pol., 1332b10ff. 
That “psychological skills” and moderation can and should be a quality of rulers in any regime is 
attested in the discussion about tyrannies that culminates at 1315a40. Cf. also 1333b25 (“ruling over 
free individuals is more becoming (kallios) (...) than ruling in the spirit of a master (tou 
despotikos)”). 
88 Pol., 1333b35. 
 209 
desire and that seeks to persuade instead of subjugate the individual. The effort of 
the statesman is, therefore, to bring together private and public interest – particular 
and general will – through the extraordinary capacity of ruling people as free and 









Those who [in comparison with other men] are as different as the soul 
is from the body and as man is from beast (...) are slaves by nature; 
for them it is advantageous to be ruled by that kind of ruler.1 
 
Rousseau: 
Some Philosophers have even suggested that there is a greater 
difference between a given man and another than there is between a 
given man and a given beast.2  
 
The idea that some men are closer to beasts than to other men does not have 
a more negative connotation, i.e. it is not more offensive, than Condillac’s 
conclusion about the merely gradual difference between man and beast in general, 
something that in our time seems more than ever to be taken for granted by 
biologists, linguists, and professional philosophers. The maxim pronounced by 
Rousseau does not contradict, but expands Condillac’s and, for that matter, the 
empiricist position as a whole. Although the perception of the empiricists made 
sense in what concerns the majority of human beings, they could not account for the 
exceptional cases. They did not see that the species would never have evolved 
                                                
1 Pol., 1254a21-26. 
2 “It is, then, continues Rousseau, not so much the understanding that constitutes the specific 
difference between man and the other animals, as it is his property of being a free agent.” SD, p. 
140 (141). 
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without these exceptional cases, no matter how minimal were the inequalities in the 
beginning when compared to our current situation; in other words, they did not see 
that the difference between man and beast is before anything the difference between 
the exceptional case of man and a beast. Against them, Rousseau claimed that, in 
their potentialities, human beings in general are always essentially different than 
other animals, and that the similarities between the life of beasts and the life of most 
human beings at the developed stage of the human species are nothing but what he 
describes as the unfortunate yet inevitable results of that very process of 
development: “perfectibility” firing backwards. 
The goal of this dissertation was to show in what sense “some philosophers,” 
among whom we must include Rousseau, have understood this fundamental 
inequality. Since the maxim stated above would have no relevant meaning if those 
closer to beasts were taken to be only the exception to the rule – namely, if they 
were merely a few stupid individuals in society – then, it must imply that those 
closer to beasts represent indeed the majority of men. Most men become enslaved 
by their institutions. Their lives are similar to that of beasts, because their individual 
will is ultimately conditioned, not to say dictated, by rules whose meaning and 
relevance transcend their existence as individuals. The idea that some men are 
closer to beasts than to other men refers to the quality that separates human beings 
from other animals in absolute, namely, the ability to think freely. Thus, the 
difference between the two men indicated by Rousseau’s maxim is greater than that 
between one of these men and a beast because it is ultimately a qualitative, not a 
gradual difference.  
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The illusions of presence that appear almost concomitantly with the 
development of speech – and which both the deconstructionists and Rousseau 
associate with the corruption of freedom – are the seeds of the necessity for laws 
and government, without which human beings could not have progressed as a 
species. This is why the greatest irony in Rousseau’s account of the human 
adventure concerns freedom, the faculty through which speech was developed, i.e. 
through which individuals of a given species, at a given time, became human. For 
whereas the capacity to be a free agent founds, as it were, the human species, the 
more human the species becomes, the more remote is the enactment of that capacity 
in its individuals. This is the sense in which, in the end, most human beings will be 
comparatively closer to beasts than to other human beings who somehow managed 
to remain free.  
Rousseau’s references to Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Aristotle are addressed 
to those hypothetical free individuals (the exceptional cases). Subtle as these 
references are, they extend the scope of Rousseau’s rhetoric to those like himself, or 
like (his) Otanes, who can articulate their ideas from outside any accepted 
convention, as being free and independent from the laws. Aristotle’s epigraph, the 
Epistle Dedicatory and the first note to the Second Discourse are, in this sense, the 
gate to the philosophical sense of Rousseau’s rhetoric. His account of the origin of 
inequality, and mainly the relation of his notes to his discourse – i.e. the alternative 
to the “straightest path” mentioned in the Notice on the Notes – cannot be fully 
appreciated without the articulation of these introductory texts. It is, then, here 
where Rousseau allows us to consider the meaning of his rhetoric. His examples let 
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us reflect on the Second Discourse from outside3 and distinguish, ultimately, the 
richness of his argument from the seductive power of his discourses. It is also only 
from the perspective opened by these introductory texts that we can contemplate the 
principle of ruling that directs Rousseau’s “legislative effort” over his readers. To 
the extent that these things coincide, Rousseau’s rhetorical strategy and the 
foundations of his political thought can be identified with the principle affirmed in 
Book One of Aristotle’s Politics: not being possible to determine a priori whether 
someone is naturally free or a slave by nature, one must rule other human beings as 
the intellect should rule the passions, in a political and kingly (i.e. non-despotic) 
way, i.e. in accordance with their democratic aspirations and with their own 
perception of freedom.4 
Before his inquiry about the origin of inequality begins, Rousseau sets, in 
these introductory texts, the boundaries of the field upon which his discourse takes 
place. He exposes the ordinary situation of most human beings by pointing up the 
exceptional character and freedom of those made to rule. But, he cannot do this 
without guarding the interest of the majority. He, thus, dissimulates, without lying, 
what most readers would perceive as a profound contradiction in his thought. His 
views on the natural inequality between rulers and ruled had to be stated obliquely, 
not to say kept latent, lest his pessimism concerning man’s prospects of true 
freedom would contaminate his democratic theory of politics and education. It is in 
this sense that the function of his philosophical rhetoric is, precisely, to isolate 
politics from philosophy; there is no room for philosophy (or philosophical 
                                                
3 With the text itself being outside the Discourse. 
4 See SC, II, 7, p. 383. 
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freedom) in his Geneva, and the highest prospect of greatness depicted in both his 
political and educational treatments of Everyman is patriotism. The general will of 
the people or the common soul represented in Émile are necessary paradigms for 
democracy; and the rule of the majority, namely, of those who are closer to beasts 
than to radically free individuals, makes the existence of the latter unsustainable in 
the state. If, on the one hand, the inequalities among the members of the state must 
be respected and, as Rousseau says in the last note to the Second Discourse, the 
health of the republic depends on the awareness of its members about their 
differences in strengths and talents, on the other, these differences will never be as 
great as the difference between them and that of a philosophically free individual 
who, in theory, has no place in the State. 
 Given the extreme case of philosophical freedom presupposed by Rousseau, 
his political and educational teachings could only be sold as philosophical teachings 
because the philosophy of his time had become, in his eyes, nothing but an ode to 
the banality of human existence. The association between cosmopolitanism, 
materialism and the Enlightenment became simply irresistible. Rousseau, 
apparently, saw no alternative but to address even the highest intellects, the 
“Philosophes,” of his time as dreamers.5 As such, his rhetoric in the Second 
Discourse is conceived not to confront his opponents on the fundamental dialectical 
issues, but to substitute their views (i.e. their dogmas) on the ever-obscure subject 
of human nature. The doctrinarian aspects of Rousseau’s work – the aspects 
correctly criticized by Derrida as dogmatic, such as his natural morality, the natural 
                                                
5 “Bad dreamers.” See again Émile, Pléiade ed., pp. 350-1. 
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goodness of man, but also the ensuing superficial sense of political freedom and 
equality – were, therefore, the only arms with which he officially equipped his 
legislators against materialism. Unfortunately, they were not sufficient and, we 
would argue, not adequate arms. 
The key to understanding the logic of Rousseau’s rhetorical strategy lies, 
ultimately, in his account of the origin of languages. The intellectual faculties 
responsible for speech – more precisely, the principle of individual action that 
allows the movement through these faculties from general to particular knowledge – 
are the means through which Rousseau orders his texts and upon which his 
philosophical order depends. Thus, both things, i.e. the account and the “rhetoric,” 
cannot be separated. We saw that deconstruction fails to explain either – and, 
therefore, the philosophical content of Rousseau’s work – for starting with the 
premise that no philosophical order can be possible. Derrida was a victim – like 
Lévi-Strauss and so many others – of the democratic myth (the egalitarian creed) 
perpetrated by Rousseau. His understanding of freedom and self-determination 
suffers from the same problem that Rousseau criticizes in the empiricists; the easy 
association between freedom and democracy (or the understanding of freedom as an 
exclusively psychological-political notion) is precisely what Rousseau’s highest 
rulers would, ideally, need to avoid. Because Derrida takes for granted the views 
that Rousseau, albeit indirectly, attempts to undermine, he could not even have 
started to understand the critique of freedom imbued in Rousseau’s writing. Thus, 
for him, Rousseau’s rhetoric must have been either merely diffusive or the elaborate 
contrivances played by Rousseau’s unconscious delusion of self-presence. Limited 
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by his prejudice, Derrida does not perceive the different types of readers addressed 
by Rousseau nor the different functions of presence (idealizations) in the life and 
action of each of these types. For Derrida, we must destroy or deconstruct presence, 
something that he sets out to accomplish by presupposing the impossibility of 
meaning tout court: we become free by first embracing insanity. Derrida starts by 
throwing the baby out with the bath water. 
Derrida does not appreciate the inevitable (natural?) role of presence in 
human communication which, according to Rousseau, characterizes all human 
languages and all attempts to transmit experiences and knowledge; he fails to 
identify the fundamental ambivalences in Rousseau’s inquiry on the origin of 
languages and, thus, the part that the intellectual powers that actually allow human 
language to exist played in Rousseau’s rhetoric. Thus, coherent with his 
preconceptions about language and his belief that philosophical knowledge is 
impossible, he depicts Rousseau as another thinker of what he calls the metaphysics 
of presence. Yet, it is Derrida, not Rousseau, who proceeds dogmatically. His 
dogmatism can be read as his faith, on the one hand, in the empiricist notion that 
thought must be explained through the analytical elements of language, and on the 
other, in the notion that all language, and thus all knowledge, is historical or 
conventional: there is no true thought, only explainable (deconstructible) thought.  
As such, Derrida’s doctrine of supplementarity – of the endless enchainment 
of signs and “meanings” through which he explains language – places him on the 
side of those like Condillac, La Mettrie and Helvétius who maintained that man 
differs from beast only by degree. By playing down consciousness and not 
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considering the non-analytical intellectual powers at the origin of human languages 
– namely, the cognitive sense of imagination,6 intuition, foresight – and thus by not 
considering their role in the production of general meanings as the ground for 
communication, Derrida misses the true dialectical force that separates humans from 
beasts: not, as he wants, the automatism of the chain of supplementarity, but the free 
action of a self-determined will, if we want, the free intention of the author. 
Rousseau would have confronted Derrida not only for his dogmatic empiricism and 
historicism, but also for the determinism implied in his thought. 
We have to conclude, however, by pointing out that the greatest failure here 
was not in Derrida’s, de Man’s or in any of the interpretations that since the 
Eighteenth century have fueled the polemics about what Rousseau was actually 
saying. The greatest failure is Rousseau’s own. The almost ineffable philosophical 
sense of his rhetoric was certainly the main source of the innumerable 
misinterpretations of his thought. We wonder whether Rousseau was, as it were, too 
effective in his goals. Effective to the point of excluding the protagonists to whom 
he allegedly addresses the most guarded passages in his text. Rousseau’s pessimism 
did not allow him to confront the “Philosophes” of his times (precisely, people like 
Condillac, La Mettrie, or Helvétius) with the full force of his arguments, hence the 
necessity of his rhetorical strategy; however, his too well-guarded “doctrine 
intérieure” was also a necessary element to the free spirited reader grappling with 
the philosophical sense of his work. Without access to Rousseau’s fundamental 
principles, one was indeed left with the options represented by Derrida and de Man: 
                                                
6 Again, Derrida’s describes the imagination as a re-active or merely mechanical faculty. See 
Gramm., p. 187, and chapter 1 above. 
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either Rousseau’s natural morality was dogmatic, too dreamy, or simply imperfect, 
and, therefore, needed to be modified (in Derrida’s case, Rousseau’s supposed 
shortcomings are substituted, and become an excuse, for the rhetorical license 
practiced by Derrida); or Rousseau’s “doctrines” were nothing but a cover-up for his 
view that language is “hollow at its core” (Rousseau is, then, as de Man claims, a 
Nietzschean avant la lettre). 
We do not have to elaborate on the fact that the political outcome of 
Rousseau’s work did not have the results he expected. Ironically, and tragically, his 
effort towards freedom and against fanaticism became one of the main sources of 
inspiration for the great political ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Individualism and communitarianism, egalitarianism and inegalitarianism, 
libertarianism and authoritarianism: they can all somehow find their voice in the 
naïve sense of justice and freedom present in Rousseau. With this in mind, we 
wonder whether up to a certain point Rousseau can indeed be accused of being 
responsible for the beginning of the political dissention that led to the ideological 
wars. To what degree did his reluctance to a head-on confrontation with materialism 
on the origin of natural inequality (regardless of the negative prospects for him of 
such confrontation) merely postpone the issue of a century or so, contributing to its 
explosive appearance in Nietzsche’s reckless rhetoric of frankness (the rhetoric 
celebrated by de Man) that fueled, among other things, one of the most perverse 
political phenomena of human history? To what degree should we look back to 
Rousseau when we reflect on the madness of both communist and liberal 
“democracies,” or about the current incapacity of our intellectual rulers of dealing 
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with the abuses made in the now vain name of freedom and equality? The question, 
of course, is not whether Rousseau could have saved the Enlightenment, but 
whether, by trying to save it, by trying to harness its rulers, he might have 
unwillingly contributed to the release of its most destructive forces. 
Whatever the case was, one must look ahead and perhaps try to find in 
Rousseau’s account of freedom the remedies for the harms to which, in the end, he 
might have contributed. All pessimism aside, freedom in Rousseau is, evidently, 
more than a vestige from the past. The capacity for free agency of our ancestors 
remains the ground for the timeless search for both our own happiness and the 
happiness of others. We need, however, to exercise the whole of our intellectual 
faculties (our primordial faculties) in order to conduct this search philosophically. 
Rousseau’s discourse on this matter is the reference that guided his moral 
philosophy and that entitled him to re-write, in light of his privileged perspective, 






On the Moral Character of Sovereignty in Rousseau’s  
Political Theory (Social Contract) 
 
 
Like the defenders of absolute monarchic power, Rousseau too sees the unity 
of sovereignty as a logical necessity of political philosophy. But unlike those 
thinkers, he separates sovereign power and political power. Sovereignty is political 
power, but only in the deepest sense of the word “political.” It is not the power to 
act upon particular questions of right and ordinary legislation, a role that Rousseau 
assigns to government. Instead, it is the power that establishes the limits and 
direction of ordinary political action.1 The sovereign power, for Rousseau, is 
essentially a moral power, and ultimately the moral power in the state. It is true that 
the moral power of the sovereign was already a crucial aspect of the “divine right of 
kings” thought by Bodin, Bossuet, Fénelon, or Robert Filmer. But Rousseau goes 
beyond his predecessors, Hobbes included, by seeing and addressing two difficulties 
necessarily implied by the unity of sovereign moral power that could not be 
properly addressed by absolutism any longer. The first of these difficulties concerns 
precisely the unity of the moral character of sovereignty, namely, what the 
                                                
1 On the difference between sovereignty and government, see SC, III, 1. On sovereign power as the 
power to make the laws, see SC, II, 6. 
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undivided moral power in the state must be. Rousseau’s argument about the 
legitimacy of the state concerns the coherence and efficiency of this moral power.2 
 Morality exists in the hearts of people. The unity of moral power in absolute 
monarchies, i.e. the effectual morality of those regimes, could not resist the 
emancipation of people’s desires promoted by modern cosmopolitanism, especially 
with the latter’s avail from the emerging liberalism predominant in Rousseau’s time. 
Rousseau takes the blind rationalism characteristic of the Enlightenment as an 
irresistible cultural force already in an advanced stage. The inevitable outcome, he 
thought, is an oppressive and ultimately despotic situation caused by the (moral) 
                                                
2 Rousseau’s critique is not only against the “second head” represented by the Church, but against 
any sort of institutionalized creed in the republic: “Par tout oú le Clergé fait un corps il est maitre 
et législateur dans sa patrie” (SC, IV, 8, De la religion civile, p. 463). Note, in the same passage, 
what Rousseau says about the unity of sovereignty: “[d]e tous les Auteurs Chrétiens le philosophe 
Hobbes est le seul qui ait bien vû le mal et le remede (sic), qui ait osé de proposer de réunir les 
deux têtes de l’aigle, et de tout ramener à l’unité politique, sans laquelle jamais Etat ni 
Gouvernement ne será bien constitué. (...) C’est ne pas tant ce qu’il y a d’horrible et de faux dans 
sa politique que ce qu’il il a de juste et de vrai qui l’a rendue odieuse.” Rousseau attaches a note to 
this last sentence in which he refers the reader to a letter by Grotius – an author criticized in the 
Social Contract for always establishing, in his manner of reasoning, right by fact (“le droit par le 
fait.” SC, I, 2) – where Grotius condemns Hobbes’ views that human beings are naturally in a state 
of war, and that “every Particular has the duty to follow the Religion approved in his country by the 
public authority, if not by adhering to it wholeheartedly, at least by professing and submitting to it 
by obedience.” If these are the views that Rousseau suggests have rendered Hobbes’ politics 
detestable, they are also, according to what he says, what is just and true about it. Grotius’ letter to 
his brother appears in the preface to Barbeyrac’s edition of De jure belli ac pacis (On the Laws of 
War and Peace); see Pléiade ed., vol. 3, p. 1502. Compare also Rousseau’s praise of Hobbes above 
with SD, Pléiade ed., p. 153, where he distinguishes Hobbes from Grotius and others for having 
better conjectured the facts that informed his (Hobbes’) discussion of natural right. On the deepest 
layer of the Second Discourse, Rousseau must establish right by fact; thus he follows Grotius’ 
alleged procedure criticized in the Social Contract, in spite of the incorrect facts established by 
Grotius in his discussion of natural right. Grotius is the only modern named in the Epistle 
Dedicatory, where he is commended together with Tacitus and Plutarch (SDED, §17). 
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split between public and private interests, and by the consequent spiritual isolation 
of individuals from the whole of which they should be a part – hence, his solution of 
making the sovereign moral power a direct attribute of these individuals. In order to 
appreciate the full significance of Rousseau’s republicanism, one must have in mind 
what he indicates in the conclusion of his main political treatise, namely, that the 
only logical alternative to his own would be a theocratic regime. Rousseau’s 
doctrine of sovereignty is his answer, on the psychological-political level, to the 
“political dualism” of modern regimes – i.e. the separation between the moral and 
political power – and to the further fragmentation of the notion of sovereignty 
implied by liberal individualism.3  
                                                
3 The idea of popular sovereignty was certainly far from being a novelty; the novelty was in 
Rousseau’s presentation of it. In modernity, the notion can be traced back to the second 
scholasticism (see mainly Suarez, De legibus, III). For some of Rousseau’s modern predecessors, 
one can consult Robert Derathé’s Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps (Vrin, 
1979), ch. II, pp. 92-100 and 120-124. In the same book, Derathé defends the view that Rousseau’s 
notion of sovereignty is in no way incompatible with Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of 
powers. “Not only, says Derathé, Rousseau generally avoids contradicting Montesquieu, but also 
irony and sarcasm are weapons that (...) he does not use against his “illustrious” predecessor, for 
whom he professes the greatest admiration” (p. 281). Derathé may be right to point out that 
Rousseau’s critique of those who have divided the objects of sovereignty (SC, II, 2) was aimed 
mainly at Hobbes, Grotius and Pufendorf, the thinkers who had an explicit theory of the parts of 
sovereignty (pp. 280 ff.) However, his suggestion that Rousseau’s position on the question of 
balance of powers differs from Montesquieu’s solution (separation of powers) only by degree would 
need further clarification (pp. 301, 307). Rousseau says right before the passage in question that “la 
volonté est générale, ou elle ne l’est pas; elle est celle du corps du peuple, ou seulement d’une 
partie.” If sovereignty is united in the general will – in other words, if sovereignty is a power of a 
will – the question of its fragmentation concerns the fragmentation of the will of which it is a 
power. In this sense, for Rousseau, sovereignty is primarily a moral power; the more technical 
question of balance of powers and the quandaries associated with the conventional understanding of 
sovereignty are secondary or at least subordinated to the moral sense of sovereignty that Rousseau 
wants to establish in the Social Contract. Derathé certainly does not have this distinction in mind 
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Rousseau re-invents what Aristotle calls orthai politeiai4 by making the 
legitimacy of any political regime depend on popular sovereignty.5 He employs 
Hobbes’ definition of “people” as opposed to “multitude,” wherein the people is 
seen, precisely, as a unity and as a being that has a will and an action of its own.6 
                                                                                                                                            
when he pairs Rousseau to the liberal thinkers. The rights with which the liberal thinkers endow 
individuals born in society entitle these individuals to a quasi sovereign power over their choices; as 
such, a permanent tension between those wills and public laws is presupposed as the rule. Rousseau 
does not deny that such a tension is a trait of politics (SC, III, 2), but for him the protection of the 
general will has all prerogatives – put differently, for him, individual freedom depends 
fundamentally on this safekeeping. When obedience to the law becomes, avowedly, merely a 
function of the instinct of self-preservation, the unity of sovereignty becomes a problematic if not 
obsolete notion. For Locke and Montesquieu, the separation and balance of powers – and thus a 
fragmentation of the conventional sense of sovereignty – become, as Derathé suggests (p. 291), a 
necessity of politics. For Rousseau too, this tendency might reflect an inevitable reality, as Derathé 
shows with his examples (pp. 302-7); yet according to Rousseau’s principles, the state would only 
be truly balanced if the general will remained strong, united, and hence sovereign. At any rate, that 
the tendency contrasts with and even negates Rousseau’s principle of sovereignty is a characteristic 
of politics: only a fundamentalist, blind rationalism would want to cancel the natural opposition. 
See also Arthur Melzer’s endorsement and re-articulation of Derathé’s argument in op.cit., pp. 200-
231; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, XI, 6; and Locke, Second Treatise of Government, XIII. As 
for Rousseau’s opinion of Montesquieu – not so unqualifiedly positive as Derathé suggests – see 
Émile, book 5, p. 836, with the conclusion to the Social Contract, IV, 9, p. 470: the principles 
established in the Social Contract are propaedeutic to Montesquieu’s otherwise “useless science.” 
4 Cf. for instance Aristotle’s Politics, 1279a15 ff.; and Plato’s Republic, 543a ff. For Aristotle’s 
treatment of republican ruling (politikos), see above. 
5 Rousseau definies legitimacy in the Social Contract by pairing duty and obedience to the desire to 
perform the duty and obey. Rights must respect a psychological order and cannot be imposed by 
force (SC, I, 3 and II, 6). For Rousseau’s definition of republican state, see SC, II, 6, the chapter 
that precedes the allegedly most unrepublican chapter in the book, ‘On the Legislator.’ 
6 “[I]t's a great hindrance to Civil Government, especially Monarchical, that men distinguish not 
enough between a People and a Multitude. The People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and 
to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude. The 
People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the People Commands; for the People wills 
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For Hobbes, the body constituted by the people is (or becomes) the body of the 
sovereign;7 but for him the metaphor has a limit. The body, the will, and the action 
of the people must be represented by the person of an actual being in order to exist, 
i.e. in order for the multitude to become a people.8 In Hobbes, the physical person of 
the sovereign represents the necessary condition for the unity of moral and political 
authority in the state. Rousseau reproduces the Hobbesian terminology and accepts 
all this; but with one caveat he strikes the heart of Hobbes’ political theory: he 
forbids the notion of representation of the will. A general will (the people) cannot 
be represented by a particular will (the king), only by itself.9 More importantly, a 
moral representation is redundant if the people, in its unity, is literally thought of as 
a moral being.10 But Rousseau is not promoting what in Hobbes’ view would be a 
sheer reification of the abstractions at stake, particularly of the general will. Our 
intention here is to stress this point. The will that constitutes the sovereignty of the 
people (general will) is evidently not the same kind of will that would constitute the 
sovereignty of a single human being (i.e. a king), due to the mere fact that the two 
beings in question are entirely different beings – even if one would have to admit 
that the general will is a human will – or at least a particular mode of human 
desire.11 Sovereignty is not in an unqualified will of the people, but in a certain 
                                                                                                                                            
by the will of one man.” Hobbes, De cive, XII, 8; see also VI, 1; and Leviathan, XVI. Cf. with last 
paragraph of SC, II, 6, p. 380. 
7 Hobbes, De corpore politico, II, 8, 9. 
8 Hobbes, Leviathan, XVIII.  
9 SC, II, 1; III, 15. 
10 SC, II, 4; I, 6; and On Political Economy, p. 245. 
11 Naturally, the general will does not exist literally as a will of the being in question; it is the result 
of the common interest that unites the individuals in the state. As such it is rooted in the individual. 
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knowledge and a certain action characteristic of that will. It is then constituted by 
only a partial aspect of the thing that ultimately defines it, namely, the will. 
Therefore, with the opposition between volonté générale and volonté particulière 
Rousseau must have had in mind the fundamental difference between the powers 
associated with these wills qua wills; however, not only is he silent about this 
simple point, but also we believe that one of his great challenges in the Social 
Contract is in how to preserve this silence and how to portray the sovereign general 
will as the will of a being that has in itself (i.e. in that will) the principle of its own 
action; a portrait according to which the sovereign people would be, in its will, as 
autonomous as a king.12  
                                                                                                                                            
That said, the general will qua will in the individual is not part (as it were, the generous part) of the 
individual’s particular will (the sum of which, in the state, Rousseau calls “volonté de tous”), 
because the objects of the two wills are, in principle, entirely different objects related to entirely 
different bodies or forms of human existence. Rousseau says that “s’il n’est pas impossible q’une 
volonté particuliere (sic) s’accorde sur quelque point avec la volonté générale, il est impossible au 
moins que cet accord soit durable et constant; car la volonté particuliere tend par sa nature aux 
préférences, et la volonté générale à l’égalité” (SC, II, 1). Schematically we can say that whereas 
the individual’s particular will reponds to objects that are, for most people, immediately identifiable 
and thus passive of being rationally pursued and acquired, the objects of the general will – or at 
least the way to pursue and acquire them – are as abstract as is the notion of that will. The general 
will reflects one’s beliefs rather than engaging one’s rationality: it is then fundamentally a passive 
will. In this sense, individual deliberations that are informed by the general will (the “deliberations 
of the people” or their consent to the laws) are, by and large, mechanical and pre-conditioned acts. 
Rousseau’s sovereign is a moral being that cannot reason because it cannot think, and that cannot 
think because it lacks, as a being, an active will. Cf. SC, II, 3. 
12 Rousseau seems to want to preserve the idea present in Malebranche (the author from whom the 
opposition is borrowed) that the two wills qua wills are equally active principles of causation, 
namely, that the two wills are not different as powers, but only in their objects. But for 
Malebranche, the general will is the form of God’s action... See the first clarification in his Traité 
de la nature et la grace. Here again, one must be careful with Rousseau’s misleading semantics. 
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Hence, in order to learn what sovereignty, as the unity of the moral power in 
the state, really meant for Rousseau, we must inquire about the terms that qualify it. 
This takes us to the second difficulty addressed by Rousseau. By making the people 
the seat of moral power, he formally reunifies in the same body (Corps politique) 
the actor and subject of morality.13 Yet if, on the one hand, Rousseau affirms that 
the general will is the law and that the people as a body have the supreme legislative 
power in the state, on the other, he dissolves the absolute identity between people 
and law by qualifying that view.14 The general will is not a free will because, as we 
have just indicated, its being (the political body) lacks the principle of its own 
action; in other words, it lacks the principle that characterizes individual human 
action, namely, the capacity to anticipate problems or perceive them with the 
mind.15 Thus the legislative “action” of the sovereign people – again, taken as a 
body – is necessarily pre-determined by another will; in spite of its sacred 
importance, it is nothing but a collective re-action to the true political action of the 
                                                
13 Cf. with Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis (On the Laws of War and Peace), II, 9, 6. 
14 “Comment une multitude aveugle qui souvent ne sait ce qu'elle veut, parce qu'elle sait rarement 
ce qui lui est bon, exécuteroit-elle d'elle-même une entreprise aussi grande, aussi difficile qu'un 
sistême de législation? De lui-même le peuple veut toujours le bien, mais de lui-même il ne le voit 
pas toujours. La volonté générale est toujours droite, mais le jugement qui la guide n'est pas 
toujours éclairé. Il faut lui faire voir les objets tels qu'ils sont, quelquefois tels qu'ils doivent lui 
paroitre, lui montrer le bon chemin qu'elle cherche, la garantir de la séduction des volontés 
particulieres, rapprocher à ses yeux les lieux et les tems, balancer l'attrait des avantages présens et 
sensibles, par le danger des maux éloignés et cachés. Les particuliers voient le bien qu'ils rejettent: 
le public veut le bien qu'il ne voit pas. Tous ont également besoin de guides: Il faut obliger les uns à 
conformer leurs volontés à leur raison; il faut apprendre à l'autre à connoitre ce qu'il veut. Alors 
des lumieres publiques résulte l'union de l'entendement et de la volonté dans le corps social, de-là 
l'exact concours des parties, et enfin la plus grande force du tout. Voilà d'où naît la nécessité d'un 
Législateur” (SC, II, 6, p. 380). See also SC, II, 3 (last paragraph and note on Machiavelli). 
15 As Rousseau says, it lacks “prévoyance” (SC, II, 6. p. 380).  
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rulers. Therefore, the ruling exercised by the people is not exactly active ruling. All 
practical significance on the side, it is the fictional and psychological character of 
this “passive ruling” that matters first.  
Ultimately, because Rousseau’s sovereign (Corps politique) is incapable of 
abstract thinking, it cannot be thought of as a person, let alone a moral person, 
unless we distinguish between Corps politique and Etat (or City), and find, 
somewhere in the latter, the principle of the sovereign’s action (i.e. the mind of the 
body).16 Rousseau’s analogy must respect the notion put forward in the Émile that 
the principle of free movement in human beings is not inherent to their bodies, but 
lies in an unfathomable relation to a substance that is external to what they 
understand as their bodies.17 Accordingly, the political body would be, as a body, a 
soulless being. Thus, on the terms of the Social Contract, the moral power of the 
sovereign people is in the passive quality of a being (Corps politique) whose 
essence is purely conservative. In other words, the political body of the people is 
literally the seat of morality in that the people are not more than the receivers and 
keepers of the moral laws. These laws, however, are not made by the government, 
which is in charge of only the particular and practical matters of the state.18 
Rousseau locates the principle of moral action in the extraordinary person of the 
legislator, whose active imagination, thought of as the capacity to anticipate what is 
                                                
16 I.e., unless we find the source of the force behind the pact. See SC, I, 6 (especially Rousseau’s 
note about the distinction between ville and cité, and between bourgeois and Citoyen) with the 
beginning of II, 4, and with the fact that the action of the legislator is outside the pact and thus 
“outside” the city, in II, 7, p. 382. Rousseau compares the political body to the human body in his 
article On Political Economy, p. 244-5. 
17 Émile, p. 576. 
18 SC, III, 1. 
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the case, works inconspicuously as the natural ruling factor in the state.19 Thus, also 
for Rousseau the unity of morality, or the moral freedom of the citizens, depends on 
the unity of moral action; that is to say, it depends on a unity of action that can only 
be found in an actual person. As an extraordinary action about and upon the general 
will of the people, the action of the legislator is, at least from this angle, the most 
sovereign in the state. In the Social Contract, Rousseau does not hide that he is 
Machiavelli’s student: the true prince or ruler must be invisible and all intricacies of 
his (sovereign) moral action should remain foreign to public debate. Sovereignty 
and the importance of its unity are, then, primarily, psychological matters; both 
moral and political power in the state must be studied accordingly. 
Paradoxically, Rousseau could not be more explicit about the almost divine 
and, at any rate, subversive character of the legislator in his famous chapter of the 
Social Contract. It is too facile, and, in light of the Second Discourse, deceitful, to 
identify Rousseau’s own work as the activity of the man he describes in that 
chapter. If he is implying his own action, he is certainly not giving us the full extent 
of it. The chapter is less about Rousseau’s own legislation than about the projected 
action of his addressees in the Social Contract; it is a eulogy of the correct spirit of 
political ruling, of “une entreprise au dessus de la force humaine et, pour l'éxécuter, 
une autorité qui n'est rien.”20 The action of legislators and the detached way in 
                                                
19 SC, II, 7, ‘On the Legislator.’ On the capacity of foresight, see also II, 10: “le législateur (...) ne 
doit pas fonder son jugement sur ce qu’il voit mais sur ce qu’il prévoit (...).” Cf. also Aristotle’s 
Politics, 1252a30.  
20 “Les sages qui veulent parler au vulgaire leur langage au lieu du sien n'en sauroient être 
entendus. Or, il y a mille sortes d'idées qu'il est impossible de traduire dans la langue du peuple. 
Les vues trop générales et les objets trop éloignés sont également hors de sa portée; chaque 
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which they are supposed to rule complicate Rousseau’s psychology of power. They 
make us think of the sort of freedom that a little earlier in the Social Contract he 
says would not concern him.21 Certainly, even if Rousseau’s legislator appears to be 
depicted as a philosophical ruler, one should not confound legislator and 
philosopher, if anything else because, from Rousseau’s perspective, his legislators 
would also be endorsing his own doctrines about first things. In Rousseau, the 
highest sense of this active sovereign power – of sovereignty predicated on 
philosophical (non-egalitarian) freedom and not on pre-established beliefs 
(regardless of whether these beliefs are based on traditional religion or on dogmatic 
rationalism) – is the hidden theme of the introduction to the work that promises to 
address those first things, namely the Epistle Dedicatory to the Second Discourse. 
The question of the passive and active sense of sovereignty is behind the 
following well-known difficulty. If on the one hand we have in the unity of the 
general will, as Rousseau insists in the Social Contract, the unity of a referential 
sovereign power for all political and legislative action in the state, on the other, this 
power must be also understood individually, namely, as the political power writ 
                                                                                                                                            
individu ne goûtant d'autre plan de gouvernement que celui qui se rapporte à son intérêt 
particulier, apperçoit difficilement les avantages qu'il doit retirer des privations continuelles 
qu'imposent les bonnes loix. Pour qu'un peuple naissant put goûter les saines maximes de la 
politique et suivre les regles fondamentales de la raison d'Etat, il faudroit que l'effet put devenir 
cause, que l'esprit social, qui doit être l'ouvrage de l'institution, présidât à l'institution même; et 
que les hommes fussent avant les loix ce qu'ils doivent devenir par elles. Ainsi donc le Législateur 
ne pouvant employer ni la force ni le raisonnement, c'est une nécessité qu'il recoure à une autorité 
d'un autre ordre, qui puisse entraîner sans violence et persuader sans convaincre” (SC, II, 7, p. 
383; see also I, 3, Du droit du plus fort).  Cf. this passage with Darius’ response to Otanes in 
Herodotus quoted above, and with SDED, §6. See also On Political Economy, pp. 246-255. 
21 Namely, philosophical freedom. SC, I, 8. 
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large that each citizen might or might not have according to opportunity, 
disposition, ambition, intelligence and consciousness of freedom. This latter 
specifically active side of sovereignty would be proportional to the effectiveness of 
the non-institutional (i.e. political or legislative) action that one might have in 
society as a whole; as such, sovereignty would be unequally distributed in the state, 
something impossible according to Rousseau’s precept of its indivisibility.22 In the 
Social Contract, Rousseau circumscribes the power of both government and people 
with his re-definition of sovereignty; the concept becomes apparently dissociated 
from (or at least incoherent with) the action that it necessarily entails – an action 
that can be only partially explained by Rousseau’s mysterious figure of the 
Legislator. Even if we account for all that Rousseau says in the chapter on the 
Legislator, and no matter how hard we try to make that cohere with Rousseau’s 
egalitarian theory of sovereignty, the paradox would persist if left in the terms of the 
Social Contract. Rousseau’s republicanism would not be essentially different from 
Machiavelli’s.  
Naturally, in light of the philosophical debate of the time and of Rousseau’s 
profound consideration of it, this conclusion is both historically and philosophically 
insufficient. We have seen that Rousseau’s treatment of the origins of human 
inequality is directly related and, ultimately, fundamental to the understanding of 
this question; it takes more than the mere acceptance of the permanent tension 
between the natural inequality of souls, and of republicanism as the most natural 
form of government, to make sense of Rousseau’s political philosophy.  
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